Showing posts with label economism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economism. Show all posts

Wednesday, 21 October 2015

"The Scourge of Managerialism" - Generic Management, the Manager's Coup D'Etat, Mission-Hostile Management Rolled Up, as Described by Some Men from Down Under

I just found an important article that in the June, 2015 issue of the Medical Journal of Australia(1) that sums up many of ways the leadership of medical (and most other organizations) have gone wrong.  It provides a clear, organized summary of "managerialism" in health care, which roughly rolls up what we have called generic management, the manager's coup d'etat, and aspects of mission-hostile management into a very troubling but coherent package.  I will summarize the main points, giving relevant quotes.

Recent Developments in Business Management Dogma Have Gravely Affected Health Care

Many health practitioners will consider the theory of business management to be of obscure relevance to clinical practice. They might therefore be surprised to learn that the changes that have occurred in this discipline over recent years have driven a fundamental revolution that has already transformed their daily lives, arguably in perverse and harmful ways.

These Changes Have Been Largely Anechoic

these changes have by and large been introduced insidiously, with little public debate, under the guise of unquestioned 'best practice'.

See our previous discussions of the anechoic effect, how discussion of facts and ideas that threaten what we can now call the managerialist power structure of health care are not considered appropriate for polite conversation, or public discussion

Businesses are Now Run by Professional Managers, Not Owners

The traditional control by business owners in Europe and North America gave way during the 19th century to corporate control of companies. This led to the emergence of a new group of professionals whose job it was to perform the administrative tasks of production. Consequently, management became identified as both a skill and a profession in its own right, requiring specific training and based on numerous emergent theories of practice.

These Changes Were Enabled by Neoliberalism (or Market Fundamentalism, or Economism)

Among these many vicissitudes, a decisive new departure occurred with the advent of what became known as neoliberalism in the 1980s (sometimes called Thatcherism because of its enthusiastic adoption by the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom). A reaction against Keynesian economic policy and the welfare state, this harshly reinstated the regulatory role of the market in all aspects of economic activity and led directly to the generalisation of the standards and practices of management from the private to the public sectors. The radical cost cutting and privatisation of social services that followed the adoption of neoliberal principles became a public policy strategy rigorously embraced by governments around the world, including successive Liberal and Labor governments in Australia.

Note that this is a global problem, at least of English speaking developed countries.  The article focuses on Australia, but we have certainly seen parallels in the US and the UK.  Further, note that we have discussed this concept, also termed market fundamentalism or economism.

Managerialism Provides a One-Size Fits All Approach to the Management of All Organizations, in Which Money Becomes the Central Consideration

The particular system of beliefs and practices defining the roles and powers of managers in our present context is what is referred to as managerialism. This is defined by two basic tenets: (i) that all social organisations must conform to a single structure; and (ii) that the sole regulatory principle is the market. Both ideas have far-reaching implications. The claim that every organisation — whether it is a mining company, a hospital, a school, a professional association or a charity — must be structured according to a single model, conforming to a single set of legislative requirements, not so long ago would have seemed bizarre, but is now largely taken for granted. The principle of the market has become the solitary, or dominant, criterion for decision making, and other criteria, such as loyalty, trust, care and a commitment to critical reflection, have become displaced and devalued. Indeed, the latter are viewed as quaint anachronisms with less importance and meaning than formal procedures or standards that can be readily linked to key performance indicators, budget end points, efficiency markers and externally imposed targets.

Originally conceived as a strategy to manage large and increasingly complex organisations, in the contemporary world, no aspect of social life is now considered to be exempt from managerialist principles and practices. Policies and practices have become highly standardised, emphasising market-style incentives, devolved budgets and outsourcing, replacement of centralised budgeting with departmentalised user-pays systems, casualisation of labour, and an increasingly hierarchical approach to every aspect of institutional and social organisation.

We have frequently discussed how professional generic managers have taken over health care (sometimes referred to as the manager's coup d'etat.)  We have noted that generic managers often seem ill-informed about if not overtly hostile to the values of health care professionals and the missions of health care organizations.

Very Adverse Effects Result in Health Care and Academics

In the workplace, the authority of management is intensified, and behaviour that previously might have been regarded as bullying becomes accepted good practice. The autonomous discretion of the professional is undermined, and cuts in staff and increases in caseload occur without democratic consultation of staff.   Loyal long-term staff are dismissed and often humiliated, and rigorous monitoring of the performance of the remaining employees focuses on narrowly defined criteria relating to attainment of financial targets, efficiency and effectiveness.

The principles of managerialist theory have been applied equally to the public and the private sectors. In the health sector, it has precipitated a shift in power from clinicians to managers and a change in emphasis from a commitment to patient care to a primary concern with budgetary efficiency. Increasingly, public hospital funding is tied to reductions in bed stays and other formal criteria, and all decision making is subject to review relating to time and money. Older and chronically ill people become seen not as subjects of compassion, care and respect but as potential financial burdens. This does not mean that the system is not still staffed by skilled clinicians committed to caring for the sick and needy; it is rather that it has become increasingly harder for these professionals to do their jobs as they would like.

In the university sector, the story is much the same; all activities are assessed in relation to the prosperity of the institution as a business enterprise rather than as a social one. Education is seen as a commodity like any other, with priority given to vocational skills rather than intellectual values. Teaching and research become subordinated to administration, top-down management and obsessively applied management procedures. Researchers are required to generate external funding to support their salaries, to focus on short-term problems, with the principal purpose being to enhance the university's research ranking. The focus shifts from knowledge to grant income, from ideas to publications, from speculation to conformity, from collegiality to property, and from academic freedom to control. Rigid hierarchies are created from heads of school to deans of faculties and so on. Academic staff — once encouraged to engage in public life — are forbidden to speak publicly without permission from their managers.

Again, we have discussed these changes largely in the US context.  We have noted how modern health care leadership has threatened primary care.  We have noted how vulnerable patients become moreso in the current system, e.g., see our discussions of for-profit hospices.  We have discussed attacks on academic freedom and free speech, the plight of whistle-blowers, education that really is deceptive marketing, academic institutions mired in individual and institutional conflicts of interest, and the suppression and manipulation of clinical research.  We have noted how health care leaders have become increasingly richly rewarded, apparently despite, or perhaps because of the degradation of the health care mission over which they have presided.

The Case Study

The article provided a case study of the apparent demise of the Royal Australasian College of Physicians as a physician led organization, leading to alleged emphasis on "extreme secrecy and 'commercial in confidence," growth of conflicts of interest, risk aversion on controversial issues.  When members of the organization called for a vote to increase transparency and accountability, the hired management apparently sued their own members.

Authors' Summary

Whether the damage done to the larger institutions — the public hospitals and the universities — can be reversed, or even stemmed, is a bigger question still. The most that can be said is that even if the present, damaging phase of managerial theory and practice eventually passes, its destructive effects will linger on for many years to come.

My Summary

I now believe that the most important cause of US health care dysfunction, and likely of global health care dysfunction, are the problems in leadership and governance we have often summarized (leadership that is ill-informed, ignorant or hostile to the health care mission and professional values, incompetent, self-interested, conflicted or outright criminal or corrupt, and governance that lacks accountability, transparency, honesty, and ethics.)  In turn, it appears that these problems have been generated by the twin plagues of managerialism (generic management, the manager's coup d'etat) and neoliberalism (market fundamentalism, economism) as applied to health care.  It may be the many of the larger problems in US and global society also can be traced back to these sources.

We now see our problems in health care as part of a much larger whole, which partly explains why efforts to address specific health care problems country by country have been near futile.  We are up against something much larger than what we thought when we started Health Care Renewal in 2005.  But at least we should now be able join our efforts to those in other countries and in other sectors.   

ADDENDUM (30 October, 2015) - This post was republished on the Naked Capitalism blog.  See the comments, which are particularly interesting and important.  

Reference

1.  Komesaroff PA, Kerridge IH, Isaacs D, Brooks PM.  The scourge of managerialism and the Royal Australasian College of Physicians.  Med J Aust 2015; 202: 519- 521.  Link here.

Musical Diversion

We have to leaven this dismal post with the 1980 live version of "Down Under" by Men at Work

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Friday, 28 August 2015

You Can Check Out Any Time You Like, But You Can Never Leave - Duke and UNC Allegedly Agreed Not to Hire Each Other's Faculty

We have intermittently discussed the worsening plight of physicians trying to provide clinical care as employees of large organizations.  Such corporate physicians are likely to be squeezed between professional values that put the patient first, and management that puts revenue first.   Physicians employed by large corporations may find their values increasingly at risk as these organizations adapt the tactics of the robber barons.

Now it appears that even ostensibly genteel academic medical institutions may be adapting these tactics.

Allegations of Anti-Competitive Faculty Employment Practices at Duke and University of North Carolina Medical Schools


The story first appeared with little fanfare in the (Duke) Chronicle in June.  An assistant professor at the UNC School of Medicine was interested in a position, also at the assistant professor level, at nearby Duke.

[Dr Danielle] Seaman had been in email communication with UNC’s Chief of Cardiothoracic Imaging beginning in 2011, when she expressed interest in a radiology position at the UNC School of Medicine, and the chief of the division encouraged her to apply, the case file describes. In 2012, Seaman was invited to visit the campus and toured the radiology department at UNC.

However,

When Seaman expressed interest in the assistant professor position again in early 2015, however, the chief responded in an email by saying he had just received confirmation that 'lateral moves of faculty between Duke and UNC are not permitted' as per a 'guideline' set by the schools’ deans.

In a later email, the chief also described to Seaman the reason the agreement was created—Duke had tried several years ago to recruit the entire bone marrow transplant team from UNC, and UNC was forced to pay them a large retention package to keep them.
Both emails are included in the filing by Dr Seaman's lawyers.


Imagine the nerve of medical faculty thinking they should be paid more by the current employer because another institution was willling to recruit them and pay them that much.
 
An Agreement Comfortable for the Deans, but Disadvantageous for Their Faculty

An August article in the Chronicle suggested that the top leaders of the two medical schools felt that the "no-poaching" agreement was mutually beneficial. 

According to the case file, Seaman became aware of the policy earlier this year, but the UNC chief of cardiothoracic imaging—who is unnamed in the file—believed the policy had been in place for several years after Duke had previously tried to recruit the entire bone marrow transplant team from UNC.

'The general rule was that we didn’t recruit there and they didn’t recruit at Duke—it certainly was in the years I was in the administration,' said John Burness, former senior vice president for public affairs and government relations from 1991 to 2008. 'I don’t know if it’s ever been a formal agreement, but it’s certainly been a practice over a long period of time.'

Burness—now a visiting professor of the practice in the Sanford School of Public Policy—noted that he could not recall an instance in which a faculty member from UNC was recruited to Duke during Nannerl Keohane’s tenure as president of the University from 1993 to 2004. Keohane also confirmed that during her time as president the University avoided poaching of UNC faculty.

Also,

'The question of whether Duke and UNC [or N.C. State] should attempt to recruit faculty from the other campus was always somewhat delicate,' Keohane, now Laurance S. Rockefeller distinguished visiting professor of public affairs at Princeton University, wrote in an email.

The Chronicle found a Duke Law professor who provided a comfortable rationale for the agreement between the two schools,

Despite the case file’s claims that such a policy is detrimental to faculty from both schools, Clark Havighurst—a former professor in the Duke University School of Law who taught healthcare policy and antitrust law for more than 40 years—also believes that this agreement would be beneficial to both institutions in the long run.

'You’d probably find relatively few instances where Duke and Carolina have poached each other’s faculty,' Havighurst wrote in an email. 'This is probably a matter of mutual restraint as much as explicit agreement, however, as each school or department would hesitate to irritate the faculty at the neighboring institution, thus undermining collegial and personal relations that are undoubtedly beneficial to each.'


What the soothing words about mutual benefit and collegiality leave out is that while the school administrations benefit from less disruption, they also likely benefited by being able to pay their faculty, especially junior faculty less. As Dr Seaman argued in her filing, as per the June Chronicle article,

The suit—filed June 9 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina—contends that the no-hire agreement had the “intended and actual effect” of suppressing competition and employee wages, therefore violating federal and state anti-trust laws.

An Aside, the Non-Poaching Agreement Defended by One of the Key Advocates for Market Fundamentalism in Medicine

As an aside, Professor Havinghurst turns out to be one of key architects of the transformation of the US health care from a regulated system emphasizing health care provided by individual professionals and small non-profit institutions to our current laissez faire commercialized system.  It is more than ironic that while Prof Havinghurst now scoffs at applying anti-trust law to alleged collusion by big employers, per M Gregg Bloche in the Stanford Law Review(1),

Since the mid- 1970s, market-oriented scholars have challenged a broad range of legal principles previously assumed to sustain the trustworthiness of physicians and health systems. Doctrines shielding physicians from antitrust law, insulating them from insurers' and hospitals' influence over clinical practice, and reinforcing the precept of undivided clinical loyalty to patients came under attack as protection for the medical profession at consumers' expense. These scholars, including Clark Havighurst, Richard Epstein, and Mark Hall, urge contractual ordering of clinical standards of care; relationships among physicians, hospitals, and health care payers; and physicians' conflicting obligations to patients, payers, and other third parties.

Again, Havinghurst appears to have been one of the principal, if not the principal advocate to use anti-trust law against small groups of physicians, and against the notion that physicians can promulgate their own codes of ethical conduct.  In an introduction to an article by Havinghurst in Health Affairs in 1983.(2)
For a decade or more, Clark Havighurst has been a philosophical thorn in the side of organized medicine, preaching a view of the health sphere that rejects decision making by professional self-regulation in favor of a system based on marketplace principles.
Note that in retrospect, this article seemed to stake out Health Affair's position as an important organ to promote market fundamentalism in health care. 

How convenient that Prof Havinghurst is still affiliated with Duke and in a position to defend his university's treatment of other faculty.


I urge you to scan Health Care Renewal to see how the change from professional self-regulation of ethics to the free rein of the laissez faire marketplace turned out. Look here for our first reporting on the late Dr Arnold Relman's discussion of how medicine was pressured to accept commercialization, and how that acceptance has since decimated our core values.  Look here for our discussion of the fallacy of the perfect market in health care.  Look here for a rebuttal from an authority we do  not often quote of the concept of health care as a commodity versus a calling. 

Summary

Note that the outcome of the lawsuit against Duke and UNC is unknown.  The allegations it makes are not proven.  However, I chose to discuss it because the evidence, particularly the emails reproduced in the court filing, seems pretty strong that the two schools did have an actual agreement not to compete in the hiring of faculty, and the argument that his suppressed faculty wages and opportunity is prety strong and obvious.

Academic physicians, particularly at elite institutions, may feel they are in a rarefied atmosphere separate from the hurley burley or everyday health care.  They may feel they are protected from, and can even ignore the health care dysfunction we discuss on Health Care Renewal.  They certainly may not think of themselves as "wage slaves" from the era of trusts, monopolies, and robber barons.

But this case exhibits that academic medical institutions are getting closer to the ruthless world of poorly regulated, commercialized, market fundamentalist health care.  Talk about collegiality is nice, but it seems pretty clear that the "non-poaching" agreement between Duke and UNC may have reflected collegiality among top medical school leadership, but limited their faculty salaries and individual faculty members' choices and opportunities.  This seems like another example, however soft spoken and genteel, of the leaders of health care organizations putting the interests of their own ingroup ahead of the interests of the larger organizations and the mission they are supposed to serve.

It is time for even academic physicians to realize that they are not protected from the troubles of the larger world.  If they truly believe in their professional values, if they really care about patients' and the public's health, and about medical and health care science and education, they will have to start speaking up, or they will end up wage slaves of the new health care robber barons along with nearly everyone else.   

To lighten things up at the end, the Eagles doing Hotel California live in 1977 -



"We are all prisoners here, of our own device"

References
1.  Bloche MG. Trust and betrayal in the medical marketplace.  Stanford Law Review 2002; 55: 919-954.  Link here.
2.  Havinghurst C. The doctors' trust.  self-regulation and the law.  Health Affairs 1983; 2: 64-76.  Link here.
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