Law and Order? - Bristol-Myers-Squibb Settles Case Alleging Fraud and Kickbacks, No Admissions of Guilt, No Individuals Charged

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Law and Order? - Bristol-Myers-Squibb Settles Case Alleging Fraud and Kickbacks, No Admissions of Guilt, No Individuals Charged

Unknown 7/22/2016 Komentar

Introduction 

Donald Trump, Republican candidate for the US presidency last week announced he is the "law and order" candidate, accompanied by then vice presidential contender and New Jersey Governor Chris Christie.



I wonder if all this interest in law and order will lead to increasing the effectiveness of enforcing laws when large US health care corporations are accused?

For years, we have been watching a parade of legal settlements made by big US health care organizations.  These have included the biggest drug companies, biotechnology companies, device companies, insurance companies, etc, etc.  Many involved accusations of fraud, kickbacks, and other seeming crimes.

In many cases, the alleged white collar crimes could have resulted in harms to patients.  For example giving physicians kickbacks to promote particular drugs or devices could have led them to prescribe treatments that could have been useless for particular patients, yet subjected those patients to risks of adverse effects.

Yet few of these cases were resolved with findings of guilt.  Many resulted in financial penalties for the accused organization, but which were tiny compared to that organization's revenue.  Almost none resulted in any consequences for the people in the organization who might have individually profited from the alleged actions, particularly the top executives who were making millions of bonuses, suggesting their apparent impunity.

This parade of settlements does not look like instantiation of law and order to me, in my humble opinion.

Bristol-Myers-Squibb Settles Allegations of Kickbacks

And the parade continues.  The latest case, which barely was noticed in the media, involved huge pharmaceutical company Bristol-Myers-Squibb.  It was best documented by Ed Silverman in Stat,

After nearly a decade of litigation, Bristol-Myers Squibb on Monday agreed to pay $30 million to settle charges by California officials of paying kickbacks to induce doctors to prescribe several of its medicines.

The settlement with the California Department of Insurance stemmed from a whistleblower lawsuit that was filed in 2007 by three former Bristol-Myers employees. They alleged that from 1997 through 2003, the drug maker used a wide variety of inducements to generate revenue. The state later joined the lawsuit in 2011 and, last year, the former employees were dismissed from the case by a state court.

The kickbacks included box seats at sporting events where doctors were given food, drinks, and parking; enrollment in a Los Angeles Lakers basketball camp for doctors and their children; prepaid golf outings at luxury courses; tickets for doctors and their families to see Broadway shows in California cities; and lavish dinners, resort hotel trips, and concert tickets for doctors who were especially big prescribers.

Among the many medicines for which doctors were persuaded to write more prescriptions were the Pravachol cholesterol pill; the Plavix blood thinner; the Abilify antipsychotic; the Glucophage diabetes treatment; and the BuSpar antianxiety drug.

A Bristol-Myers spokesman wrote us that the company denied any wrongdoing, but also noted that the firm began adhering to a voluntary industry marketing code in 2002. 'We are pleased to put this matter behind us so that we can focus on making transformational medicines for patients battling serious diseases,' he wrote.

Note that in this case, as is typical for such cases, the financial penalty seems to be minimal compared to the company's total revenues (more than $16.5 billion according to Google finance.)  The company was allowed to deny wrongdoing (although in absence of same, why should it pay a fine?)  No individuals who might have personally profited from the actions in question suffered any negative consequences.

Why Not More Severe Penalties for a Repeat Offender?

Furthermore, the outcome seems to have nothing to do with the accused's track record.  Anyone who follows the news knows that in general, penalties in criminal cases are likely to be different for first offenders and habitual criminals.  Penalties in civil cases also may depend on the defendant's track record.

However, this case, like most other cases involving big health care organizations, seems to have occurred in a vacuum, separate from the company's track record.  Yet a bit of searching reveals that BMS, like many other big health care corporations, seems to have a pretty bad record.


- In 2003, for $617 million, BMS settled suits alleging it tried to prevent competition from low cost generic versions of its products Taxol and Buspar (per the NY Times).
- In 2004, for $150 million, BMS settled suits by the SEC alleging accounting fraud (per the NY Times here).
- In 2007, BMS paid a $1 million dollar penalty while pleading guilty to lying to federal agents about a deal with the Canadian drug company Apotex (per Law360).   In 2009, it paid additional financial penalties in response to a US Federal Trade Commission charge about this case (per the FTC).
 - In 2007, for $515 million, BMS settled a suit alleging it used kickbacks to induce use of Abilify for dementia and by childeren, despite evidence that the drug was not suitable for either.  The settlement included a five year corporate integrity agreement.  (Look at our post here).
 - In 2014, BMS settled allegations its subsidiary Lantheus Medical Imaging Inc evaded state taxes (per the Corporate Crime Reporter)
 - In 2015, Bristol-Myers-Squibb settled allegations by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that it bribed physicians in China to induce them to prescribe its drugs.  (Look at our post here).

(Parenthetically, I apologize that many of these previous cases have not been previously mentioned on Health Care Renewal.  For that I apologize.  Yet some simple Google searches were all that were required to find them.)

Why did none of the law enforcers involved in the later cases do similar searches, and why did the company's track record not figure into how the current case was resolved?

Chris Christie and the Rise of the Deferred Prosecution or Corporate Integrity Agreement for Too Big to Jail Organizations

The answer to that will not be easy.  At best, it now seems to be standard operating procedure for law enforcement to treat big health care organizations very gently.  However, there is one clue in BMS track record that it might be helpful to discuss in this political season.


Note that in one of the biggest settlements listed above, BMS agreed to a corporate integrity agreement.  According to a 2015 article in Time, the use of such agreements, coupled with apparently large fines but no other penalties, for corporate offenders was pioneered by none other than then US Attorney Chris Christie, (who spoke in the video above).

Christie was apparently horrifed by the criminal prosecution of Arthur Andersen, a big accounting firm, in the wake of the Enron scandal.  At that time, federal prosecutors acted so that

The company itself—not its employees who might have been responsible—was indicted and found guilty. The trial put the company out of business. The conviction was overturned on appeal, but not before the company’s reputation was destroyed and its employees forever branded with a Scarlet Letter, representing Andersen, not Adultery.

The article described Mr Christie's response:

Christie had watched wall-to-wall coverage of the case, and it made him uncomfortable. He decided he did not want to run his office in that way. Instead of bulldozing New Jersey companies facing smaller-scale fraud cases and leaving their employees out of work, Christie preferred to build a case against the firms and then bring their leaders in for a take-it-or-leave-it chat. Ultimately, seven New Jersey corporations accepted deferred prosecution agreements, or deals with the government that let them avoid trial in exchange for the companies hiring independent monitors to oversee operations and put in place guards against future wrongdoing.

Christie often was relieved they were open to the deals. 'Put the company itself out of business? Lose all the jobs?' Christie asked when asked about the alternatives. He pointed to a corruption case he built against St. Barnabas Health Care System, the state’s largest, for double- and over-billing Medicare and Medicaid services. St. Barnabas paid $265 million to settle the case. 'What are you going to do?' Christie asks. 'Close the hospital, the largest hospital that serves the poor?'

Neither Time, nor Mr Christie seemed to notice that this reasoning involved a logical fallacy, a false dilemma.  True, there are two options:
1) criminally prosecute the whole company
2) allow the company to operate under a deferred prosecution or corporate integrity agreement.
But there is a third option:
3) Criminally prosecute the individuals in the company who were most involved in and most benefited from the bad behavior.

So in the St Barnabas example, what he could have done was prosecute the people at St Barnabas who were most responsible for the over-billing, and let the hospital itself go with a fine. Mr Christie for some reason never seemed to think about that option.  Neither have most other US law enforcers who have dealt with large organizations since.

Ironically, Mr Christie has got himself into some ethical hot water because of how he managed corporate integrity or deferred prosecution agreements involving BMS and other health care organizations.  Some have alleged that Mr Christie found some other advantages to using such agreements, advantages that accrued mainly to Mr Christie and his cronies.  As the Time article noted, re BMS

As part of its penance, the company also proposed paying for a professor of business ethics at a law school. The company initially offered to pick up the tab at a school in New York. No way, Christie said. 'This is a New Jersey case. Pick a New Jersey school,' Christie replied. Rutgers already had such a program, and there was only one other law school in New Jersey. It just happened to be Christie’s alma mater, Seton Hall. 'It couldn’t have mattered less to me,' Christie says. 'I didn’t get anything out of it. I was long graduated from Seton Hall.' (The Justice Department signed off on the agreement, but would later limit U.S. Attorneys’ ability to negotiate such deals.)

Christie’s critics pounced on the $5 million payment to Seton Hall, and to this day are trying to use it as a way to suggest he is another pay-to-play New Jersey politician.

And in two other health care cases:

Christie hired former Attorney General John Ashcroft, his one-time boss, to monitor Zimmer Inc., one of the firms that settled with the government. In turn, Ashcroft’s company charged between $1.5 million and $2.9 million a month to monitor the medical device company. By the time Christie arrived in Washington to answer lawmakers’ questions, The Ashcroft Group had earned $52 million on that case. 'To me, that is outrageous,' Rep. Steve Cohen chided Christie. 'I don’t care what you did. It is not worth $52 million,' the Tennessee Democrat continued. 'Even if you took steroids and hit 70 home runs, it is not worth $52 million.'

Lawmakers also wanted to know why he named David Kelley to a post to oversee the Bristol-Myers Squibb settlement. Kelley two years earlier, as a former prosecutor, declined to bring securities fraud charges against Todd Christie, the future-Governor’s brother. Was this payback for sparing a Christie Family?

Mr Christie defended his conduct in the BMS case:

Christie to this day says he has no regrets about the deferred prosecution agreements, including the professor position. To him, it matters less about whether there was a conviction than whether the illegal behavior ended. 'The goal as the U.S. Attorney is to stop the conduct,' Christie says. 'If you’ve stopped the conduct, you’ve won.'

But of course the current case, and those involving BMS from 2014 and 2015, shows that Mr Christie's corporate integrity agreement did not "stop the conduct" at least in the case of BMS.  That rationale was fallacious too.


Summary

Now that political campaigners are once again shouting about law and order, maybe this is the time to call for effective and equal enforcement of the laws regarding white collar crime in health care.  For years, we have watched perpetrators of small scale Medicaid and Medicare fraud go to jail.  Yet when big companies are accused of big scale crime, almost no one ever goes to jail.

It is time for equal justice for all in health care.

Let me end with a quote from a report by Senator Elizabeth Warren (D - Massachusetts) published in January, 2016, entitled "Rigged Justice: 2016 - How Weak Enforcement Lets Corporate Offenders Off Easy."

 Laws are effective only to the extent they are enforced. A law on the books has little impact if prosecution is highly unlikely.

This country devotes substantial resources to the prosecution of crimes such as murder, assault, kidnapping, burglary and theft, both in an effort to deter future criminal activity and to provide victims with some degree of justice. Strong enforcement of corporate criminal laws serves similar goals: to deter future criminal activity by making would-be lawbreakers think twice before breaking the law and, sometimes, by helping victims recover from their injuries.

When government regulators and prosecutors fail to pursue big corporations or their executives who violate the law, or when the government lets them off with a slap on the wrist, corporate criminals have free rein to operate outside the law. They can game the system, cheat families, rip off taxpayers, and even take actions that result in the death of innocent victims—all with no serious consequences.

The failure to punish big corporations or their executives when they break the law undermines the foundations of this great country: If justice means a prison sentence for a teenager who steals a car, but it means nothing more than a sideways glance at a CEO who quietly engineers the theft of billions of dollars, then the promise of equal justice under the law has turned into a lie. The failure to prosecute big, visible crimes has a corrosive effect on the fabric of democracy and our shared belief that we are all equal in the eyes of the law.

Under the current approach to enforcement, corporate criminals routinely escape meaningful prosecution for their misconduct. This is so despite the fact that the law is unambiguous: if a corporation has violated the law, individuals within the corporation must also have violated the law. If the corporation is subject to charges of wrongdoing, so are those in the corporation who planned, authorized or took the actions. But even in cases of flagrant corporate law breaking, federal law enforcement agencies – and particularly the Department of Justice (DOJ) – rarely seek prosecution of individuals. In fact, federal agencies rarely pursue convictions of either large corporations or their executives in a court of law. Instead, they agree to criminal and civil settlements with corporations that rarely require any admission of wrongdoing and they let the executives go free without any individual accountability.

And end with a video of her speaking on the subject.

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There They Go Again - the New England Medical Journal Publishes another Rant, this Time about Power Morcellation

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There They Go Again - the New England Medical Journal Publishes another Rant, this Time about Power Morcellation

Unknown 3/21/2016 Komentar

In 2015, we noted (here and here) that the New England Journal of Medicine seemed to have been reduced to publishing rants about "pharmascolds" who are paranoid about conflicts of interest. Now there they go again....

Background

The sad story about the risks of power morcellation for the treatment of fibroids has received considerable media attention.  The state of play through July, 2014 was described in a series of articles in the Cancer Letter of July 4, 2014. (Look here.)

Uterine fibroids are a common affliction of women.  Their preferred surgical management had changed from open surgery to minimally invasive surgery, sometimes robotically performed, and often incorporating a device called a power morcellator to pulverize the fibroids, allowing the use of small incision.  However, after a patient at the Brigham and Womens' Hospital (BWH) in Boston, part of the Partners Healthcare system, was found to have disseminated sarcoma post power morcellation, most likely because the machine spread tumor cells throughout her abdomen, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an advisory against using the procedure morcellation, and despite some controversy, the procedure is now uncommonly used.

The patient so severely affected was Dr Amy Reed, an anesthesiologist at the BWH.  Her husband, a cardiothoracic surgeon at BWH, launched a campaign to reduce the use of power morcellation.  His pursuit of this campaign underlined an important part of the history, 

The use of power morcellation was effectively allowed by the FDA in the absence of any controlled trials meant to assess its safety or efficacy in this context.  The device was deemed moderate risk and approved through the 510(k) process because it appeared similar to previously allowed devices, even though older devices were not used to remove fibroids.  The Cancer Letter quoted Dr David Challoner, who was on a relevant Institute of Medicine (IOM) committee, saying allowing the device on the market was 

one more example of the clearance of a device for a use, not approval, based on predicates already in the market, that is, prior morcellators for other uses

The New England Journal of Medicine Weighs In - with a Special Pleading

Once again, NEJM national correspondent Dr Lisa Rosenbaum had a contrarian view(1).  As we discussed here and here, last year Dr Rosenbaum wrote three commentaries suggesting the importance of conflicts of interest in health care had been overblown, especially with respect to medical journals.

This time, she argued that the FDA overreacted to the tragic case of  Dr Amy Reed. In particular, she was afraid that the risks of power morcellation were exaggerated, and based on poor quality data,

Several experts argued that these risk estimates were too high and that it was riskier to expose 100,000 or so women per year to open procedures rather than laparoscopic ones. Since the rarity of LMS precludes a randomized trial, however, risk estimates had to be based primarily on retrospective case series of varying rigor. Some studies were poorly stratified for risk factors such as age, and others spanned decades during which diagnostic criteria for LMS had changed.

Dr Rosenbaum failed to mention that the lack of good data about the risks of power morcellation stemmed from the lack of any large, well designed randomized controlled trials done to assess its benefits and harms. Of course, since the device's use was allowed by the FDA 510(k) process without any requirement for trial data, there was no incentive for device companies, at least, to do such trials.

Nonetheless, Dr Rosenbaum also argued the benefits of power morcellation were downplayed. 

the benefits of morcellation are largely invisible and thus 'unavailable.' Who sees the women who undergo a minimally invasive procedure, recover quickly, and avoid losing income? What does a pulmonary embolus, a wound infection, or a hemorrhage that didn’t happen look like? You can’t post pictures of these nonevents on social media. But their nonoccurrence is why we ought to be celebrating.

A March 18, 2016 article asked my opinion about Dr Rosenbaum's use of the clinical evidence.

'She talks about the data concerning the possible harms of power morcellation and argues that that data comes from relatively low-quality studies, not randomized, controlled trials, and that it is hard to tell the actual rate of harms, in particular, the dissemination of cancer. On the other hand, Dr. Rosenbaum implies that the benefits of power morcellation are well known.'

'She writes initially that power morcellation allows the treatment of fibroids to be ‘done more efficiently and effectively,’ she later implies that power morcellation is less invasive, leads to quicker recovery, avoids income loss, and furthermore, reduces the likelihood of pulmonary embolus, wound infection, or hemorrhage.'

'However, she doesn’t provide any data about these ostensible benefits. A quick search suggested that there are no good randomized, controlled trials that assessed benefits. Her argument that we have abandoned a beneficial treatment based on poor quality and perhaps exaggerated the data about its harms—that does not seem to be supported by any clear data about its benefits.'

I rendered that opinion on March 18 before I read a Cochrane Collaboration review of minimally invasive surgery versus open surgery for fibroids(2).  However, that review does not seem to contradict my statements above.  The review included some patients who were treated using power morcellation, but apparently did not find any studies that assessed patients treated only with power morcellation with those treated only with an alternative.  Even so, it only included nine studies that enrolled a total of 808 patients.  Thus, I think it is reasonable to say that there have not been any large, well-done randomized controlled trials of power morcellation versus other treatments of fibroids.  Even so, while the review found some advantages for minimally invasive surgery versus open surgery in terms of short-term post-operative pain and length of hospital stay, it did not address pulmonary embolus, wound infection, or hemorrhage directly.  So while Dr Rosenbaum was right to say that the evidence from clinical research about the magnitude and nature of harms of power morcellation was relatively weak, the evidence about its benefits is also weak. Thus, Dr Rosenbaum's argument that the harms have been exaggerated while the benefits were overlooked was based on a logical fallacy, special pleading. 

This special pleading seemed the basis for her claim that

women may suffer more from its [power morcellation's] disuse.

So, as I was quoted by the Cancer Letter,

'The NEJM is perhaps the most prestigious, most highly regarded English-language medical journal in the world,' Poses said. 'It is, in many cases, viewed as the standard for scholarly medical journals. I am a bit surprised that it published a commentary by its own national correspondent that appears to make an argument—about benefits and harms of treatment and policymaking about treatment—that does not have a clear discussion of the data that support or fail to support either the benefits or the harms of the treatment.'

More Arguments, Less Justification

Dr Rosenbaum insisted that her concerns were about the question,

How do you use data to clarify tough trade-offs when the most compelling narratives paint evidence-based reasoning itself as an anathema?

However, she did not demonstrate an approach to policy making on power morcellation that was more evidence-based than what has transpired so far.

In addition, Dr Rosenbaum decried challenges to health care innovation from "the power of tragic stories," and the title of her commentary ("N-of-1 policymaking") suggested that the the FDA approach to power morcellation was based on a single tragic story.  Yet an FDA spokesperson insisted in the March 18, 2016 Cancer Letter article,

The FDA evaluated the available data at the time and determined that it was of sufficient quality and reliability to support our November 14, 2014 decision.

Furthermore, Dr Rosenbaum expressed concerns that power morcellation met its "demise" because of unwarranted concerns about the "greedy corporation," "medicine's corruption," and "industry greed."   Yet she ignored arguments that these concerns were not unreasonable.    

First, the commentary ignored claims that power morcellation procedures were very lucrative, e.g., those in the 2014 Cancer Letter article

'This is a very lucrative procedure.'  [Dr] Noorchashm, [Dr Reed's husband] said.  'The procedure itself bills $30,000 to $50,000, depending on the center.'

Nor did she argue against the assertion in the same article that device companies used political influence to promote their very expensive product,

There is a very strong pressure from the device industry to get into the market quickly.

The device companies have been able to make [the 510(k) process that allowed power morcellation] survive politically over the ensuing 40 years.

Also, Dr Rosenbaum's NEJM commentary failed to counter the assertion by Dr Noorchashm that the device manufacturers concealed the risks of power morcellation.

Device manufacturers clearly knew of the cancer risk.  You can see warnings about malignant tumors in the Ethicon and Karl Storz user manuals.  Clearly, their lawyers had warned them to put them there to avoid liability.  The bottom line is that these manufacturers knew of this hazard, but neither reported it back to the FDA, as would have been the safe and responsible thing to do.(3) 

Finally, according to the March 18, 2016 Cancer Letter article, while Dr Reed has apparently sued the BWH, and Dr Rosenbaum admitted she is on "faculty" at the BWH, neither she, the NEJM, nor the BWH will say whether she is currently being paid by the BWH.  Particularly,

the hospital declined to provide information on Rosenbaum's title and whether she is a full-time faculty member, citing personnel policies.

My response (in the Cancer Letter article) was

'I can see that the hospital would not want to reveal her salary, if in fact she has one, and that has privacy implications,' Poses said. 'But I don’t understand why the hospital would not be able to simply tell you whether or not she is employed there and in what capacity.'

Thus, the latest commentary in the New England Journal of Medicine by National Correspondent Dr Lisa Rosenbaum used special pleading to argue for an expensive medical device with dubious benefits but which no more dubious evidence suggests may cause cancer.  The commentary also decried the device's critics as unreasonably concerned about "greed" and "corruption," even though the device is clearly expensive, there are at least creditable allegations that the device makers used political influence to promote it and concealed its risks, and ironically the commentary itself obfuscated whether Dr Rosenbaum has a major financial relationship to the hospital that is being sued in connection with use of that device there.

Thus, this latest New England Journal of Medicinearticle, like those by the same author in the same journal which we have discussed before (here and here), seems more like a rant in a political blog than a scholarly article in the US' and perhaps the world's most prestigious scholarly medical journal.  What is going on at the NEJM? What has happened to its editorial standards?  Why should it continue to inspire such trust?    

ADDENDUM (22 March, 2016) - See also comments in the 1BoringOldMan blog. 


References

1.  Rosenbaum L.  N-of-1 policymaking - tragedy, trade-offs, and the demise of morcellation.  N Engl J Med 2016; 374: 986-990.  Link here.
2.  Chittawar PB, Franik S, Pouwer AW et al.  Minimally invasive surgical techniques versus open myomectomy for uterine fibroids. Cochrane Library 2014. Link here.
3.  Dyer O. US surgeon who campaigned against potentially dangerous device receives legal threat.  Brit Med J 2014; 349: g5577.  

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Drinking the Managerialists' Kool-Aid? - Why Did Medical Educators Launch Trials of Increased Sleep Deprivation of Physician Trainees Apparently in Violation of the Nuremberg Code?

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Drinking the Managerialists' Kool-Aid? - Why Did Medical Educators Launch Trials of Increased Sleep Deprivation of Physician Trainees Apparently in Violation of the Nuremberg Code?

Unknown 12/04/2015 Komentar

It all seemed so bizarre.  In 2014, with little fanfare, two large trials that imposed longer work hours and sleep deprivation on physician-trainees (interns and residents), ostensibly to combat the problem of excess hand-offs of patients among physicians.  Both trials involved multiple academic medical centers, including some of the most prestigious in the US.  Within a year, the American Medical Student Association (AMSA) and Public Citizen called for a federal investigation of the trials, calling them "highly unethical."

This unprecented conflict between prestigious academic medical institutions and the largest organization of medical students and a respected watchdog group suggests either the former have serious ethical problems, or the latter have gone a little crazy.  The minimal media attention to the dispute did not explain what is going on.  My suspicion is that these events open a window on how respected medical academics are now in the thrall of the managerialist leaders of health care.

Background of the Studies

My Personal Experience on the Medical Housestaff

Let me start by disclosing the axe I am grinding.  I was an internal medicine intern from 1978-79 in a program known to be very arduous.  For much of the year, I worked up to 36 consecutive hours every fourth night, often without more than a few hours of sleep.  My on call shifts were extremely busy, involving admission of usually 4-5 complex and acutely ill patients, handling exacerbations and emergencies affecting my own patients already in the hospital, and three other interns' patients for about 12-15 hours of the shift.  The workload was augmented by a hefty amount of "scut," that is, tasks that either did not involve direct patient care, or could easily have been done by someone who was not a physician, e.g., paperwork and phone calls, other bureaucratic tasks, drawing blood, starting IVs, and even transporting patients.  As the shift dragged on into the evening, I knew my mind was getting fuzzier and my coordination was getting clumsier.

The notion that working 36 hours straight was educational, was good for my patients, or was good for me seemed nonsensical.  One reason I went into medical education was to improve the experience for future trainees.

Addressing Housestaff Sleep Deprivation

I was hardly the only person who thought the work requirements imposed on medical housestaff were nonsensical.  The first notable improvement was the advent of night float systems that allowed on-call housestaff to get at least some sleep.  Eventually, in part after the infamous "Libby Zion case," (see NY Times retrospective here,)  teaching hospitals were required to limit work hours.  In 2003, Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education limited the total work week to 80 hours, required one day off a week, and required call schedules no more frequent than every third night.  (Note that my old program fulfilled all but the first.)  In 2011, the rules were tightened further, limiting interns to shifts no longer than 16 hours.

Pushback Against Duty Hour Restrictions

Yet soon after the pushback began.  A 2014 MedPage today article that described the two studies noted,

The rule change elicited mixed reactions from residents and program directors of residency programs, who worried that increased hand-offs led to worse patient care and shorter hours reduced education opportunities. 

I agree that the increasing number of hand-offs could be problematic, and discuss that below.  On the other hand, the notion that sleep deprived housestaff could learn anything useful while in that condition seems bizarre.  There is plenty of evidence about the adverse cognitive effects of sleep deprivation, including affects on learning.  (See, for example, Durmer et al.)(1)

A brief discussion of one of the two trials, the iCOMPARE trial, put it this way:

Policy limiting duty hours in graduate medical education training programs has become a central point of debate amongst stakeholders. Evidence from human chronobiology and sleep science argues for shorter shifts, because fatigue leads to errors. Evidence from operations research argues for more continuity because patient handoffs also lead to errors, and may reduce the effectiveness of education necessary to produce independent clinicians for the nation’s future.

Poorly Conceived Study Question

The two controversial trials were thus designed to answer the question of whether allowing increased consecutive duty hours would lead to better hand-offs and better outcomes.   This question seems poorly conceived, and was not clearly justified.

The trials were apparently based on the idea that housestaff training programs can exist in only two possible states: allowing longer duty hours with fewer and better done hand-offs, or allowing shorter duty hours with more and badly done hand-offs.  Therefore, the only choice seems to be to maintain the current system (tighter duty hour restrictions) or go back to the old system (more relaxed restrictions).

However, these are not the only possible alternatives.  One can easily think of other choices.

Oddly, the spotty materials about the iCOMPARE trial available online did not include any consideration of why the more restrictive duty hour regulations may have led to bad handoffs.  Perhaps the current problem with hand-offs, while it may be real, may have not come about only due to a decrease in the consecutive hours housestaff were allowed to work.  Perhaps it came about because the consecutive hours regulation was imposed on the closed systems of housestaff training programs in which the clinical and non-clinical responsibilities of the housestaff were fixed.  So, cutting consecutive work hours without decreasing the number of patients that need to be managed, or the housestaff's total workload, including "scut," may have pushed individual residents to try to do more work in less time.  This could have had various detrimental effects, including increased numbers of hand-offs occurring under too much time pressure. 

That hypothesis suggests that measures other than allowing more consecutive work hours could address any unintended effects on hand-offs of the mandated consecutive work hour reduction.  It seems plausible that shorter duty hours combined with measures to decrease total housestaff workload, starting with offloading "scut" work, could produce as good or better results than simply going back to the old system.  

Nonetheless, the two trails were set up as if the only alternative to the current situation is to return to the old situation (longer work hours allowed).  Thus it seems that the reasoning underlying the trials was based on a false dilemma.     

Summary of the Studies' Methods

This apparently badly conceived study question led to trials whose design and implementation raised further concerns.  Per the 2014 Medpage article:

The Comparative Effectiveness of Models Optimizing Patient Safety and Resident Education (iCOMPARE) will compare the current duty-hour regimen (16-hour maximum continuous work period for interns) to what the trial calls a 'more flexible regimen' that eliminates the 16-hour cap.

A total of 59 residency programs are enrolled, including academic and community-based programs.

The 12-month study, led by investigators from the University of Pennsylvania, Johns Hopkins University, and Brigham and Women's Hospital, states that its goal is 'to provide evidence to help policymakers evaluate whether the current duty-hour standards should be changed.'

Measured outcomes will include 'patient safety and trainee education,' with data from Medicare claims, exam scores, and participant surveys.

The study comes on the heels of a similar year-long, randomized trial for surgical interns (Flexibility In duty hour Requirements for Surgical Trainees, or FIRST), which began in July 2014 and is currently underway.

Also

The programs in iCOMPARE's intervention arm will adhere to three rules, which are consistent with the ACGME's July 2003 duty hour regulations:
An 80-hour weekly limit
1 day off in 7
In-house call no more frequent than every 3 nights, averaged over 4 weeks

The Protest

In November, 2015, the complaints about the two trials were announced by AMSA and Public Citizen.  The main issues were summarized in a Huffington Post article by Dr Michael Carome of Public Citizen.   First he stated that on its face, making house staff work long hours, as they are in the intervention group, is dangerous.

The iCOMPARE and FIRST trials have allowed first-year medical residents to work shifts lasting 28 consecutive hours or more -- nearly twice the current maximum number of hours allowed by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) for such residents. The ACGME's awareness of the known harms to both residents and patients caused by excessively long work hours led the organization in 2011 to tighten restrictions on resident physicians' work hours, including limiting shifts for first-year residents to a maximum of 16 hours.

Substantial evidence shows that sleep deprivation due to excessively long work shifts increases the risk of motor vehicle accidents, needle-stick injuries and exposure to blood-borne pathogens, , and depression in medical residents. It also exposes their patients to an increased risk of medical errors, sometimes leading to patient injuries and deaths

The last statement cited seven references. I should note here that I could not find in the current media reports, or in the spotty documentation of the ICompare trial avaiable online any engagement with the evidence that sleep deprivation is bad for trainee physicians (and everyone else).

The next important point is that the housestaff who were research subjects of the trial, and their patients who also were at least indirectly research subjects did not give their informed consent for participation in the trial.

Among the many disturbing aspects of the trials is the researchers' failure to seek the voluntary informed consent of either the resident doctors or their patients who are forced to be part of these experiments.

According to a recent media report, the University of Pennsylvania's IRB -- the designated lead IRB that reviewed and approved the iCOMPARE trial -- incorrectly found that the trial involves only 'minimal' risk and therefore waived the requirements for obtaining informed consent for all subjects.

For the FIRST trial, the administrator of the IRB at Northwestern University, the lead institution for that trial, shockingly determined that the trial was not even 'research with human subjects' and, therefore, that IRB review and approval were not required. As a result, there was no opportunity for the IRB to discuss the risks of the research and the need for obtaining the voluntary informed consent of both the general surgery residents and their patients. This determination represents a colossal failure of Northwestern University's human subjects protection system. This same failure presumably occurred at many of the other institutions that participated in the FIRST trial.

An article in the business section of the Chicago Tribune added that Public Citizen claimed the failure to obtain informed consent was all the more serious because the house staff and patients were exposed to danger contingent on their trial participation.

It claimed the 'highly unethical' experiments, including the other led by the University of Pennsylvania and Johns Hopkins University, exposed doctors to an increased risk of making serious medical errors and suffering personal injury.

'Substantial evidence shows that sleep deprivation due to excessively long work shifts increases the risk of motor vehicle accidents, needle-stick injuries and exposure to blood-borne pathogens and depression in medical students,' according to the complaint. For patients, the long hours could lead to increased medical errors and death, the complaint said.

Furthermore, the trials apparently did not include mechanisms for house staff to refuse participation, or to stop participating.  An article in Medscape quoted Dr Karl Bilimoria, a professor of surgery at Northwestern who led the surgical trial,

Dr Bilimoria said that for first-year general surgery residents assigned extended hours at intervention-arm hospitals, the trial was no secret. 'They were told, because they had to monitor their hours,' he said. 'Residents knew which arm of the trial they were in.'

'This has been very public.'

Asked whether this process amounted to informed consent, he replied that if residents strongly disagreed with the prospect of longer hours, 'they could choose to work elsewhere.'

The news coverage of the controversy included several statements that the trials were particularly and severely unethical.  For example, a BMJ news article quoted

Charles Czeisler, professor of medicine and director of sleep medicine at Harvard Medical School [who] told the BMJ, 'I was shocked when I heard about this study assigning resident physicians to work marathon shifts.'  Czeisler said that even as little as one week of sleep deprivation was knwon to cause serious harms.

In Modern Healthcare,

Other ethics researchers found it difficult to understand how such a trial could be approved by an institutional review board.

'Because you're looking at deaths of patients as the major outcome, that makes it much more difficult ethically to support because patients may be harmed,' said Dr. Robert Klitzman, director of the master of bioethics program at Columbia University. 'If you find that twice as many patients died under anything but the current system, you could say they died unnecessarily.'

Apparent Violations of the Nuremberg Code

 [Photograph: Defendants in the dock at Nuremberg trials.  Link here.]

In fact, in my humble opinion, the two trials appeared to violate several major components of the Nuremberg Code, the set of principles for ethical research that was developed after Nazi atrocities visited in the course of supposed medical experiments were revealed during the Nuremberg Trials.  These principles include,

1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.

This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved, as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that, before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject, there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person, which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.

The two trials did not get true informed consent from the housestaff subjects. As trainees required to complete housestaff training to become surgeons or internists, informing housestaff that their program would be participating in the trial, and their only option if they did not want to participate would be to seek another program surely seems like any consent they provided was given under duress.  Furthermore, it is not clear that they were ever informed of "all the inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon" their "health or person[s]."

2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methds or means of study, and not random and unncessary in nature.

Again, if the major rationale for doing the trials was to mitigate the postulated effects of increasing hand-offs, there are many other ways one could try to do this which do not involve increasing duty hours and sleep deprivation.

3.  The experiment should be designed based on the results of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study, that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.

Again, there is a considerable body of research that sleep deprivation is harmful to patient and humans in general.  Thus, the science suggests that increasing sleep deprivation will have unfavorable results, and thus the performance of a trial of increasing sleep deprivation  seems unjustified.

9. During the course of the experiment, the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end, if he has reached the physical or mental state, where continuation of the experiment seemed to him to be impossible.

Again, the housestaff could not easily opt out of further participation. At best, to do so, as one of the investigators said, they would have to quit their training programs, which could jeopardize their careers and entail major financial costs.

The Rebuttal

The main arguments of the trial proponents in response to the complaints seemed weak, and often appeared to be based on logical fallacies.

The ACGME and the IRBs Approved the Trials - Appeals to Authority

In the Chicago Tribune article:

But Northwestern said the council [ACGME] granted a waiver for the longer hours and helped fund the study.

'It was done with their approval,' Dr Karl Bilimoria, principal investigator for the trial ... said.

An article from the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel and MedPage Today  quoted Dr Thomas Nasca, CEO of the ACGME,

He said institutional review boards at all the participating hospital reviewed the trial protocols and determined the patients did not need to be informed.

These arguments amount to assertions that the trials must have been ethical because external authorities said they were.  Thus they appear to be based on logical fallacies, appeals to authority. 

The Arguments and Evidence Supporting Duty Hour Restrictions are Weak - Burden of Proof

In an unfortunately misnamed ModernHealthcare article (it refers to medical students rather than housestaff) , Dr Bilimoria was again quoted,

The key piece is that we just have never had prospective, randomized high-level evidence to inform our decisionmaking....

Similarly, in a Medscape article  Dr Nasca, the ACGME CEO,

calls resident scheduling rules a work in progress, especially because only very small, single-institution studies have examined the effect of long hours on residents and patients.

On the other hand, there are no big randomized trials to suggest that longer duty hours or increased sleep deprivation is advantageous.  However, there are huge numbers of studies that show that sleep deprivation is bad for patients and people in non-medical settings, as well as medical trainees.

In any case, the supporters of the trials seem to be arguing that the burden of proof should be on those who want to limit duty hours, while it seems more reasonable that to justify a trial of increased sleep deprivation, the burden of proof was on those who proposed the trial.  Thus, this appears to be a version of the burden of proof logical fallacy.

Increased Hand-Offs are Bad, and the Only Alternative to Having Them is to Increase Duty Hours - False Dilemma

In trying to defend their work the advocates for these trials further corroborated my concerns above that the trials were conceived without any consideration that measures other than increasing duty hours (and consequent sleep deprivation) was the only possible alternative to the current situation.   For example, in the Modern Healthcare article.

'There's always a trade-off,' [senior RAND natural scientist Dr Mark] Friedberg said, noting the increased number of patient hand-offs that occur with shorter hours. These hand-offs reduce consistency of care and open patients up to more mistakes and miscommunication among providers. 'It's not clear-cut. That's why you have to do the science,' he said.

However, he did not argue that increased hand-offs are so bad that a trial of increasing duty hours and sleep deprivation to achieve fewer hand-offs could be justified.  He also did not consider whether there might be some way to mitigate the effect of increased hand-offs without causing sleep deprivation.

Similarly a New Haven Register article quoted Dr Thomas Balcezak, chief medical officer for Yale-New Haven, saying

one issue is that there are 'more handoffs between caregivers' when residents work shorter hours. 'There’s always a risk that important information could fall through the cracks' because of 'a lack of consistency or continuity.'

Again, that seems to be at best a theory, but not evidence based argument. Besides, the article quoted Dr Carome of Public Citizen on just one of many other possible approaches to mitigate the effects of increased hand-offs,

hospitals could overcome that problem by hiring doctors to work overlapping shifts.

There is no evidence that the people who were so concerned about hand-offs thought of any alternative ways to mitigate any problems the duty hour restrictions could have created.  This corroborates my concerns that the trials were fundamentally based on a logical fallacy, the false dilemma.

Managerialism and Tunnel Vision

So why would medical educators at some of the most prestigious US teaching hospitals launch trials to see if increasing housestaff sleep deprivation might benefit them and their patients, mandate partcipation of housestaff and patients in these trials without obtaining informed consent or allowing these subjects to opt out of the trials, thus seemingly violating the Nuremberg Code, and then defend their actions with logical fallacies?

I do not think they have gone mad.  I do suspect they are in the thrall of their managerialist hospital executives.

Recently we discussed the rise of managerialism in the leadership of health care organizations. Managerialism, which wraps up what we have called generic management, the manager's coup d'etat, and aspects of mission-hostile management into a very troubling but coherent package, was first  described for a medical audience in 2015 by Komesaroff in an article in the Medical Journal of Australia(2):

The particular system of beliefs and practices defining the roles and powers of managers in our present context is what is referred to as managerialism. This is defined by two basic tenets: (i) that all social organisations must conform to a single structure [defined by management theory and dogma]; and (ii) that the sole regulatory principle is the market. Both ideas have far-reaching implications. The claim that every organisation — whether it is a mining company, a hospital, a school, a professional association or a charity — must be structured according to a single model, conforming to a single set of legislative requirements, not so long ago would have seemed bizarre, but is now largely taken for granted. The principle of the market has become the solitary, or dominant, criterion for decision making, and other criteria, such as loyalty, trust, care and a commitment to critical reflection, have become displaced and devalued. Indeed, the latter are viewed as quaint anachronisms with less importance and meaning than formal procedures or standards that can be readily linked to key performance indicators, budget end points, efficiency markers and externally imposed targets.

Many of the prestigious teaching hospitals/ acacemic medical centers/ hospital systems participating in the two controversial trials may be led in the managerialist tradition.  We have shown numerous examples of such leadership that may put short term revenue and the continuing enrichment of top managers ahead of all other concerns, including good patient care and the integrity of academics, has been frankly mission hostile, and jump on the latest management bandwagons as solutions all problems.

I postulate that housestaff directors at such institutions tremble at the idea of challenging such leaders.  Yet to improve the handoff problem, teaching programs might have to do things that cost money.  Spending money that does not lead to immediate increases in revenue, and boosts in management pay, could be an anathema to managerialists.  Also, to improve the hand-off problem, programs might have to challenge management dogma, such as the worship of badly designed, time wasting electronic health records.  So I suspect the leaders of the two studies consciously or unconsciously eschewed trial designs that could assess any educational alternative that might have made management uncomfortable.  Thus boxed in, they wound up with an apparently indefensibly unethical research project.

I hope that the two studies create the degree of controversy they deserve, and that the federal government promptly starts investigating honestly and thoroughly.  I further hope that this unseemly episode causes medical educators to rethink the cozy or at least conflict averse relationships they have with their managerialist leaders.

True health care reform would restore health care leadership that understands health care and medicine, upholds the health care mission, is accountable for its actions, and is transparent, ethical and honest.

ADDENDUM (5 December, 2015) - This post was republished on the Naked Capitalism blog. 

References

1.  Durmer JS, Dinges DF.  Neurocognitive consequences of sleep deprivation.  Sem Neurology 2005.  25. 117-129.  Link here.

 2.  Komesaroff PA, Kerridge IH, Isaacs D, Brooks PM.  The scourge of managerialism and the Royal Australasian College of Physicians.  Med J Aust 2015; 202: 519- 521.  Link here.

Baca selengkapnya

Turn That Door Around - A Physician Substantially Tied to the Pharmaceutical Industry Nominated to Run the FDA

boards of directors CME conflicts of interest FDA key opinion leaders logical fallacies revolving doors

Turn That Door Around - A Physician Substantially Tied to the Pharmaceutical Industry Nominated to Run the FDA

Unknown 9/24/2015 Komentar

It seems to be the season of the revolving door in health care.  The latest version got some media attention, because it involves one of the most important health care leadership positions in the US government, the Director of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  However, the case actually seems much more serious than what the media has recently reported.

The Basics

For an introduction, we turn to the Wall Street Journal from September 15, 2015:

President Barack Obama plans to nominate the prominent cardiologist and medical researcher Robert Califf as the next commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, the White House said Tuesday.

Dr. Califf had been named the FDA’s deputy commissioner for medical products and tobacco—effectively the No. 2 post—in February. He joined the FDA from Duke University, where he had served as a professor of medicine, a leading pharmaceutical researcher and the vice chancellor for clinical and translational research.

The new nomination got some rave reviews. For example, from the WSJ article,

Francis Collins, director of the National Institutes of Health and a scientist who has worked with Dr. Califf for years, called this 'a fantastic nomination.'

Then this in the NY Times (Sept 15, 2015):

'He’s never forgotten that at his core he’s a doctor, and he cares deeply about providing evidence to help people take better care of patients,' said Dr. Robert Harrington, professor and chairman of the department of medicine at the Stanford University School of Medicine, who worked with Dr. Califf at Duke.

Also, a MedPage Today article was entitled, "Califf Nomination for FDA Chief Gets Most High Marks," and included such testimonials as,

'He has a very good understanding of industry and academia, and think that will serve him well,' Caleb Alexander, MD, co-director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Drug Safety and Effectiveness in Baltimore, told MedPage Today....

Also, this from Dr Harlan Krumholz,

He's a broad thinker and a very creative and visionary individual. He will be an outstanding choice.

And this from Dr Sanjay Kaul,

I can't think of a more qualified person than Dr. Califf to lead the FDA at the present time. He is an accomplished leader in cardiovascular disease research whose work has resulted in therapies that save lives and improve the quality of life for millions of patients.

Is it time to break out the confetti yet?

Conflicts of Interest a Fly in the Ointment?

The only fly in the ointment was the matter of Dr Califf's ties to industry. The WSJ article included,

Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Center for Health Research, a Washington-based group focusing on medical-product safety, questioned his ties to the drug industry.

'Dr. Califf’s expertise and his close ties to the pharmaceutical industry are both well-known,' she said. 'His ties to industry have been a source of great concern to public-health experts when he was previously considered for FDA commissioner, and those ties raise important questions about this nomination.'

The MedPage Today article noted that Public Citizen's Health Research Group stated,

'During his tenure at Duke University, Califf racked up a long history of extensive financial ties to multiple drug and device companies, including Amgen, Astra-Zeneca, Eli Lilly, Johnson & Johnson, Merck Sharpe & Dohme and Sanofi-Aventis, to name a few,' Michael Carome, MD, the group's director, said in a statement. 'Strikingly, no FDA commissioner has had such close financial relationships with industries regulated by the agency prior to being appointed.'

The MedPage Today article, however, then went on to undermine those concerns, implying that only fringe people like those at Public Citizen were really worried. 

Most experts contacted by MedPage Today seemed to think Califf would not have a problem getting Senate confirmation. 'I expect him to be confirmed," said [Dr. Steven] Nissen. 'He is very well liked by people ... in both parties, and I would expect the nomination to go well.'

'All signals suggest that Dr. Califf is well-respected on both sides of the political aisle,' Jay Wolfson, DrPH, JD, senior associate dean at the University of South Florida's Morsani College of Medicine, in Tampa, said in an email.

'There are some who believe his relationship with [the drug industry] may be a problem, but most see it as a value-added factor in building a functional, more streamlined relationship with the industry in order to improve the speed with which truly effective and quality drugs and devices are made available, mitigate the excessive costs associated with pharmaceuticals, and influence policies and practices intended to improve health status.'

Note that the experts were not all named, or their expertise described, the first two paragraphs were really about Dr Califf's political support, and the third paragraph clearly reflected the views of someone who thought that the FDA needs to have a lighter regulatory touch. 

There was additional reporting about Dr Califf's conflicts of interest, but again with the effect of minimizing their importance.  The Wall Street Journal published a second article on September 18, 2015 which first reported,

From 2009 through early 2015, Dr. Califf received consulting fees of roughly $205,000 from companies including Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co., GlaxoSmithKline PLC and one medical-device maker, records show. The payments are documented by the federal Open Payments database, and PharmaShine, a database of pharmaceutical disclosures operated by Obsidian Healthcare Disclosure Services LLC. Drug makers spent an additional $21,000 on travel, meals and other expenses for Dr. Califf, data show.

But the article provided this counterpoint,

Kevin Griffis, a spokesman for the Department of Health and Human Services, said Dr. Califf had ceased all work with drug makers once he was hired by the FDA and that he has gone through a rigorous screening process for potential conflicts of interest. Mr. Griffis said Dr. Califf had donated all the consulting fees he has received since the mid-2000s to nonprofit groups.

'Dr. Robert Califf’s professional career has been dedicated to advancing biomedical research, including the rigorous evaluation of the safety, efficacy and appropriate use of both new medical products and those already on the market,' said Mr. Griffis, assistant secretary for public affairs at HHS.

Note that Dr Califf already is at the FDA, in a position that I do not believe required Senate confirmation.  It is striking, however, how the agency's own public relations people have jumped to his defense now as a nominee who has to be confirmed by the Senate.  However, I suppose that had Dr Califf donated all this fees to a local soup kitchen, they could not be called much of a conflict of interest.  But Mr Griffis said "nonprofit groups," without specification, not "soup kitchens." And continue reading to find out more. 

A simultaneous NY Times article enlarged a bit on Dr Califf's industry relationships,

He has written scientific papers with pharmaceutical company researchers, and his financial disclosure form last year listed seven drug companies and a device maker that paid him for consulting and six others that partly supported his university salary, including Merck, Novartis and Eli Lilly. A conflict-of-interest section at the end of an article he wrote in the European Heart Journal last year declared financial support from more than 20 companies.

However the NYT article also quoted Mr Griffis about the donations to "nonprofits," and added,

A résumé studded with industry funding is not unusual in academic medicine, Dr. Califf’s supporters note. Doctors are paid consulting fees all the time, and universities routinely conduct clinical trials on behalf of companies. Those contracts help support university researchers’ salaries, a standard practice. Many emphasize that it does not imply an inherent conflict.

His supporters contend that Dr. Califf’s vast experience in the clinical science world could be a major asset in his new post.

Furthermore,

Supporters and former colleagues say Dr. Califf’s background makes him perfectly suited to the job of commissioner. He has spent years improving the way clinical trials are conducted, coming up with groundbreaking trial designs for medicines against blood clots.

'His integrity in scientific matters is impeccable, and his innovation in clinical trial design is legendary,' said Dr. Steven Nissen, a cardiologist at the Cleveland Clinic, who has been an outspoken critic of both the F.D.A. and drug companies.

Even better,

Dr. Califf is often in the gym on the StairMaster before 6 a.m., said a former colleague at Duke, Dr. Adrian Hernandez. He often invites younger doctors to join him in golf and has a passion for Duke basketball that he expresses by wearing the team colors on game days.

How could anyone criticize a man who is at the gym at 6 AM?

More seriously, note that while the recent reporting may bring up questions about Dr Califf's conflicts of interest in terms of financial relationships with drug, device and biotechnology companies when he was on the Duke faculty, all the reporting also included passages minimizing the importance of these conflicts.  To minimize the issue of conflicts of interest, articles cited unnamed experts, suggesting the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority; noted that the financial ties that were criticized are standard practice in academic health care, suggesting the logical fallacy of an appeal to common practice.  The articles also cited Dr Califf's positive attributes which may have been relevant to his work at the FDA, like knowledge of research, but were not related to the question of conflicts of interest. This suggests another appeal to authority, or something of a reverse ad hominem (pro hominem?) fallacy.  It seems odd that what appear to be straightforward journalistic reports of a presidential nomination included such attempts to defend the candidate.  Note further that many of these logical fallacies appeared not in quotes from Dr Califf's supporters, but in text apparently written by journalists (e.g., "industry funding is not unusual," "in the gym on the Stairmaster," etc.)

Nonetheless, this is the state of play as of this moment.  The thrust of the media coverage suggested that Dr Califf is a brilliant physician and researcher, and while he as some ties to industry, they do not amount to much of a problem, except in the eyes of the likes of Public Citizen.


If one digs deeper, however, there is more. When Dr Califf was appointed to his current FDA position in February, 2015, and years earlier when his name was first mentioned as a possible candidate to run the FDA, evidence appeared that his ties to pharmaceutical, biotechnology and device companies were much more serious than what the recent accounts suggested.  

Where Does the Money from Industry Sponsored Research Grants Go? 

The recent coverage of Dr Califf's nomination in the NY Times dismissed his multiple corporate research grants as common practice.  Yet in the TIME coverage of  his original appointment to the FDA in February, 2015, this reminder of the significance of corporate sponsored research grants appeared.

Califf says his salary is contractually underwritten in part by several large pharmaceutical companies, including Merck, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly and Novartis.

Note that apologists for physician and academician interaction with industry often claim that industry funding of research grants that does not go directly to individuals does not cause important conflicts of interest. In one sentence, however, this article underlined how these grants support academic salaries, and hence lead to the dependency that is at the heart of conflicted relationships.

As we posted in 2007, academic medical institutions now depend on "external," including corporate research funding to support their research faculty's salaries, and via "overhead," their overall budgets.  Dr Lee Goldman, then Dean and Executive Vice President at Columbia University, called faculty who bring in a lot of grant money "tax payers," who earn gratitude, and likely bonuses and perks.  Thus Dr Califf's multiple large corporate research grants cannot be completely dismissed as conflicts of interest. 


A More Extensive List of Industry Relationships

Furthermore, a relatively obscure February, 2015, report from MDDIOnline noted that Dr Califf had more industry relationships than were reported this month,

Conflict of interest disclosures dating back to 2007 made public by the DCRI show that Califf has been paid for consulting or other services provided to a number of medical device pharmaceutical, and biotech companies, including Medtronic, Acumed, Bayer Healthcare, Merck, Novartis, Roche, GlaxoSmithKline, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Sanofi-Aventis, and Eli Lilly & Co. Califf also disclosed that he held equity in two pharmaceutical companies—Boulder-based N30 Pharmaceuticals and South San Francisco, CA-based Portola Pharmaceuticals—as recently as 2014. Califf retired from Portola’s board of directors January 26, according to a press release from the company.

A somewhat more obscure commentary by Martha Rosenberg in OpEdNews provided even more extensive listings of Dr Califf's industry relationships. And it suggested having a look at the disclosures he has made in the past in medical journal articles. A statement in a 2013 JAMA commentary was particularly telling,

Dr Califf receives research grants that partially support his salary from Amylin, Johnson & Johnson, Scios, Merck/Schering-Plough, Schering-Plough Research Institute, Novartis Pharma, Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation, Aterovax, Bayer, Roche, and Lilly; all grants are paid to Duke University. Dr Califf also consults for TheHeart.org, Johnson & Johnson, Scios, Kowa Research Institute, Nile, Parkview, Orexigen Therapeutics, Pozen, WebMD, Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation, AstraZeneca, Bayer/Ortho-McNeil, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Boehringer Ingelheim, Daiichi Sankyo, Gilead, GlaxoSmithKline, Li Ka Shing Knowledge Institute, Medtronic, Merck, Novartis, sanofi-aventis, XOMA, University of Florida, Pfizer, Roche, Servier International, DSI-Lilly, Janssen R&D, CV Sight, Regeneron, and Gambro; all income from these consultancies is donated to nonprofit organizations, with most going to the clinical research fellowship fund of the Duke Clinical Research Institute. Dr Califf holds equity in Nitrox LLC, N30 Pharma, and Portola.

These lists of corporations from which Dr Califf got salary support and consulting fees are much longer than previous lists.  He acknowledged 13 commercial research sponsors, and consulted for 32 organizations, most of which were pharmaceutical companies.  Again, given that the salary support and overhead likely supplied by corporate research grants do suggest conflicts of interest, Dr Califf may have had many more of these sorts of conflicts than current reports implied  

A Seat on a Pharmaceutical Company Board of Directors

Note that the MDDIOnline article mentioned that Dr Califf was a member of the board of directors of Portola Pharmaceuticals. That was a significant source of income.  According to the Portola Pharmaceuticals 2015 proxy statement, Dr Califf received $259,623 in cash and stock options from the company in 2014.  I cannot find anything to suggest that this payment did not go directly to him.  This position, and the money it paid were not mentioned in the recent coverage. That payment alone seems to represent a major conflict of interest.

However, being on the board of directors of a health care corporation presents a deeper conflict than that produced by a simple payment of money or stock options, no matter how large. In 2006, we discussed corporate directorships as a new and important species of conflict of interest for medical academics.  As we have previously posted, corporate directors have fiduciary responsibilities to the company and its shareholders to support its financial success.  They are supposed to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders" [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]   Thus corporate directors have a much more significant commitment to the corporation than do corporate consultants, or researchers supported by corporate grants. 

Where Did Those Donated Consulting Payments Go?

Also note that the disclosure statement in the JAMA article mentioned that most of the consulting payments Dr Califf received went to the clinical research fellowship of the Duke Clinical Research Institute (DCRI).  Dr Califf was the first director of DCRI, 

So, while Dr Califf apparently did donate the consulting fees to a non-profit organization, that organization actually was part of Duke, and an organization that Dr Califf once led. It appears likely that Dr Califf benefited at least indirectly in terms of institutional gratitude and reputation from these consulting fees that he donated to his own institution.  So it appears that Dr Califf's donations of his consulting fees did not reduce the conflicts of interest generated by these fees to the extent suggested by the current FDA spokesperson and current media reports. 

Payments for "Educational Activities" 

Finally, perusal of disclosures of Dr Califf's commercial relationships made by the Duke Clinical Research Institute for the years 2010-2015 showed that he received payments for "educational activities" in 2011 from Amylin.  Information about earlier years is not available on this site, but in 2009, Dr Daniel Carlat wrote this about Dr Califf's then rumored candidacy for leadership of the FDA in the Carlat Psychiatry Blog,

look at these industry disclosures. He took money—lots of money--from 18 different pharmaceutical or device firms. Most of this was not for research, but for consulting and speaking, including CME. If Dr. Califf believes that it is ethical for physicians to help drug companies market their products, that’s his own business. But to elevate him to a position in which he is the country’s chief watchdog over unsafe medications and foods seems a dangerous move. With money from 18 drug companies padding his bank account, he will presumably spend most of his FDA career recusing himself from crucial decisions. Not a good idea.

There has been no mention of Dr Califf being a paid speaker for pharmaceutical companies in any of the recent reporting.  Dr Carlat implied that Dr Califf was paid to speak to further marketing objectives of pharmaceutical companies, that is, was giving "drug talks."  Since the publication of "Dr Drug Rep" in the New York Times in 2007, authored by Dr Carlat, the public has learned that such talks mainly include content provided by the pharmaceutical companies, and are meant by the companies as marketing exercises.  From that case we also learned that physicians who deviate from the marketing message do not last long on speakers' bureaus.  (See posts here and here.)

Paid speakers may be regarded by pharmaceutical companies as paid "key opinion leaders," KOLs, who serve a marketing function in the guise of academics. As noted here and here, the companies buying their services may believe they have bought the services of sales people.    Evidence about key opinion leaders actually performing like marketers has come from documents revealed during litigation (e.g., see this recent example of a huge monetary settlement made of charges that GlaxoSmithKline, a major multinational drug company committed fraud among other things, and in the course of its unethical activities used key opinion leaders as marketers).   Also, see the Neurontin marketing plan (see post here), and the Lexapro marketing plan (see post here) for examples of how company keaders view key opinion leaders as marketers.

So the revelation that Dr Califf received corporate payments for "education" suggests a bigger commitment to corporate marketing objectives than has previously been revealed.  

Summary

So, looking at not only current media reports, but media reports from earlier this year, and also proxy statements, the fine print of journal articles, and old blog posts, it appears that Dr Robert Califf really did have very substantial financial interactions with the drug, device and biotechnology industry.  These interactions likely underwrote his salary and his standing with the leaders of his former employer, Duke University.  Dr Califf seemed to be a paid speaker for drug companies on at least two occasions, suggesting that the companies may have put him in a covert marketing role, or viewed him as a paid key opinion leader.  Finally,  Dr Califf served on the board of directors of one drug company, a much deeper commitment than being a sponsored researcher or consultant.

Thus Dr Califf really appears to be one of the most, if not the most drug, device and biotechnology industry connected individual ever nominated to lead the agency that is the most important regulator of the US drug, device and biotechnology industry.  Some of his connections, particularly his previous membership on a pharmaceutical company board, and his previous roles as a paid pharmaceutical speaker, suggested not only financial relationships, but commitments to companies' financial and marketing goals.  These appear to be major conflicts of interest vis a vis Dr Califf's current leadership position at the FDA, and his nomination to be the ultimate leader of this regulatory agency.  This is the revolving door writ large.

As we have said very recently,  the revolving door can be veiwed as a species of conflict of interest.  Government officials who can look forward to extremely lucrative employment in health care industry may be much more inclined to seem friendly to the industry while in office.  Government officials who just came from industry are likely to maintain their industry mindset and be mindful of their industry friends.

Worse, some experts have suggested that the revolving door is in fact corruption.  As we noted here, the experts from the distinguished European anti-corruption group U4 wrote,

The literature makes clear that the revolving door process is a source of valuable political connections for private firms. But it generates corruption risks and has strong distortionary effects on the economy, especially when this power is concentrated within a few firms.

Furthermore, the ongoing and increasing revolving door phenomenon clearly suggests excess coziness between industry and government, now to the extent that industry and government leaders of health care are becoming interchangeable.  This suggests that health care is increasingly run by this cozy ingroup, who very likely put their own interests ahead of those of patients and the public.

The continuing egregiousness of the revolving door in health care shows how health care leadership can play mutually beneficial games, regardless of the their effects on patients' and the public's health.  Once again, true health care reform would cut the ties between government and corporate leaders and their cronies that have lead to government of, for and by corporate executives rather than the people at large.

ADDENDUM (28 September, 2015) - This post has been republished on the Naked Capitalism blog,  and OpEdNews.

ADDENDUM (28 September, 2015) - See also more detail on Dr Califf's activities on the Portola board on the PEU Report blog. 

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Say It Ain't So: Logical Fallacies in Defense of Conflicts of Interest ... in the New England Journal of Medicine?

conflicts of interest logical fallacies NEJM

Say It Ain't So: Logical Fallacies in Defense of Conflicts of Interest ... in the New England Journal of Medicine?

Unknown 5/21/2015 Komentar

Introduction

We have been viewing with alarm the web of conflicts of interest draped over medicine and health care since we started Health Care Renewal.  We have been particularly concerned about how conflicts of interest may have led to threats to the integrity of clinical research, especially due to manipulation and suppression of clinical research studies.  We have also been concerned about how COIs have led to threats to the integrity of medical education, especially given how health care corporate marketers have paid influential health care professionals and academics to be "key opinion leaders," mainly to act as salespeople in disguise.  We have discussed individual and institutional conflicts of interest involving all sorts of health care organizations.

When we started writing about these issues, we did not find many who shared our concerns, but the topics have become better known.  The Institute of Medicine wrote an apparently authoritative report in 2009 on conflicts of interest which got some notice, but attracted few adherents.  There have been few changes on the policy front in the US regarding conflicts of interest, with the notable exception of the Sunshine Act incorporated into the Affordable Care Act which required increased disclosure of payments made to health professionals and organizations. 

So it was surprising that the New England Journal of Medicine, probably the most influential and important English language medical journal, recently published an editorial by Drazen (1) and three commentaries by Rosenbaum(2-4) about conflicts of interest, all suggesting that concerns about COIs are overblown, and that excess attention to COIs may be inhibiting medical progress.

It was more surprising, given the reach of this journal, that these articles featured a catalog of logical fallacies in support of their arguments.  We have noted that logical fallacies have been a stock in trade of those who actively defend laissez faire policies about conflicts of interest, and other kinds of interactions among health professionals and industry.  However, I would not have believed that the New England Journal of Medicine would go along with this sort of thing.

However, they did, and so we will endeavor to sort out their catalog, noting the most important uses of logical fallacies, in order of the chronological sequence of the publications....

Burden of Proof Fallacy: That All Physician - Industry Collaborations are Beneficial is Assumed, but Contentions that Financial Conflicts of Interest Affecting Physicians Must be Disclosed, Regulated or Banned Require Rigorous Proof  

"The burden of proof is a fallacy in which the burden of proof is placed on the wrong side," per the Nizkor Project definition.

The Assumption that All Physician-Industry Interactions are Good

The Drazen and Rosenbaum articles assert that the burden of proof rests on those who assert that conflicts of interest ought to be disclosed, regulated or restricted.  However, they take the benefits of all physician-industry interactions as given.  For example,

This partnership between an academic researcher and a drug company went on to alleviate substantial human suffering and should be a model for current behavior. Unfortunately, it is not.(1)

Simply put, in no area of medicine are our diagnostics and therapeutics so good that we can call a halt to improvement, and true improvement can come only through collaboration.(1)

the benefits wrought by interactions between physician-scientists and industry are ... clear.(2)

[Physician-industry] interactions [are] characterized by a shared mission to fight disease.(4)

life-saving therapies ... development requires the combined talents of clinicians and industry scientists.... (4)

The series of articles includes multiple assertions that physician-industry collaboration, which is not further defined, is necessary for the advancement of medicine.  The articles never explicitly exclude various kinds of "collaborations" that others may question, including for example, corporate marketers paying well known, often senior academic physicians to be "key opinion leaders" and thus act as salespeople; or paying physicians to give "drug talks" that are clearly marketing exercises, (e.g., the case of "Dr Drug Rep.")

The NEJM articles only supply anecdotal data at best to support this broad assertion.  Of the two anecdotes used by Drazen(1), one was about collaboration between Selman Waksman and Merck during the 1940s in the development of streptomycin.  The applicability of this anecdote, from long ago, done under the pressures of wartime, and long before the era of "shareholder value" theories of management that put short-term revenue ahead of all else (look here), was unclear.   The other "cogent example has been a vaccine against Ebola virus disease."  However, no such vaccine has been licensed for use or accepted as effective, yet.  In fact, society's failure to develop such a vaccine up to now has been attributed to pharmaceutical industry management's emphasis on the preeminence of revenue.  Until the recent epidemic, Ebola vaccine was not seen as a big money maker (look here).

In short, the series of articles accept the value of physician-industry collaboration, writ broadly, in the absence of clear evidence.

The Contention that the Burden of Proof is on Those Who Argue that COIs Should be Disclosed, Regulated or Restricted


On the other hand, regarding assertion that conflicts of interest ought to be disclosed, regulated, or restricted, Rosenbaum wrote

we still lack an empirical basis to guide effective conflict management.(3)

Equally unclear are the benefits and harms of regulations aimed at exposing or mitigating these conflicts.(3)

It remains unclear whether ... disclosures actually mitigate the risk of bias.(3)

conflict-of-interest policies have evolved not through careful data gathering and analysis.... (4)

In particular, most of Rosenbaum's three articles(2-4) focus on her general doubts about and perceptions of faults in the evidence-base about the harms of conflicts of interest, or the benefits of disclosing, regulating or restricting them. For example,

though considerable social science research suggests that even small gifts may influence physicians, it doesn't necessarily follow that greater financial stakes are more influential.(3)

Suggestive data may be worse than no data at all.(3)

It depends on how you define harm.  Consider pharmaceutical 'gifting,' a practice that smacks of bribery - which may be sufficient reason to prohibit it.  But does it actually harm patients?(4)

Furthermore, while decrying the lack of rigorous data in support of disclosing, regulating or restricting COIs, she raises doubts about such actions based on vague anecdotes and general, but unsubstantiated assertions, including

some of the young, talented physician-investigators I spoke with expressed worry about how any industry relationship would affect their careers.(3)

The proportion of physician-investigators who have such concerns was not stated.

A medical school dean probably won't lose her job if patents aren't produced under her tenure, but she will be taken to task if she appears to lax in regulating faculty-industry interactions.(4)

No further specifics about consequences to such academic leaders appeared. 

For many people, however, the medical-industrial complex elicits deeply negative feelings that make it tough to evaluate fairly any intervention aiming to mitigate industry influence.(4)

The evidence in support of this assertion was not apparent.

I think the desire for retribution against 'bad pharma' informs our management of industry interactions in a way that obscures the possibility that we are obstructing medical advances.(4)

The evidence in support of this thought was not apparent. 

Thus Drazen and Rosenbaum clearly believe that the burden of proof is entirely on those who advocate disclosing, regulating or restricting conflicts of interest.  Yet they never argue this point explicitly.  In my humble opinion, I see no reason that their beliefs should be considered a fundamental law of nature, while the beliefs of those who differ with them should be considered unproven hypotheses. The NEJM series of articles seem to be an extended exercise in the burden of proof fallacy.

Appeal to Authority: Important People and Organizations Agree with Us

The appeal to authority fallacy is that an argument supported by an authority must be true, as per Nizkor.  

Drazen and Rosenbaum corroborate their opinions with those of various authorities, but fail to identify any authorities who disagree with them.  In fact, as noted below, they often cite opinions with which they differ without noting who advanced them.  So, for example, 

The National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences of the National Institutes of Health, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, the World Economic Forum, the Gates Foundation, the Wellcome Trust, and the Food and Drug Administration are but a few of the institutions encouraging greater interaction between academics and industry, to provide tangible value for patients.(1)

Shaywitz and Stossel, who have each written on the benefits of academic-industry collaboration and the challenges of bringing new products to market, are rare voices competing with a loud chorus of shaming.(3) 

Richard Epstein, a University of Chicago law professor who writes convincingly about the dangers of overregulating medical conflicts, questions certain limitations on the ties of FDA advisory-panel measures.(3)

Note that the authors of the NEJM articles do not discuss whether these authorities could have their own biases.  For example,while Drazen cited the support of the Gates Foundation above, Rosenbaum later acknowledged the current CEO of the Gates Foundation is a former Vice President of Genentech(4).  Neither noted that Dr Desmond-Hellmann was on record early as an apologist for the huge increases in drug prices that occurred starting in the first decade of this century (look here).  Dr Stossel has been known to deploy his own logical fallacies to defend physician-industry interactions (look here), as has Professor Epstein (look here).  Dr Stossel has been known not to disclose his own relationships with industry (look here).

Furthermore, while Rosenbaum attributed a stance in favor of disclosing, regulating or restricting COIs  to former NEJM editor Dr Arnold Relman, it was in the context of doubting his approach, rather than supporting his authority.(3)  Most of the views she cited as opposing hers were not attributed.


Ad Hominem Fallacy: People who Advocate Increased Disclosure, Regulation, or Restriction of COIs are "Pharmascolds"

The ad hominem fallacy is that a posited defect in the character, abilities, competence etc of a person making an argument means the argument is false, see Nizkor.  Rosenbaum wrote,

Physicians know that 'pharmascolds,' as physician-scientist David Saywitz and Tom Stossel have dubbed them, will 'vilify the medical products industry and portray academics working with them as traitors and sellouts.'(3)

The wording thus gives credence to the idea that anyone who advocates for disclosure, regulation or restriction of conflicts of interest is such a "pharmascold."  The articles by Rosenbaum never seeks to balance that assertion with any epithets that might be applied to people who advocate for unrestricted physician-industry interaction.  The implication is that "pharmascolds" are at best excessively sensitive, or worse, engaged in witch hunts. Thus this appears to be at least a back-handed use of the ad hominem fallacy.

Appeal to Pity Fallacy: People Who Advocate a Lenient Approach to Conflicts of Interest are Besieged by a Monolithic Force of "Pharmascolds"

The appeal to pity is an attempt to make an argument more convincing by making the person making it worthy of pity, see Nizkor.  

Rosenbaum started her second article(3) thus,

In 1980, the Journal’s editor Arnold Relman wrote an editorial entitled, 'The New Medical-Industrial Complex' Although it’s hard to pinpoint the moment when a culture forever changed, the editorial represented a seminal event.

She further stated, "In the ensuing decades, endless attention has been paid."  Her examples of this endless attention were two books, the report by the Institute of Medicine, "new rules," and the "recent passage of the Physician Payment Sunshine Act."

Rosenbaum opened her third article(4) thus,

Although I probably couldn’t have explained its rationale, I never questioned the anti-pharma animus that pervaded my medical education. The message I received from certain outspoken classmates and fellow trainees was that interacting with pharmaceutical reps was simply wrong.

She noted that

I suspect my experience was not unique. Indeed, the American Medical School Student Association (AMSA) now grades medical schools on their creation of a 'pharma-free' environment, issuing annual report cards on conflict-of-interest policies and curricula.

As mentioned above, she cited with dismay her interpretation of a single medical student's opinion that a biased lecture caused "violation."  She later cited a Wall Street Journal article and a British Medical Journal article which she thought were too critical of industry.

Near the end of the article was this personal anecdote,

Recently, for the first time, I was asked to consult for a medical products company. My first thought was, 'This would be fascinating.' My second was, 'There’s no way.' I would have to disclose the relationship, my credibility would suffer, and I would be defenseless. That I immediately succumbed to this fear reflects our failure to manage industry relationships effectively.

So the evidence for a huge, powerful, monolithic movement of "pharmascolds" presented was minimal.  Rosenbaum cited a 1980 article and asserted it changed the world, without any real documentation of that.  Otherwise, she cited a few books, a society of medical students, and some personal anecdotes about medical students.  The most telling anecdote was about the author's person perception that her credibility would suffer - presumably unfairly in her eyes - were she to consult on a "fascinating" project, never mind what she would have been paid to do that.  So at the very end, this ostensibly scholarly article concludes with an apparent appeal to pity its poor author for having to give up this wonderful opportunity.  That seems like the essence of an appeal to pity fallacy.

Furthermore, while the evidence of a powerful army of pharmascolds was lacking, the author did not address the evidence that the majority of academic physicians have conflicts of interest, as do the majority of department chairs(5,6).  While she speculated how a medical school dean might be oppressed by the pharmascolds, she did not address how many medical school deans, leaders of academic medical centers, and other top leaders of academic medicine have conflicts (look here).  Finally, she neglected to mention that conflicts of interest mainly come out of corporate marketing and public relations budgets that total billions in US dollars yearly nationally.

So the image of the poor pitiful defenders of the laissez faire approach to industry relationships seems a bit overdrawn.  


Straw Man Fallacies Industry Critics Claim to be Free of Bias, Equate COIs with Rape and Child Abuse, Use Flawed Reasoning, Believe All Physician-Industry Interactions Constitute Fraud

Per Nizkor, "the Straw Man fallacy is committed when a person simply ignores a person's actual position and substitutes a distorted, exaggerated or misrepresented version of that position."  Rosenbaum attributes to all or most supporters of disclosing, regulating, or restricting conflicts of interest all sorts of statements or beliefs without evidence that anyone, or more than a few people actually hold such beliefs, viz...

But couldn't industry critics blind spots leave them unjustifiably confident that despite their industry aversion, they are bias free?(3)

There was no documentation that industry critics claim they are free of all biases.

The application of language associated with rape and child abuse to the circumstances of education about effective drugs reveals a feature of the conflict-of-interest movement that has fed its contagion and rendered it virtually unassailable....(4)

Note that this was based on a single Harvard Medical student saying a single lecture lead him or her to feel "violated."  There was no documentation that anyone actually made a comparison to rape or child abuse, much less that such ideas are widely held.

Such flawed syllogistic reasoning has become the norm.(4)

Note that this refers to a "narrative" that someone who works with industry must have a favorable view of industry and therefore must make decisions based not on "clinical and research expertise but a desire for financial gain."  That in turn was derived from a single article in the news media.

'If post-Hart political journalism has a motto,' writes [journalist Matt] Bai, 'it would be: 'we know you're a fraud somehow.  Our job is to prove it.'  A similar motto could apply to much reporting on physician-industry interactions.'(4)

Furthermore,

the climate is so permeated with assumptions of fraudulence that treatments ... that have revolutionized our ability to prevent and treat disease become pawns in the hunt for wrongdoing.(4)

The few examples Rosenbaum supplied of supposedly faulty journalism did not seem to discuss fraud at all.

Summary

The series of articles about conflicts of interest that just appeared in the New England Journal, while ostensibly scholarly, published by the journal's "national correspondent" in the Medicine and Society section, appear to be polemical.  They deployed a substantial number of logical fallacies to make the point that medicine and society have gotten too tough on conflicts of interest.  They are notably short on logical, dispassionate discussion of the evidence.  Thus, they seem more like posts on a very opinionated blog site rather than commentaries in a scholarly medical journal.

By publishing this series of high visibility articles, the New England Journal of Medicine seems to have deliberately muddied the waters of discussion about conflicts of interest.  This is sad, because the journal was once considered the foremost English language scholarly medical journal, but it now seems to be publishing polemics.

This latest publishing phenomenon, or debacle, should be a reminder why conflicts of interest, if unhindered, become so prevalent.  They are relationships that benefit both parties involved.  For example, a pharmaceutical company marketing department presumably benefits from the increased revenue generated by increased sales generated by prominent key opinion leaders touting its products in the guise of professional and/or academic experts.  The KOLs, on the other hand, benefit from their generous payment.  Who loses?  - physicians who are increasingly regarded as pharma shills; physicians, whose decision making on behalf of patients may be hindered by constant exposure to marketing and public relations drowning out logical, evidence based discussion;  patients, who need to worry whether the tests and treatments they get were ultimately too influenced by conflict of interest fueled marketing and public relations, and not enough by evidence and logic.

As we said many times before, the web of conflicts of interest that is pervasive in medicine and health care is now threatening to strangle medicine and health care.  For patients and the public to trust health care professionals and health care organizations, they need to know that these individuals and organizations are putting patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain. Health care professionals who care for patients, those who teach about medicine and health care, clinical researchers, and those who make medical and health care policy should do so free from conflicts of interest that might inhibit their abilities to put patients and the public's health first. 

ADDENDUM (21 May, 2015) - See also detailed comments by Larry Husten on Forbes.and by Dr Susan Molchan on the HealthNewsReview blog.  Both delve into the details of some of the cases and data that Dr Rosenbaum does cite, and thus raise questions about the facts she chose to use, and how she chose to interpret them. Also, corrected citation for "pharmascolds."

ADDENDUM (26 May, 2015) - See additional posts here, here, here and here by Micky on the 1BoringOldMan blog.

ADDENDUM (29 May, 2015) - See posts in the Lown Institute blog by Shannon Brownlee, Dr Vinay Prasad, and Dr Vikas Saini. 

ADDENDUM (8 June, 2015 - See also comments by Dr Steven Reidbord in the KevinMD blog. 


References
1.Drazen JM.  Revisiting the commercial-academic interface.  N Eng J Med 2015; ; 372:1853-1854. Link here.
2. Rosenbaum L.  Reconnecting the dots - reinterpreting industry-physician relations.  N Eng J Med 2015; 372:1860-1864.  Link here.
3. Rosenbaum L. Understanding bias - the case for careful study.  N Engl J Med 2015;  372:1959-1963.  Link here.
4.  Rosenbaum L.  Beyond moral outrage - weighing the trade-offs of COI regulation. N Engl J Med 2015; 372: 2064-2068.  Link here.
5.  Campbell EG, Gruen RL, Mountford J et al. A national survey of physician–industry relationships. N Engl J Med 2007; 356:1742-1750. Llink here.
6.  Campbell EG, Weissman JS, Ehringhaus S et al.  Institutional academic-industry relationships.  JAMA 2007;298(15):1779-1786. doi:10.1001/jama.298.15.1779.  Link here.

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