Ho-hum, Another Month, Another Set of Multi-Million Dollar Settlements by Health Care Corporations Acting Badly

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Ho-hum, Another Month, Another Set of Multi-Million Dollar Settlements by Health Care Corporations Acting Badly

Unknown 2/21/2016 Komentar

Amazingly, with a US presidential election looming, there is finally some public discussion here of the impunity of top corporate executives.  Columnist Gretcher Moregenson wrote on February 6, 2016 in the New York Times,

Ho-hum, another week, another multimillion-dollar settlement between regulators and a behemoth bank acting badly.

Then,

As has become all too common in these cases, not one individual was identified as being responsible for the activities. Once again, shareholders are shouldering the costs of unethical behavior they had nothing to do with.

It could not be clearer: Years of tighter rules from legislators and bank regulators have done nothing to fix the toxic, me-first cultures that afflict big financial firms.

Similarly, but more broadly, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D - Massachusetts) published a report in January, 2016, entitled "Rigged Justice: 2016 - How Weak Enforcement Lets Corporate Offenders Off Easy." She summarized its main conclusions in a New York Times op-ed,

Corporate criminals routinely escape meaningful prosecution for their misconduct.

Furthermore,

In a single year, in case after case, across many sectors of the economy, federal agencies caught big companies breaking the law — defrauding taxpayers, covering up deadly safety problems, even precipitating the financial collapse in 2008 — and let them off the hook with barely a slap on the wrist. Often, companies paid meager fines, which some will try to write off as a tax deduction.

The failure to adequately punish big corporations or their executives when they break the law undermines the foundations of this great country. Justice cannot mean a prison sentence for a teenager who steals a car, but nothing more than a sideways glance at a C.E.O. who quietly engineers the theft of billions of dollars.

These enforcement failures demean our principles. They also represent missed opportunities to address some of the nation’s most pressing challenges.

In particular, she cited this example involving health care.

When Novartis, a major drug company that was already effectively on federal probation for misconduct, paid kickbacks to pharmacies to push certain drugs, it cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars and undermined patient health. Under the law, the government can boot companies that defraud Medicare and Medicaid out of those programs, but when Novartis got caught, it just paid a penalty — one so laughably small that its C.E.O. said afterward that it 'remains to be seen' whether his company would actually consider changing its behavior.

Note that we discussed the Novartis settlement here.  The case referred to by Senator Warren was just the latest in a series of ethical misadventures by Novartis which led to legal actions in the US and around the world, but feeble penalties.

But while Ms Morgenson wrote about financial institutions, now we can also write:

Ho-hum, another month, another set of multimillion-dollar settlements between regulators and  behemoth health care companies acting badly.

In chronological order, since mid-January, 2016...

For $830 Million, Merck Settled Shareholders Lawsuit Alleging Deceptions by Corporate Management

On January 15, 2016, the Wall Street Journal reported,

Merck said Friday it agreed to pay $830 million to resolve a class-action lawsuit brought by shareholders, alleging the drug maker and its executives made false and misleading statements about the safety of Vioxx between its introduction in 1999 and its market withdrawal in 2004.

The shareholders alleged they paid inflated prices for Merck shares because of the company’s conduct.

Note that if the company misled its shareholders, it also misled health care professionals and the public about the harms of Vioxx,  putting many patients at risk. Of course, the Vioxx case is now old news, but it continues to be an example of a case in which the corporation paid fines, presumably at the expense of shareholders, employees and patients, but in which no one who authorized or directed the bad behavior paid any penalty.

As is typical in such cases,

Merck, which is based in Kenilworth, N.J., said Friday the settlement of the shareholders’ lawsuit doesn’t constitute an admission of liability or wrongdoing by the company or individual executives named as defendants in the case.

Merck has paid billions to settle multiple lawsuits related to Vioxx, yet what it paid was much less than the revenue produced by the drug.

The bulk of Merck’s Vioxx-related costs came from its 2007 agreement to pay $4.85 billion to settle thousands of product-liability lawsuits alleging that patients’ use of Vioxx caused heart attacks and strokes, and that Merck failed to properly warn people of the risks. Merck didn’t admit liability in that settlement.

In addition, Merck agreed in 2011 to pay $950 million to resolve allegations by the U.S. Justice Department and state governments that the company deceived the government about the safety of Vioxx, and marketed it for uses not included in the prescribing label approved by the Food and Drug Administration.

Merck recorded more than $11 billion in Vioxx sales during the drug’s years on the market from mid-1999 to September 2004.

The company did plead guilty to one criminal charge related to Vioxx.

 As part of the 2011 settlement, Merck pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor criminal violation of a federal drug law, admitting that it promoted Vioxx to treat rheumatoid arthritis before that use was approved by the FDA.

But apparently no Merck manager was ever charged with a crime, much less convicted.  We have discussed the Vioxx case here, and other issues with Merck here.

Note that this settlement comes soon after a smaller settlement in 2015 that was barely mentioned in the press,Merck to pay $5.9 million for misleading marketing of pink eye drug: U.S [Reuters]

For $785 Million, Pfizer Settled Suit Alleging Overcharging of Medicaid

On February 16, 2016, per the Wall Street Journal,

Drugmaker Pfizer Inc. on Tuesday said it reached an agreement in principle to pay $784.6 million to settle a long-running U.S. government investigation of allegations that its Wyeth unit overcharged government Medicaid health programs for the heartburn drug Protonix.

Of course,

Pfizer said the agreement doesn’t include any admission of liability by Wyeth.

Much less did the agreement include any penalties for anyone at Wyeth or Pfizer who authorized or directed the overcharging. Yet some people must have.

Note that this settlement did not seem informed by Pfizer's amazingly lengthy record of legal settlements, and some guilty pleas and/or convictions (for illegal marketing/ misbranding, and for violating the racketeering influenced corrupt organization [RICO]  statute), as most recently summarized here.

Note also, pertinent to the report by Senator Warren mentioned above, every week people pay severe penalties for defrauding Medicaid, Medicare, or other federal health programs.  Today, a quick Google search for "medicaid fraud prison" found such stories from the last month as a woman sentenced to five years in Louisville, and another women sentenced again to five years in Dallas. Yet no person at Pfizer paid any penalty for for practices that deprived the government of hundreds of millions of dollars.  

For $250 Million, Fresenius Settled Lawsuits Alleging it Withheld Information About the its Products' Hazards

Per the New York Times, January 18, 2016,

The world’s largest provider of kidney dialysis equipment and services has agreed to pay $250 million to settle thousands of lawsuits from dialysis patients and their relatives claiming that the company’s products had caused heart problems and deaths.

The settlement was announced by Fresenius Medical Care, a German company whose North American division is one of the two large dialysis providers in the United States.

The lawsuits arose after Fresenius’s own medical office sent an internal memo to doctors in the company’s dialysis centers saying that failure to properly use one of the company’s products appeared to be causing a sharp increase in sudden deaths from cardiac arrest.

But the company did not warn doctors in non-Fresenius clinics who were also using the product, called GranuFlo. It did so only after the internal memo was sent anonymously to the Food and Drug Administration, which began an investigation.

 The company conducted a recall, which was actually a change in the label, not the removal of the product from the market.

Note that this settlement was of allegations not of financial chicanery, but of behavior that put patients in harms way. Nonetheless,

Kent Jarrell, a spokesman for the company, said the initial internal memo was actually incorrect and contradicted by further careful analysis. He said the warning language added to the GranuFlo label in 2012 was eventually removed. GranuFlo, and a related product called NaturaLyte, are used in dialysis machines to help cleanse patients’ blood.

In the first case to go to trial, a jury in Massachusetts state court ruled that Fresenius was negligent, for not distributing the memo more widely, but that a patient’s death could not be attributed to GranuFlo, so no monetary damages were awarded, according to Mr. Jarrell and to Christopher Seeger, a lawyer who led the settlement negotiations for the plaintiffs.

But if the initial concern was unwarranted and Fresenius won the first trial, why would it pay $250 million to settle? Mr. Jarrell suggested that a reason was to put the more than 10,000 lawsuits behind it.

'Fresenius deeply regrets the confusion and concern temporarily generated by the November 2011 memorandum,' he said in an emailed statement.

Again, there were no admissions or findings of guilt, no apologies (except for causing "confusion and concern"), and no negative consequences for the corporate managers who authorized or directed the actions in question.  While the FDA apparently issued a recall notice for GranuFlo, no federal agency apparently took action against the company or any individuals within it.    Also, this settlement seemed uninformed by previous settlements made by Fresenius, which were made in 2011 of allegations of false claims, in 2010 again of allegations of false claims, and in 2007 of allegations of restraint of trade (look here).

Summary

We first discussed how legal settlements may serve as markers for misbehavior by large health care organizations, but not as deterrents to future bad behavior in 2006.  Then we wrote ...

 Why do the mainly monetary penalties seem mainly to come out of the hides of stock-holders and consumers, rather than the people who actually made the decisions that lead to the offenses?

In 2008, we wrote,

After all, a fine or settlement paid years later can just be written off as a cost of doing business. Furthermore, although such a payment may have a (minimal) effect on the company's bottom line, it has no real effect on the people whose decisions and actions lead to the problem.

So rather than repeating our usual verbiage about the impunity of health care leaders, let me defer to Senator Warren:

Laws are effective only to the extent they are enforced. A law on the books has little impact if prosecution is highly unlikely.

This country devotes substantial resources to the prosecution of crimes such as murder, assault, kidnapping, burglary and theft, both in an effort to deter future criminal activity and to provide victims with some degree of justice. Strong enforcement of corporate criminal laws serves similar goals: to deter future criminal activity by making would-be lawbreakers think twice before breaking the law and, sometimes, by helping victims recover from their injuries.

When government regulators and prosecutors fail to pursue big corporations or their executives who violate the law, or when the government lets them off with a slap on the wrist, corporate criminals have free rein to operate outside the law. They can game the system, cheat families, rip off taxpayers, and even take actions that result in the death of innocent victims—all with no serious consequences.

The failure to punish big corporations or their executives when they break the law undermines the foundations of this great country: If justice means a prison sentence for a teenager who steals a car, but it means nothing more than a sideways glance at a CEO who quietly engineers the theft of billions of dollars, then the promise of equal justice under the law has turned into a lie. The failure to prosecute big, visible crimes has a corrosive effect on the fabric of democracy and our shared belief that we are all equal in the eyes of the law.

Under the current approach to enforcement, corporate criminals routinely escape meaningful prosecution for their misconduct. This is so despite the fact that the law is unambiguous: if a corporation has violated the law, individuals within the corporation must also have violated the law. If the corporation is subject to charges of wrongdoing, so are those in the corporation who planned, authorized or took the actions. But even in cases of flagrant corporate law breaking, federal law enforcement agencies – and particularly the Department of Justice (DOJ) – rarely seek prosecution of individuals. In fact, federal agencies rarely pursue convictions of either large corporations or their executives in a court of law. Instead, they agree to criminal and civil settlements with corporations that rarely require any admission of wrongdoing and they let the executives go free without any individual accountability.

Keep in mind that the impunity of health care leaders, especially in contrast with the tough enforcement efforts against small fry health care offenders, not only has a corrosive effect on the fabric of democracy but endangers patients' and the public's health, and makes health care more expensive and inaccessible.

Maybe now that the impunity of corporate leaders is becoming a mainstream topic of discussion, we can start talking about, and then doing something about the impunity of corporate leaders in health care. 

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Pfizer's Latest International Pfiascos - Charges of Anti-Competitive Practices, Inflated Prices, Deception and Secrecy

adverse effects antitrust deception executive compensation health care prices legal settlements marketing Pfizer suppression of medical research vaccines

Pfizer's Latest International Pfiascos - Charges of Anti-Competitive Practices, Inflated Prices, Deception and Secrecy

Unknown 9/14/2015 Komentar

Many big health care organizations seem to just be unable to keep out of trouble, and the bigger they are, the more kinds of trouble.  Pfizer Inc, considered to be one of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies, has supplied us with plenty of stories.  Enough new stories about Pfizer have accumulated since last year to do a roundup.   

Presented in chronological order....

Italy Demands Damages from Pfizer for Anti-Trust Violations

This story came out in May, 2014, via Reuters,

Italy said on Wednesday it was seeking more than a billion euros in damages from multinational drug companies following a ruling by the country's antitrust authority that their policies had been detrimental to Italy's national health service.

The health ministry said in a statement it was requesting a total 1.2 billion euros ($1.6 billion) from Novartis and Roche for the damages incurred in 2012-2014, and was requesting 14 million euros from Pfizer.

It cited several recent antitrust rulings that the companies' repeated anti-competitive actions had caused the national health service 'considerable damage'.

The specific charges against Pfizer were:

Italy's state council, the highest administrative court, in February ruled that Pfizer had abused its dominant position relating to the glaucoma drug Xalatan 'with a clear and persistent intention to suppress competition'.

At least in English language news sources, I have not seen how this turned out, but note that this was apparently an administrative court finding, not just a prosecutor's allegation.

Pfizer Accused of Overcharging for Pediatric Vaccines

This appeared in January, 2015, here via Ed Silverman's PharmaLot blog (when it was affiliated with the Wall Street Journal),

In a bid to widen access to vaccines, Doctors Without Borders is calling on Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline to lower the prices for their pneumococcal vaccines to $5 per child in developing countries. The non-profit claims the drug makers are 'overcharging' donors and developing countries for vaccines that 'already earn them billions of dollars in wealthy countries.'

The non-profit, which regularly advocates for lower prices for medicines, maintains that, in general, the price to vaccinate a child against several diseases is now a 'colossal' 68 times more expensive than in 2001. In a new report, Doctors Without Borders attributes 45% of that increased cost to the price tags for pneumococcal vaccines sold by the drug makers. Pneumococcal disease, by the way, kills about 1 million children per year, mostly in poor and developing nations.

Think about the children.

The non-profit maintains that the current price tag makes it difficult to supply the vaccine to large numbers of children, and the drug makers have already received $1 billion in incentives to manufacturer the vaccine for developing countries. 'We think it’s time for Glaxo and Pfizer to do their part to make vaccines more affordable for countries in the long term, because the discounts the companies are offering today are just not good enough,' says Malpani in a statement.

Moreover, Doctors Without Borders warns that pricing may eventually make it harder for a growing number of middle-income countries to afford vaccines. Over time, some of these countries will eventually ‘graduate’ from the subsidized vaccine pricing established by Gavi and, when that happens, Doctors Without Borders estimates costs may rise up to six times what is the countries pay today.

The post included a statement from Pfizer about how hard it is to manufacture the vaccine, and an update to the post included a statement from Pfizer that it was already selling its pneumococcal vaccine, Prevenar 13, below cost to GAVI, which buys up vaccines and provides them to poor countries. A week later, again via (the old version of) PharmaLot, Pfizer announced an additional 6% price cut. Furthermore, Bill Gates, whose foundation supports GAVI, insisted that cutting vaccine prices would discourage pharmaceutical companies from investing in vaccine research and supplying products to poor countries, according to the Guardian.

However, neither Pfizer nor Mr Gates acknowledged how much money Pfizer already is making from Prevenar in developed countries, amounts which likely do far more than offset any losses in poorer countries. Specifically, in July, 2015 FierceVaccines reported that

The world's biggest vaccine by sales--Prevnar 13--just keeps getting bigger. And in doing so, the shot helped Pfizer notch 44% vaccines growth for the second quarter as the unit saw sales grow from $1.09 billion in last year's Q2 to $1.58 billion during the period this year.

For the quarter, the superstar pneumococcal disease-blocker notched a U.S. sales increase of 87% versus the same period last year, a jump Pfizer CEO Ian Read attributed to 'continued strong uptake' in U.S. adults.

Also,

Prevnar 13, which reeled in $4.29 billion in sales last year, is expected to grow to $5.83 billion in 2020 and remain atop the vaccines sales charts.

And,

The company is also working 'country by country' to broaden the vaccine's reach in G7 countries....

So there seems to be some evidence in support of the Doctors Without Borders claim that Pfizer could easily afford some small losses selling vaccines for use by poor children in less developed countries while it makes billions of dollars from vaccine sales in developed countries.  


Pfizer Settles Shareholder Suit for $400M

This settlement was just the latest that has resulted from allegations of illegal drug marketing by Pfizer.  As reported again by the redoubtable Ed Silverman in the old version of PharmaLot,

Pfizer has reached an agreement in principle to pay $400 million to settle a class-action securities lawsuit that alleged the drug maker illegally marketed several medicines and, subsequently, caused investors to lose money, according to a filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The lawsuit alleged that, between January 2006 and January 2009, Pfizer marketed several drugs on an off-label basis. The medicines included the Bextra painkiller that was withdrawn from the market in 2005; the Geodon antipsychotic; the Zyvox antibiotic and the Lyrica epilepsy treatment.

The lawsuit, which was filed in federal court in 2010, alleged that the sales boost the drug maker received from the marketing prompted Pfizer executives to make 'false and misleading statements about Pfizer’s financial performance and sales practices [that] caused Pfizer stock to trade at artificially inflated prices.'

This settlement followed an even larger one back in 2009 when,

the drug maker revealed plans to pay $2.3 billion to resolve criminal and civil allegations that these drugs were marketed illegally.

We discussed that settlement in 2009 here, here, and here.  Note that the 2009 settlement included a guilty plea to a criminal charge (albeit to a misdemeanor), and was of allegations including paying kickbacks to doctors for use of Pfizer drugs.  So this additional settlement of deceiving investors just ices that cake. 

UK Competition and Markets Authority Stated Pfizer Abused Market Dominance

This story appeared in August, 2015, via the Telegraph,

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has issued a statement of objections alleging the companies breached UK and EU law by raising the prices they charged for phenytoin sodium sold to the NHS.

In particular,

The CMA says that for years industry giant Pfizer, which is listed in the US, and Flynn, a Stevenage-based company, between them sold the drug at a price up to 27 times higher than it had been previously priced.

Before September 2012, Pfizer manufactured and sold phenytoin sodium capsules to UK wholesalers and pharmacies under the brand name Epanutin.

Pfizer then sold the UK distribution rights for Epanutin to Flynn, which 'de-branded' the drug and started selling its version in September 2012. Pfizer continued to manufacture the drug, which it sold to Flynn at prices the CMA says were 'significantly higher' than those at which it had previously sold Epanutin.

The CMA claims Pfizer sold the drug at between 8 and 17 times its historic prices to Flynn, which then sold on phenytoin sodium at between 25 to 27 times more than the prices previously charged by Pfizer.

Before Flynn bought the rights for Epanutin, the NHS spent about £2.3m on phenytoin sodium capsules a year, according to the CMA. After the deal this spend rose to just over £50m in 2013 and more than £40m in 2014.

While the CMA findings were apparently "provisional," but the agency has the power to find that the law has been breached and "has the power to fine then up to 10pc of their global annual turnover - last year Pfizer had revenue of almost $50bn."  So this is the second government finding of anti-competitive behavior by Pfizer in a little over one year.

Pfizer Resists AllTrials Calls for Transparency

Late in August, 2014, per the Guardian,

Pfizer, one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical groups, has said it will resist demands from investors and transparency campaigners that it disclose results from all historical drug trials.

We have been discussing how pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and device companies have manipulated the clinical trials they sponsor to increase the likelihood that the results make their products look good, and may suppress trials whose results cannot be made to look good enough. This clinical research suppression and manipulation can lead to poor clinical decisions, may harm patients, and abuses the trust of patients who volunteer to participate in clinical research. This situation has led to the AllTrials campaign to make clinical research transparent (look here). However,

Pfizer said it had a 'longstanding commitment to clinical trial transparency' and it already published data for trials from 2007. Requests for earlier data are considered on an individual basis. But it added: 'We don’t believe that further investment beyond this would offer value to patients, health services or to our shareholders.'

This despite arguments above about the harms of research suppression.  Given how much money Pfizer has spent on lawsuits, including one above about allegations of its management's deception of shareholders, one might think it would be worth it for management to make a little investment in transparency.

Pfizer Found to Have Withheld Reports of Adverse Drug Events in Japan

Finally, reported in September, 2015 by in-PharmaTechnologist.com,

Pfizer failed to report hundreds of serious adverse drug reactions (ADRs) in the required timeframes according to Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) which has issued the US firm with a business improvement order. 

That website has copy protection so I cannot quote further, but the order involved 11 drugs, including Enbrel and Lyrica.  So here is yet another example of a government agency finding that Pfizer was less than transparent, if not overtly deceptive.

Summary

So in a little more than a year, Pfizer has been accused of anti-competitive practices raising drug costs in Italy, excess pricing of vaccines for use by poor children in undeveloped countries, deceiving its own investors about illegal marketing activities in the US, abuse of market dominance leading to excessive drug costs in the UK, stonewalling clinical trial transparency measures globally, and failing to disclose adverse drug effects in a timely manner in Japan.  This is on top of an already impressive record of misbehavior (See our summary of Pfizer mischief at the end of the post.)

However, as seems usual these days, no one at Pfizer who might have authorized, directed or implemented any of this bad behavior has ever seemingly paid any sort of penalty for it.  Instead, while this was going on, the top leadership of Pfizer just gets richer faster and faster.  In fact, in March, 2015, the Wall Street Journal reported the current Pfizer CEO's total compensation in 2014,

Pfizer Inc. said Thursday that Chief Executive Ian Read’s total compensation rose 23% last year, lifted by an increase in pension value that offset a reduced annual bonus and equity award.

Furthermore,

Mr. Read’s 2014 pay package totaled $23.3 million. The board raised the CEO’s salary to $1.83 million from $1.79 million but decreased his annual bonus by $400,000 and his equity award by nearly $1 million despite concluding that Mr. Read’s leadership during the year was 'outstanding.'

[Even though] Over the course of 2014, shares in the New York-based pharmaceutical company gained about 2% amid a 4% decrease in revenue.

It is not obvious that the rise in CEO pay is even remotely correlated to any rise in share-holder value.  Moreover, there seems to be a total disconnect between the rewards given the CEO and the ethical record of the company he leads, especially since Pfizer, which calls itself "one of the world's premier pharmaceutical" corporations, announces its aspirations thus,

we at Pfizer are committed to applying science and our global resources to improve health and well-being at every stage of life. We strive to provide access to safe, effective and affordable medicines and related health care services to the people who need them.

Never mind all those pesky allegations of overpricing, anti-competitive practices, deception and opaqueness, and never mind that current executives are becoming exceedingly risk in part from the continuation of such practices.  So it seems the board of Pfizer will just continue handing its executives piles of money, despite, or for all I know, because of the company's continuing bad behavior.  Given these incentives, is it any wonder that the bad behavior continues?  Pfizer seems to be just another example - albeit a big one - of how health care is dominated by an oligarchy of unaccountable leaders who continue to demonstrate their impunity hidden by aspirational but hollow public relations and marketing.

Of course, it is doubtful such bad behavior would continue if there risks of external penalties, e.g., from law enforcement.  But there never seem to be any.

In the past, US law enforcement authorities have announced they would use the responsible corporate officer doctrine, a legally tested rationale for prosecuting corporate managers for bad behavior by those who report to them (e.g., in 2010, look here),  But it seems they have never done so, at least in cases involving large health care organizations.  Last week, the US Department of Justice announced it would start going after executives of companies that misbehave, and would press the companies to give up the name of responsible executives in exchange for more lenient treatment of the companies themselves (e.g., see this report in the NY Times).  Meanwhile, however, the march of legal settlements for bad behavior in health care continues, absent any penalties for organizational leaders who might have authorized or directed it, much less for those who simply put incentives in place to foster bad behavior while looking away from what those incentives inspired.    

I hope these current promises by law enforcement officials are not as hollow as earlier ones, because continuing our society's continuing failure to rein in corrupt business practices via law enforcement and regulation may lead a desperate populace to more radical approaches. The UK Labor Party just elected a Marxist leader (see this Reuters report.)  One wonders how long it will be before anger at the larger oligarchy, of which health care leadership is merely a part, boils over in other countries, and in more radical ways.

Instead, we continue to advocate for true health care reform with the immediate priority of changing how health care organizations are led, and ensuring leadership that upholds health care values, is willing to be accountable, and is open, honest, transparent and ethical.  We still may have time to reform.  But the reform will have to be big and true.  If not, moderate voices may be drowned out, and the results may be worse than anyone could imagine.

Appendix - Pfizer's Previous Settlements


For all our posts on Pfizer, look here.

In the beginning of the 21st century, according to the Philadelphia Inquirer, Pfizer made three major settlements,
- In 2002, Pfizer and subsidiaries Warner-Lambert and Parke-Davis agreed to pay $49 million to settle allegations that the company fraudulently avoided paying fully rebates owed to the state and federal governments under the national Medicaid Rebate program for the cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor.
- In 2004, Pfizer agreed to pay $430 million to settle DOJ claims involving the off-label promotion of the epilepsy drug Neurontin by subsidiary Warner-Lambert. The promotions included flying doctors to lavish resorts and paying them hefty speakers' fees to tout the drug. The company said the activity took place years before it bought Warner-Lambert in 2000.
- In 2007, Pfizer agreed to pay $34.7 million in fines to settle Department of Justice allegations that it improperly promoted the human growth hormone product Genotropin. The drugmaker's Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. subsidiary pleaded guilty to offering a kickback to a pharmacy-benefits manager to sell more of the drug.

Thereafter,
- Pfizer paid a $2.3 billion settlement in 2009 of civil and criminal allegations and a Pfizer subsidiary entered a guilty plea to charges it violated federal law regarding its marketing of Bextra (see post here).
- Pfizer was involved in two other major cases from then to early 2010, including one in which a jury found the company guilty of violating the RICO (racketeer-influenced corrupt organization) statute (see post here).
- The company was listed as one of the pharmaceutical "big four" companies in terms of defrauding the government (see post here).
- Pfizer's Pharmacia subsidiary settled allegations that it inflated drugs costs paid by New York in early 2011 (see post here). 
- In March, 2011, a settlement was announced in a long-running class action case which involved allegations that another Pfizer subsidiary had exposed many people to asbestos (see this story in Bloomberg).
- In October, 2011, Pfizer settled allegations that it illegally marketed bladder control drug Detrol (see this post).
- In August, 2012, Pfizer settled allegations that its subsidiaries bribed foreign (that is, with respect to the US) government officials, including government-employed doctors (see this post).
- In December, 2012, Pfizer settled federal charges that its Wyeth subsidiary deceptively marketed the proton pump inhibitor drug Protonix, using systematic efforts to deceive approved by top management, and settled charges by multiple states' Attorneys' General that it deceptively marketed Zyvox and Lyrica (see this post).
- In January, 2013, Pfizer settled Texas charges that it had misreported information to and over-billed Medicaid (see this post).
- In July, 2013, Pfizer settled charges of illegal marketing of Rapamune (see this post.)
- In April, 2014, Pfizer settled allegations of anti-trust law violations for delaying generic versions of Neurontin( see this post).
- In June, 2014, Pfizer settled another lawsuit alleging illegal marketing of Neurontin (see this post).

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Praluent, the Next Expensive "Game Changer," Blockbuster," "New Hope," - But Not Yet Shown to Benefit Patients

aliromucab evidence-based medicine health care prices manipulating clinical research PCSK9 inhibitor Praluent Regeneron Sanofi-Aventis

Praluent, the Next Expensive "Game Changer," Blockbuster," "New Hope," - But Not Yet Shown to Benefit Patients

Unknown 8/06/2015 Komentar

Here we go again.  The same month that it approved Entresto (look here), the US Food and Drug Administration approved a new PCSK9 inhibitor cholesterol lowering agent, alirocumab, immediately marketed as the pricy Praluent by Sanofi and Regeneron, and heralded by a blast of media hype.  Yet the evidence that this drug benefits patients is lacking, and critical review of the one big published randomized controlled trial of it raises many concerns.

Media Hype

Let us first consider the media hype.  The TIME coverage started with this headline,

This New FDA-Approved Cholesterol Drug is a Game Changer

The New York Times article by Andrew Pollack quoted Katherine Wilemon, founder and president of the FH foundation, an advocacy group for patients with familial hypercholesterolemia, who have very high cholesterol values and increased risk of heart and vascular disease,

It represents a new era of hope for us.

The Washington Post article started with,

The Food and Drug Administration on Friday approved the first in a new class of cholesterol-busting drugs that many doctors believe will trigger a breakthrough in reducing the incidence of strokes and heart attacks, which kill hundreds of thousands of Americans each year.

USA Today reported,

The drugs are predicted to be blockbusters many times over, adding billions of dollars to prescription drug costs, said Steve Miller, senior vice president and chief medical officer at Express Scripts, a leading pharmacy benefit manager.

Another NY Times article by Gina Kolata directly described the drug as

powerful almost beyond belief.

Ms Colata also quoted a cardiologist who characterized the drug again as a "game changer."

To be fair, note that while the WaPo article, NYT article by Pollack and the USA Today article provided hype attributed to "doctors," or identified individuals, they also quoted some people who were very skeptical about the drug.  However, in most of the media coverage, the positivity seemed to be more prominent and extreme than the skepticism. 

The High Price

In general, the media coverage noted that the "breakthrough," "blockbuster," "powerful" new drug would not come cheap.  Praluent would cost about $14,600 a year.  Naturally, those selling it saw this as a bargain.  For example, Andrew Pollack wrote in the NYT,

Sanofi and Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, which developed the product, said the price was justified by the potential benefits to patients and savings to the health care system that the drug would provide by preventing heart attacks and strokes — though the ability of the drug to do that has not been proved.

'We came to a price that is reflective of value, not what the market will bear,' said Elias Zerhouni, head of research and development at Sanofi, who said his own brother had suffered three heart attacks and needed new options to control cholesterol.

Gina Kolata went farther,

The $14,600 yearly price of the drug, which is injected under the skin once every two weeks, is a stunner. Yet for some patients, that might actually be a bargain.

She justified this by comparing the cost to apheresis, a radical procedure to treat high cholesterol. She did not discuss whether it had any evidence of clinical benefit. Yet,

'Cost is in the eye of the beholder,' said Dr. Daniel Soffer, [Mr. DeRuchie’s cardiologist at the University of Pennsylvania.

Presumably, Dr Soffer was the one who had recommended the apheresis treatment.

Note that at best, the company that sells this drug can justify the price only in terms of potential, not actual value or results.  

No Evidence for Clinical Benefit

Praluent, generic name alirocumb, is certainly a breakthrough in that it seeks to lower cholesterol through a novel mechanism.  The drug is a biologic, a monoclonal antibody that inhibits the enzyme PCSK9.

Yet a close reading of the one large published randomized controlled trial of alirocumab(1) belays the hype beyond that.  The study by Robinson et al was a double blind randomized controlled trial of alirocumab injections every 2 weeks versus placebo.  The protocol called for patients to be treated for 78 weeks, and followed for 8 more weeks, a bit more than one and one-half years.

Loss to Follow Up and Missing Data

The study enrolled 1553 patients in the alirocumab group, and 788 in the placebo group.  However, many patients did not complete the study: a total of 437 (28.1%) in the alirocumab group, and 193 (24.5% in the placebo group).  Reasons for noncompletion were adverse events (113, 7.2% alirocumab vs 47, 6.0% placebo); "nonadherent" to treatment (60, 3.9% vs 38, 4.7%), and "other reason," (264, 17.0% vs 108, 13.7%).

So the drop out rate was fairly high.  It was particularly troubling that the reasons for most of the drop outs were vague "other reaons."  I could not find a clarification of this term in the main article or  supplemental materials.

Furthermore, it was not clear how the investigators intended to collect data from patients after they dropped out, and how complete data collection about clinical events was for patients who dropped out.  (Note that for patients that dropped out, the investigators simply imputed, that is estimated cholesterol values, but did not necessarily measure them.  So even this measure was "potential.")

Drop outs and missing data are classically problematic because patients may drop out after suffering  events that could be counted as study outcomes.  The rate of these events could differ according to treatment group.  If patients who dropped out of the alirocumab group had more adverse events than those who dropped out of the placebo group, and these events were not recorded, the high drop out rate could have concealed important harms of the drug.

Thus it is quite possible that the study by Robinson et al undercounted adverse events due to aliromucab.

Multiple Study Sites

The study enrolled patients at a remarkable number of sites, 320 in 27 countries, so that the average number of patients enrolled per site was only seven.    It seems improbable that a study involving so many investigators and centers, most of whom must have devoted little of their time and effort to this particular study, would have adequate quality control.  I could not find a discussion of implementation quality control in the published article.

Thus it is possible that poor quality of study implementation, which could have affected enrollment and data collection, may have challenged the validity of the Robinson et al study.

 Lack of Generalizability in the Patient Population

The complete list of exclusion criteria, only appearing in the supplementary material, was extensive.  Patients with many common problems were supposed to be excluded, and the definition of the some exclusion criteria were vague and subjective.

Common conditions leading to exclusion were:
- Recent heart and cardiovascular problems, i.e., "(within 3 months prior to the screening visit [Week -3] or between screening and randomization visits) MI, unstable angina leading to hospitalization, uncontrolled cardiac arrhythmia, CABG, PCI, carotid surgery or stenting, cerebrovascular accident, transient ischemic attack, endovascular procedure or surgical intervention for peripheral vascular disease."
- "Planned to undergo scheduled PCI, CABG, carotid or peripheral revascularization during the study"
-  Severe congestive heart failure, i.e., "New York Heart Association Class III or IV heart failure within the past 12 months"
- Poorly controlled hypertension, i.e., "Systolic blood pressure >180 mmHg or diastolic blood pressure >110 mmHg at screening visit or randomization visit."
- "History of hemorrhagic stroke."
- "History of active optic nerve disease."
- Use of systemic corticosteroids, other than for replacement 
- "History of cancer within the past 5 years, except for adequately treated basal cell skin cancer, squamous cell skin cancer, or in situ cervical cancer."
- "History of HIV positivity."
-   "Positive test for Hepatitis B surface antigen and/or Hepatitis C antibody (confirmed by reflexive testing)."
- Kidney dysfunction, specifically, "eGFR <30 nbsp="" p="">- Poorly controlled diabetes, specifically, HbA1c >10%.
- Abnormal liver enzymes, specifically, ALT or AST > x ULN

Vaguely described exclusions were:

E 25. Conditions/situations such as:
A) Any clinically significant abnormality identified at the time of screening that in the
judgment of the Investigator or any sub-Investigator would preclude safe completion
of the study or constrain endpoints assessment such as major systemic diseases,
patients with short life expectancy.
B) Patients considered by the Investigator or any sub-Investigator as inappropriate
for this study for any reason, e.g.:
i) Those deemed unable to meet specific protocol requirements, such as scheduled
visits.
ii) Those deemed unable to administer or tolerate long-term injections as per the
patient or the investigator.

Also,

iv) Presence of any other conditions (eg, geographic, social….) actual or anticipated,
that the Investigator feels would restrict or limit the patient’s participation for the
duration of the study.

Thus the study would have excluded patients with a variety of common conditions, and may have excluded many other patients based on rather poorly defined decisions by individual investigators.  Since patients in clinical practice commonly have common conditions, the generalizability of the results of this study to many practices and patients was not clear.

No Evidence of Clinical Benefit

Patients should not be subject to treatments whose benefits do not clearly outweigh their harms.  The Robinson et al article focused on reductions in measured cholesterol, particularly LDL cholesterol.  The new drug certainly did seem to clearl reduce cholesterol, particularly LDL cholesterol.  However, these are only the results of laboratory tests.

Although high cholesterol and high LDL cholesterol indicate increased risk of future cardiac events, many patients with abnormal values do not have such events.  Having a high cholesterol or LDL cholesterol does not directly cause symptoms, or dysfunction.  Thus simply lowering cholesterol does not immediately or directly benefit patients.  Furthermore, other drug have been shown to lower cholesterol, but ultimately they accomplished this without ever being shown to benefit patients, e.g., by preventing heart attacks, strokes, or premature death.

However, cholesterol values are considered intermediate or surrogate variables.  They are not directly related to what happens to patients, who they feel or function, whether they get new diseases, or when they die.  So only showing that the new drug lowers cholesterol does not prove clinical patient benefit.

Although the published trial did attempt to record cardiovascular events, it did not find that the drug prevented them.  The small difference in total cardiovascular events affecting patients given alirocumab (4.6%) versus placebo (5.1%) did not reach statistical significance, that is, could well have been due to chance alone.

Furthermore, while elevated cholesterol is a chronic problem, and the problems with which it is correlated occur over the long run, the study ran for less than 2 years.  It could not measure the effects of the new drug beyond that.

So the clinical benefit of the drug was not evident in this trial.

On the other hand, the drug was not without its own risks.  More patients who received aliromucab left the study due to adverse events (7.2%) thand did those who got placebo (5.8%),  as noted above.  Also, as noted above, it was possible that adverse events affecting dropouts were not fully recorded.  Given that there were higher rates of dropouts due to non adherence and "other" reasons among patients who received alirocumab, the study might still have missed important adverse effects of the new drug.

So the study did not prove that the new drug has any clinical benefits, showed it does have clinical harms, and could still have easily underestimated its harms.  So it certainly did not show it had benefits that outweighed its harms.

Summary and Conclusions

The NEJM study was accompanied by an editorial by Stone and Lloyd-Jones(2) which documented that drugs previously shown to lower cholesterol were never proved to do any good for patients, and concluded,

it would be premature to endorse these drugs for widespread use before the ongoing randomized trials, appropriately powered for primary end-point analysis and safety assessment, are available. 

After an FDA advisory committee recommended approval of aliromucab in June, 2015, John Mandrola entitled a Medscape article,

Dear FDA: Resist the Urge on PCSK9 Drugs

His reasons included lack of proof of clinical benefits, and concerns that harms may have been missed but mainly because of its inability to detect long-term outcomes.


Again, the current media articles also noted the concerns raised by Dr Mandrola and the NEJM editorial These concerns, however, did not dissuade the FDA from approving aliromucab.  These concerns did not apparently affect the pricing of Praluent.  These concerns will likely not deter the drug manufacturers from continuing an aggressive marketing campaign.  Whether these concerns will deter physicians from prescribing, or patients from asking for these drugs is unknown, but unlikely.

And I have not seen anything published so far that addressed how the problem with dropouts and missing data may have lead to further underestimation of aliromucab's harms, the multiplicity of study sites may have lead to quality control problems further challenging the study's validity, and the extensive exclusion criteria may have reduced the study's generalizability.

So here we go again.  Another new drug is put on the market accompanied by a mighty hoopla, yet in the absence of clear data that it does more good for patients than harm.

As we said last year about valsartan-sacubitril, also just (July, 2015) put on the market as Entresto, at a high price and with lots of hype,...

All the enthusiasm about this drug may be premature, and does not appear to be evidence-based.  That clinical research sponsored by organizations that sell health care goods and services may be manipulated to make the sponsors' products look better than they really are is now an old story.  We have seen multiple instances in which drugs and devices turned out to be less efficacious and/or more dangerous than originally advertised.  Excess enthusiasm about such new innovations may drive up costs, and worse, hurt patients.  Physicians, other health care professionals, and those concerned about health policy ought to be much more skeptical about every new instance of a purportedly wondrous innovation. 

Evidence-based medicine rigorously applied suggests that individual health care and health policy decisions should be driven by the best available evidence, mostly from clinical research, about the benefits and harms of tests, treatments, programs, and so on, in the context of what outcomes matter to patients.  The skepticism EBM should engender could lead to health care that is more about patients and their outcomes, and less about ideology, hype, and hucksterism.


How high must our health care costs go, and how many unproven treatments must eventually be exposed as such before we learn that lesson?

ADDENDUM (6 August, 2015) - Fixed minor errors: misspelling of Ms Kolata's name fixed, misstatement re apharesis fixed, erroneous reference to second approved PCSK9 inhibitor removed.  

ADDENDUM (9 August, 2015) - Note that his post was republished on the Naked Capitalism blog.  


References
1. Robinson JG, Farnier M, Krempf M et al.  Efficacy and safety of alirocumab in reduincg lipids and cardiovascular events.  N Engl J Med 2015; 372: 1489-1499.  Link here.
2.  Stone NJ, Lloyd-Jones DM.  Lowering LDL cholestero is good, but how in whom?  N Engl J Med 2015; 372: 1564-5.  Link here.  

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How Institutional Conflicts of Interest Exacerbate the Anechoic Effect - the Example of ASCO Fearing "Biting the Hand that Feeds You"

American Society of Clinical Oncology anechoic effect conflicts of interest health care prices institutional conflicts of interest medical societies You heard it here first

How Institutional Conflicts of Interest Exacerbate the Anechoic Effect - the Example of ASCO Fearing "Biting the Hand that Feeds You"

Unknown 6/27/2015 Komentar

As we recently discussed (here, here, here and here), in May, 2015, the New England Journal of Medicine, arguably the world's foremost medical journal, published an editorial and a three-part commentary arguing that current concerns about the effects of financial conflicts of interest (COI) on health care are overblown(1-4).  On June 1, the Wall Street Journal published a report on the 2015 meeting of the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) that provided a vivid example of why these concerns should not be dismissed.

Questioning Drug Prices at the ASCO Meeting

The main issue in the article was:

In a sign of growing frustration with rising drug prices, a prominent cancer specialist on Sunday sharply criticized the costs of new cancer treatments in a high-profile speech at one of the largest annual medical meetings in the U.S.

'These drugs cost too much,' Leonard Saltz, chief of gastrointestinal oncology at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, said in a speech heard by thousands of doctors here for the annual meeting of the American Society of Clinical Oncology.

The notion that health care prices are high and are rising continuously in the US should hardly be novel for regular Health Care Renewal readers.  We have been writing about it for a while, starting in 2005.

We first posted about high drug prices in July, 2005, with the example of BilDil.  This was a brand-name combination drug that included two compounds that were already cheaply available in generic form, advertised as a uniquely convenient therapy for congestive heart failure.  We were aghast that the price of the combination drug might be $5.40 - $10.80 a day (in 2005 dollars), over three times the cost of the two drugs in generic form.

But only a few days later we noted that three cancer costs had yearly costs in the five figures, and one, Erbitux, cost as much as $100,000.  Most amazingly we noted that Thalidomid was priced at $25,000  a year.  Yet it was just the infamous thalidomide, the drug initially marketed as a tranquilizer that caused severe birth defects after it was initially sold in Europe.  The drug was still available in generic form in South America for about seven cents a pill.

Since then, the ridiculously high prices of many tests and treatments, but most notably new drugs and devices, has been so widely covered our discussion has been limited to special cases.   For example, consider just a few headlines from April to May, 2015.

How Much Would You Pay for an Old Drug? If You Have MS, a Fortune (Bloomberg)

Pharmaceutical Companies Buy Rivals' Drugs, Then Jack Up the Prices (WSJ)

How Marketing Exclusivity Led to Higher Drug Costs and Questionable Benefits (WSJ)

Runaway Drug Prices (NY Times)


Drug Prices as a Taboo Topic

However, despite this wide attention to the problem, the speech at ASCO was notable.  Back to the WSJ...

Dr. Saltz’s speech was unusual because it was made at the meeting’s plenary session, where the field’s most significant scientific research is presented and which all meeting participants are expected to attend. An estimated 25,000 doctors and scientists attended this year’s meeting.

One would think that the high price of drugs, especially cancer drugs, would be a fit subject for discussion at a plenary session of ASCO, however,

It is unprecedented for plenary speeches, which typically address scientific and medical issues, to substantially take on the topic of drug costs, said Alan Venook, a professor of medicine at the University of California San Francisco who planned the meeting’s scientific session and invited Dr. Saltz to speak.

The prominent venue for the speech was also unusual because, like many medical meetings, ASCO is sponsored by pharmaceutical companies and often focuses on highlighting advancements in drug development, said Dr. Venook. He said discussing drug prices there is 'uncomfortable' because it could be seen as 'biting the hand that feeds you.'

Doctors are also reluctant to antagonize the drug industry because they need pharmaceutical firms to invest in developing new medicines for patients, he said.

'It’s a tough balancing act for ASCO where the meeting is largely funded by pharma,' Dr. Venook said in an interview. 'You can’t have a [plenary] talk trashing pharma, but you can have a talk by a respected person questioning it.'

So because pharma gives ASCO a lot of money, at best, only the most distinguished ASCO members can gently question pharma, but cannot criticize, much less "trash" the source of their mammon.


This is thus a succinct example of why financial conflicts of interest in medicine and health care can be bad.  The incredibly high prices of cancer drugs should be a fit topic for discussion at a meeting run by a society of medical oncologists.  But those in charge of the meeting and the society are afraid to initiate such a discussion, and even more afraid of appearing to criticize the companies that charge these prices, because the society has become dependent on money from these very same companies.  So this is further an example of how conflicts of interest can create the anechoic effect - the notion that certain topics in medicine and health care are taboo, because discussing them might trouble the powers that be, and particularly the moneyed interests that now dominate medicine and health care. 

In a succinct response to the NEJM series (1-4) soft pedaling concerns about conflicts of interest, the British Medical Journal ran a commentary by a former NEJM national correspondent, and two former NEJM editors.(5)  It stated,

The NEJM has now sought to reinterpret and downplay the importance of conflicts of interest in medicine by publishing articles that show little understanding of the meaning of the term. The concern is not whether physicians and researchers who receive industry money have been bought by the drug companies, as Drazen writes, or whether members of guideline panels or advisory committees to the US Food and Drug Administration with ties to industry make recommendations that are motivated by a desire for financial gain, as Rosenbaum writes. The essential issue is that it is impossible for editors and readers to know one way or the other.

In this case, we seem not to be talking about the possibility that health care professionals "have been bought by the drug companies,"  but how drug companies essentially "buying" a professional organization has apparently heretofore prevented medical professionals from discussing a vital issue that could have major effects on patients.

Following the Money

In case there is any question about the money involved and its sources, one only needs to go to some publicly available in formation supplied by ASCO (mostly because of reporting requirements imposed on all US non-profit organizations of a certain size).  

The latest (2014) annual report from ASCO reveals that the organization only gets 16.1% of its revenue from member dues.  Thus a ostensible membership organization gets only about a sixth of its funding from members' dues.

Yet the organization has become quite wealthy.  Its most recent (2013) US Internal Revenue Service 990 Form reveals that it owns over $55 million in real estate, and has over $104 million in investments (presumably as an endowment.)  The organizations' leaders are also doing very well. Its CEO, Allen Lichter MD, got $804,775 in total compensation in 2012.  Eleven other managers, of which three are health care professionals (one MD, one RN, one PharmD), got at least $220,000 in total compensation.  Five of them got more than $300,000. 

The source of all that money seems mainly to be pharmaceutical and other health care corporations that sell goods and services for cancer care.  US non-profit organizations are not forced by law to reveal the details of their financial support.  However, the ASCO annual report does list 23 pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, and one for-profit cancer hospital chain as contributing at least $1 million each in total to the non-profit over time.  The report lists 37 pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device companies as current corporate donors, and also 10 other for-profit health care related corporations as current corporate donors.

In addition to these apparently marked institutional conflicts of interest, ASCO leaders may have their own individual conflicts of interest.  I do not have the resources to search all relationships affecting meeting organizers and ASCO officers and trustees, and the organization does not post conflicts of interest affecting its leadership and governance in a prominent place. However, Dr Alan Venook, who confessed to his discomfort about inviting a talk that might be perceived as biting the hand that feeds the finances of ASCO, is or has been on advisory boards for Thershold Pharmaceuticals,  Mirna Therapeutics, and GlobeImmune.  For a 2014 presentation, he gave the following disclosures: "Research support from Genentech/Roche, BMS, Lilly, Novartis; H. Lenz: Consulting, advisory boards and research support from Genentech/Roche, BMS and Merck."  Furthermore, the current chair of the ASCO Board of Directors, Julie M Vose, MD, is also on the Medical Advisory Board of EmergingMed Inc, and the Clinical Advisory Board of Bullet Biotechnology.

Summary

The New England Journal of Medicine recently launched a counter-attack against the "pharmascolds" who are allegedly slowing the pace of medical progress by their excessive and puritanical concerns about financial conflicts of interest.  Yet the arguments that COIs could be bad for health care are logical, and based on at least some reasonably good evidence.  (See the article by Steinbrook et al in the BMJ mentioned above[4], the accompanying BMJ editorial[5] just to start and then the 2009 Institute of Medicine report.)

Moreover, we have encountered a lot of vivid cases suggesting that conflicts of interest can have adverse influences on health care.  In this most recent one, we see at least one prominent if conflicted organizational insider admitting that institutional, and perhaps individual conflicts of interest have made discussion of at least one big health care and health care policy topic taboo.  This seems to corroborate our previous discussion that the anechoic effect - that certain topics in health care are taboo - may be generated by conflicts of interest of the people who ought to discuss them, or of those to whom those people may have to answer.

True health care reform requires full disclosure of conflicts of interest for honesty's sake, and marked reduction of conflicts affecting those who make health care decisions on behalf of individual patients, and health care policy decisions that affect patients' and the public's health.  If we allow conflicts of interest to continue, we will have difficulty even discussing the most severe problems affecting health care, because those generating the topics are benefiting from the circumstances that enable such problems.

ADDENDUM (1 July, 2015) - This post was republished on 28 June, 2015, on the Naked Capitalism blog. 

ADDENDUM (20 July, 2015 ) - This post was republished on July 12, 2015 in OpenHealth News.

References

  1.Drazen JM.  Revisiting the commercial-academic interface.  N Eng J Med 2015; ; 372:1853-1854. Link here.
2. Rosenbaum L.  Reconnecting the dots - reinterpreting industry-physician relations.  N Eng J Med 2015; 372:1860-1864.  Link here.
3. Rosenbaum L. Understanding bias - the case for careful study.  N Engl J Med 2015;  372:1959-1963.  Link here.
4.  Rosenbaum L.  Beyond moral outrage - weighing the trade-offs of COI regulation. N Engl J Med 2015; 372: 2064-2068.  Link here.
5. Steinbrook R, Kassirer JP, Angell M.  Justifying conflicts of interest in medical journals: a very bad idea.  Brit Med J 2015; 350: h2942.  Link here. 
6. Loder E. Revisiting the commercial-academic interface in medical journals.  Brit Med J 2015; 350: h2957.  Link here.

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The US' Multinational Trade Negotiations - Trading Away Its Own and Other Countries' Current and Future Restraints on Drug Prices?

CMS health care prices Medicare pharmaceuticals regulatory capture revolving doors trade policy US Trade Representative

The US' Multinational Trade Negotiations - Trading Away Its Own and Other Countries' Current and Future Restraints on Drug Prices?

Unknown 6/18/2015 Komentar

Trade Agreements More about Deregulation than Trade

International trade negotiations, especially their more technical aspects, seem far removed from health care and health policy, and unrelated to health care dysfunction.  However, it seems that such trade negotiations have become a back door route to affect health policy, especially national efforts to regulate health care intended to improve patients' and the public's health.  

We recently discussed how current multinational trade negotiations seem to be more about changing regulation in favor of big corporations than broadly advancing trade.  Some of the effects of the proposed trade pacts could have bad effects on patients' and the public's health, particularly by allowing corporations to challenge particular countries' public health policies outside of these countries' judicial systems, in kangarooish courts seemingly designed to favor corporate interests.  Also, the trade pacts' focus on intellectual property could lead to longer patent protection on drugs, biologics, and devices, raising health care costs.  However, attempts to figure out how proposed trade agreements could affect health care and public health were hindered by the secrecy surrounding the negotiations.

"Procedural Fairness" for Pharmaceutical Companies, not You and Me

Earlier in June, 2015, a part of the current draft of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) appeared on  Wikileaks, revealing yet another set of concerns about how the agreement could affect health care.  It was entitled "Annex on Transparency and Procedural Fairness for Pharmaceutical Products and Medical Devices," and hence was specifically about health care.

The bulk of the annex seemed to be about improving the treatment of drug, device and biotechnology companies by national agencies that make decisions about payments for their products. The annex apparently proposed establishing the companies' rights to rapid reviews, access to applicable procedures and guidelines, access to written decisions, company appeals of the agencies' decisions, and protection of corporate confidential information. On the other hand, there was nothing I could see in the annex about the rights of, say, patients or health care professionals.

We have noted the concern that international trade agreements may make government regulation subject to corporate appeal in "investor-state dispute settlement" (ISDS) processes, essentially international quasi-courts that are not subject to national judicial systems, may not provide for any input by parties other than governments and corporations (that is, by, for example citizens, patients or health professionals), and may not allow appeal.  Thus, by specifically incorporating new protections for corporations seeking favorable payments for their new products from national agencies, the annex could make it possible for the corporations to appeal to ISDS, going around national court systems.  As reported in the Huffington Post,

According to an analysis of the leaked document by Jane Kelsey, a law professor at the University of Auckland in New Zealand, these rules are enough to expose national health authorities to legal challenges under TPP’s investor-state dispute settlement process, or ISDS. ISDS empowers companies to challenge countries’ domestic laws before a tribunal of international judges if they believe the laws unfairly limit investment. The tribunals have the power to impose significant fines on countries if their laws are found responsible for the investment hardship in question. While pharmaceutical companies could not challenge national health programs’ policies through ISDS, their grievances would be eligible for ISDS if the companies claimed the policies hindered investment.

In fact, the Huffington Post article noted suspicions that the US Trade Representative (USTR) has been negotiating on behalf of big US drug, device and biotechnology companies to target price regulations in Australia and New Zealand,

Among the United States’ TPP negotiating partners, pharmaceutical provisions have faced the greatest opposition from Australia and New Zealand, which have national health authorities that provide prescription drugs to their citizens at heavily discounted rates. The U.S. Trade Representative and U.S. pharmaceutical companies have targeted the cost containment measures in those countries’ prescription drug programs for years. Pharmaceutical companies also claim that New Zealand’s drug approval process is opaque and difficult to navigate.

Why Explicitly Include the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)?

However, anyone in the US who thinks that all the burden from the trade pact is only on other countries, particularly those down under, should think again. The draft trade pact annex also seemed designed to prevent any future attempts by the US government to control drug and device costs, especially for the US Medicare program, even though the current US President has proposed such attempts. 

Note that when the US program was extended to cover drugs, the legislation specifically forbade the government from negotiating prices, a provision that seemed more about protecting corporate revenues than the federal budget.  So, as reported by the New York Times,

The newly leaked annex, dated Dec. 17, 2014, lists Medicare and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services as falling under its strictures.

The USTR pooh poohed any concerns about that,

Officials at the United States trade representative’s office, while declining to comment on a leak they would not acknowledge, said rules in the Pacific accord would have no impact on the United States because Medicare already adhered to them. The trade representative’s office helped develop the proposals.

'Already, transparency and procedural fairness are integral parts of the U.S. legal system and as such are principles reflected in U.S. trade agreements,' the representative’s office said in a statement.

Maybe preventing any government negotiation about, much less control of drug and device prices may be part of what the USTR called "procedural fairness."  In any case, if the US, and specifically CMS are doing so well, why bother giving this trade pact jurisdiction over them, unless to prevent any uppity future US government from daring to negotiate with the pharmaceutical industry?

The Huffington Post noted that

In an earlier statement, [Director of Public Citizen's Global Access to Medicine Project Peter]  Maybarduk expressed concern that the rules would 'limit Congress’ ability to enact policy reforms that would reduce prescription drug costs for Americans –- and might even open to challenge aspects of our health care system today.'

He expanded on that in a commentary for The Hill,

Earlier this week, WikiLeaks published the draft TPP 'Annex' on healthcare technologies. In the five-page document, the U.S. government commits Medicare to rules and procedures that would make it difficult — if not impossible — to implement a national formulary that would provide leverage for proposed negotiations with drugmakers under Medicare Part D.

Medicare costs are expected to more than double from $77 billion in 2015 to about $174 billion in the next decade. In February, the president called for giving Medicare the power to negotiate prices with drug manufacturers to ameliorate this cost burden. Americans support giving Medicare negotiating power by wide margins and across party lines.

Negotiations are most effective if the U.S. government has leverage. Experts suggest that key leverage in Medicare negotiations should come from developing a national drug formulary — a list of drugs that Medicare would cover. A formulary would stimulate competition, reduce prices and lead to healthier outcomes for patients and the healthcare system.

But the leaked TPP 'Annex' shows that the pact would impose procedural requirements on formulary decisions, exact significant administrative costs and open up the drug review process to increased corporate influence. Medicare would have to live by these rules. The result could be a toothless negotiator, and a formulary filled with expensive drugs that have questionable public health benefits, if any.

Summary

So why did the US Trade Representative acquiesce to, if not actively promote, a trade pact that would limit the ability of the US government, specifically, CMS to try to put a damper on the ever rising health care prices that threaten to bankrupt individuals and maybe eventually the Medicare program itself? And why, incidentally did it do so when this appeared to contradict the current US President's own stated goal to have Medicare negotiate the prices it pays for drugs?  (And why, incidentally, did it promote a pact that would give international tribunals jurisdiction over US government actions when that may be unconstitutional according to an increasing number of experts?) 

The best speculation we offered before was that the USTR has been "captured" by industry, in part through the conflicts of interest generated by multiple passages through the revolving door by current and former USTR personnel. 

At the moment, the TPP has stalled again in the US Congress.  However, do not underestimate the ability of its proponents to get it moving again.  The now intermittent drip of secrets from the ongoing trade negotiations showing how little they have to do with trade, and how much they have to do with advancing corporate interests suggest the need for much more vigilance in defense of patients' and the public's health.

Meanwhile, I repeat again that we need to do a lot more to undo regulatory capture that affects health care, and stop the incessantly spinning revolving door.    Attempts to turn government toward private gain and away from being of the people, by the people, and for the people have no doubt been going on since the beginning of government (and since the Constitution was signed, in the case of the US).  However, true health care reform  would require curtailing the severe sorts of conflicts of interest created by the revolving door.

Real heath care reform would require  multiyear cooling off periods before someone who worked in the commercial world can get a job in a government whose work has direct effect on his or her previous employer or industry sector, and before someone who worked in government whose work had direct effect on a particular economic sector can accept a job for a company in that sector.

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All the President's Trade Negotiators - Revolving Doors, Regulatory Capture, and Health Care Corporate Friendly Trade Agreements

AbbeVie Abbott anechoic effect corporatism Eli Lilly global health health care prices Pfizer PhRMA regulatory capture revolving doors US Trade Representative

All the President's Trade Negotiators - Revolving Doors, Regulatory Capture, and Health Care Corporate Friendly Trade Agreements

Unknown 5/14/2015 Komentar

This week's spectacle in Washington, DC was a nearly unanimous Democratic minority in the Senate blocking a proposal for expedited consideration of multinational trade agreements favored by the Republican majority, but also by the Democratic President and his trade negotiators (look here).  Democrats mainly based their actions on perceptions that the trade agreements favored multinational corporations  over people.

While trade agreements may seem to be another, albeit international species of wonkery, these agreements could have major effects on patients' and the public's health.  Since these concerns have been essentially ignored by the US medical and health care literature, (although they have appeared in UK journals, Australian, and New Zealand journals in English), they I will discuss them below. Worthy of further discussion is the possibility that these potential threats to health care and public health may arise not just from ideological disagreements, but also from health care corporations' increasing capture of government, facilitated by the conflicts of interest generated by the revolving door. 

Corporate Friendly Trade Agreements

The US has been negotiating two major multinational trade agreements, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic  Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) for years. 

In a March, 2014, commentary, renowned economist Joseph E Stiglitz summarized the objections to the these proposed trade agreements.  His greatest fears were that such agreements

will benefit the wealthiest sliver of the American and global elite at the expense of everyone else.

This seems surprising, since most people think of trade agreements solely in terms of their effects on tariffs, not a big concern for health care and public health professionals.  However, Stiglitz noted

Tariffs around the world are already low. The focus has shifted to 'nontariff barriers,' and the most important of these — for the corporate interests pushing agreements — are regulations. Huge multinational corporations complain that inconsistent regulations make business costly. But most of the regulations, even if they are imperfect, are there for a reason: to protect workers, consumers, the economy and the environment.

What’s more, those regulations were often put in place by governments responding to the democratic demands of their citizens. Trade agreements’ new boosters euphemistically claim that they are simply after regulatory harmonization, a clean-sounding phrase that implies an innocent plan to promote efficiency. One could, of course, get regulatory harmonization by strengthening regulations to the highest standards everywhere. But when corporations call for harmonization, what they really mean is a race to the bottom.

 In the US, and other developed countries, there are lots of regulations that have major effects on health care and public health.  Changes in these regulations, or their implementation, could have major effects again on health care and the public health.  So those interested in health care and public health ought to be concerned about how such trade agreements could affect such regulation.

International Tribunals Could Trump National Law
One of Stiglitz's concerns was  that the trade agreement would allow international tribunals that could override national law, particularly law promoting public health:

What we know of ... particulars [of the TTP] only makes it more unpalatable. One of the worst is that it allows corporations to seek restitution in an international tribunal, not only for unjust expropriation, but also for alleged diminution of their potential profits as a result of regulation. This is not a theoretical problem. Philip Morris has already tried this tactic against Uruguay, claiming that its antismoking regulations, which have won accolades from the World Health Organization, unfairly hurt profits, violating a bilateral trade treaty between Switzerland and Uruguay.

In fact, Philip Morris has also used such tribunals to overturn Australian laws meant to discourage smoking for public health purposes.  The details of the Philip Morris case summarized in May, 2015 in an article by Lauren Carasik in  Foreign Policy, show the major public health implications of such trade tribunals,

In 2011, Australia passed a tobacco-control law to discourage smoking. It required cigarettes to be sold in plain packages with prominent warnings, with brand information relegated to the bottom of the box. Touted as 'one of the most momentous public health measures in Australia’s history' by the country’s health minister, the law was meant to deter a habit that will ultimately kill 1.8 million current Australian smokers, according to a recent study. After the country’s highest court upheld the constitutionality of the anti-smoking law, tobacco giant Philip Morris claimed that it violated the company’s corporate rights and launched a suit using a little-known provision called investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The case is pending, as is a similar case against Uruguay. A similar tobacco-control measure in New Zealand is on hold pending the outcome of these cases.

So these examples suggest that national laws meant to promote the public health could be challenged in these trade tribunals by multinational corporations based on these laws' postulated effects on corporate profits, regardless of the laws' public health rationale or legality in their own countries. 


Furthermore, a letter to the Lancet(1) noted,

Investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions allow investors to sue governments if policy changes or even court rulings substantially affect the value of their investment, yet do not allow governments to sue investors for breaching the right to health.   ISDS processes constrain governments' abilities to regulate on the basis of the precautionary principle, or even to implement health policies on the basis of established evidence. These processes can have a chilling effect on efforts to address key health issues, such as alcohol, the obesity epidemic, and climate change. In New Zealand, the fear of costly ISDS litigation is already constraining government regulation on tobacco plain packaging.

Thus, creation of such international tribunals could favor financial concerns of multinational corporations over individual countries' governments' attempts to promote health care or public health. So, while these undemocratic tribunals are touted as a way to reduce non-tariff trade barriers, an editorial in the British Medical Journal(2) asserted,

Yet these barriers are some of our most prized social and environmental standards, including regulations on food safety, pesticide residues, and toxic chemicals....

Not only would these tribunals we able to override national laws, their operation would lack procedural safeguards.  Demonstrating that opposition to these trade agreements is also multinational, an article in the UK Independent in October, 2014, noted,

Critics say the tribunals, held under the so-called Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system, subvert democratic justice, giving power over foreign citizens to big companies. Hearings are held in private, in international courts at the World Bank in Washington DC, bypassing the legal system of the country being sued, meaning details are often impossible to uncover. In some cases the very existence of the case is not made public.

In addition, per the article in Foreign Policy,

Critics like Global Trade Watch, a division of Public Citizen, a consumer advocacy organization, say the ISDS system is anti-democratic. Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) called for the ISDS language to be stripped out of the deal, writing in the Washington Post in February, 'If a final TPP agreement includes Investor-State Dispute Settlement, the only winners will be multinational corporations.' The problem is that the ISDS system lacks many procedural safeguards fundamental to the rule of law. The tribunals, run by the World Bank and the United Nations, are three-judge panels composed of highly paid private lawyers picked from a limited pool by states and corporations; individual lawyers can switch between serving as judges and advocates on behalf of corporations in different cases. And there is no comprehensive code of judicial conduct guiding the panelists on matters such as conflicts of interest.

Although the panels adjudicate disputes worth millions or even billions of dollars, they are not accountable to any elected body. Moreover, there is no system of precedent binding judges to an established body of decision-making, making it difficult for the parties to discern the applicable standards and their likelihood of success. And finally, there are no appeals, either within the ISDS system or externally, on the merits of decisions. An annulment is only possible for limited procedural errors, and those proceedings are heard before a different panel drawn from the same pool of professionals.

Under the system, states are deprived of the right to resolve these disputes since corporations can proceed directly to the tribunals without exhausting domestic remedies. But this privilege is not reciprocal: Corporations are not subject to suit in the tribunals by those harmed by their actions. Foreign companies are thus granted expanded rights without corresponding responsibilities.

Finally, in May, 2015, the United Nations special rapporteur on promotion of a democratic and equitable international order suggested that the proposed international tribunals would undermine human rights and violate the UN charter (per this Guardian article).

Further criticism of the tribunals came from the UK Labour party Shadow Health Secretary (as of April, 2014) who felt it would leave British general practitioners "powerless to resist legal challenges from US health giants with huge financial resources in the event of a contractual dispute (per the Independent).

To summarize thus far:  international trade agreements being pushed by the US government could set up trade tribunals that could reverse national laws meant to protect health and safety.  Such tribunals would not follow the procedures used, for example, in US courts, and could not be held accountable by individual governments.  Various aspects of these tribunals, and recent actions involving tribunals already set up by earlier trade agreements suggest the process may be heavily biased in favor of the financial interests of multinational corporation, and against patients' and the public's health.  Thus, health care and public health professionals ought to be alarmed about new agreements that could set up new tribunals, or expand the reach of existing tribunals.


Intellectual Property Rights vs Access to Health Care

Another set of problems affecting patients' and the public's health  are provisions in trade agreements favoring corporate "intellectual property" over access to drugs, devices and health care.  Stiglitz wrote in 2014,

America has been fighting to lower the cost of health care. But the TPP would make the introduction of generic drugs more difficult, and thus raise the price of medicines. In the poorest countries, this is not just about moving money into corporate coffers: thousands would die unnecessarily. Of course, those who do research have to be compensated. That’s why we have a patent system. But the patent system is supposed to carefully balance the benefits of intellectual protection with another worthy goal: making access to knowledge more available. I’ve written before about how the system has been abused by those seeking patents for the genes that predispose women to breast cancer. The Supreme Court ended up rejecting those patents, but not before many women suffered unnecessarily. Trade agreements provide even more opportunities for patent abuse.

To date, most of the details of the proposed trade agreements have been kept secret, but as noted on the PLoS Medicine blog in December, 2013, by Reshma Ramachandran and David Carroll,

Last month, Wikileaks posted the complete Intellectual Property (IP) Chapter of the secretly-negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) confirming public health advocates’ worst fears of the agreement’s impact on patients worldwide.

In particular,

The Wikileaks posted text revealed that the USTR and Obama Administration have decided to aggressively prioritize the interests of multinational pharmaceutical and medical companies over patients worldwide and at home. In fact, according to emails submitted to Intellectual Property-Watch under the Freedom of Information Act, the USTR has actively solicited the input of industry groups, giving them special access to the negotiating text while consumer and health groups have had to resort to requesting special meetings with negotiators. 

So,

Indeed, the recently leaked TPP chapter reflect these corporate interests as evidenced by the still-included provisions. In the text, the USTR has proposed a number of provisions that will further strengthen patents and data exclusivity for pharmaceuticals. Such provisions will bar the entry of generic competition into the market allowing for brand-name drug companies to retain their monopoly market and set drug prices at exorbitantly high prices. These provisions include:

- Lowering patent standards allowing for “evergreening” or the granting of patents for newer forms of existing medicines including new formulations or minor modifications even in the absence of a therapeutic benefit

- Mandating that surgical, therapeutic, and diagnostic methods must be patented making medical practitioners in TPP member states liable for infringement and restricting their choices for treatment

- Imposing data exclusivity on all pharmaceuticals, including biologics with the minimum period for this class to be set at 12 years (despite the fact that the White House is publicly in favor of a 7 year data exclusivity period and the FTC has stated that there is no need for any data exclusivity period at all) thereby not allowing drug safety regulators from accessing clinical data to grant market approval for generic and biosimilar drugs

-  Adjusting patent term periods to account for “unreasonable delays” including patent prosecution periods ranging from two years to more than four years extra further delaying generic drug entry into the market

- Adjusting patent term periods for regulatory approval periods allowing for patent extensions for both new pharmaceutical products as well as methods for producing or using new pharmaceutical products halting any potential innovation

- Linking patent status and drug marketing approval causing drug regulatory authorities to take on the additional task of early patent enforcement, allowing for bogus patents to be a barrier to generic drug registration Such proposals go beyond current U.S. and international law including the World Trade Organization’s Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.

Additionally, the TPP has the potential to jeopardize millions of lives in the participating countries by driving up the costs of medicines significantly. Even in the United States, there has been a public outcry from physicians regarding the high cost of medicines. Earlier this year, over 100 oncologists came together to write a perspective piece in the journal Blood calling the prices of brand-name cancer drugs “astronomical, unsustainable, and perhaps even immoral.” The United States health care system has in fact greatly benefited from the entry of generic competition. On May 9, IMS Health released a report entitled Declining Medicine Use and Costs: For Better or Worse?, which found that many Americans had forsaken much needed doctor visits, medicines, and other treatments as they struggled to afford health care. In light of this, it is appalling that U.S. negotiators would continue to push provisions that would further exacerbate the cost burden of healthcare for patients not only abroad, but at home. 

Public Citizen particularly criticized the provision for patenting procedures,

Medical procedure patents raise healthcare costs. Health providers, including surgeons, could be liable for the methods they use to treat patients. Essentially, except for when a surgeon uses her bare hands, surgical methods would be patent eligible subject matter under the U.S. proposal.

Additional concerns about the potential of new trade agreements to increase the price of medicines and health care, and limit access to them, came, per Ramachandran and Carroll, from Doctors Without Borders, the American Association of Retired Person, and the International Federation of Medical Students.  More recently, such concerns were stated by amfAR re access to and costs of HIV medications (reported on Vox), and were restated by Doctors Without Borders (reported by the National Journal).

Perhaps more US health care professionals and public health advocates would be speaking out if they understood the problem.  However, concerns about how new proposed trade agreements could affect health care and public health have been notably anechoic in the US.  I could find absolutely no discussion of them in any moderate or large circulation US health care or medical journal.  There has been discussion in English language medical and and health care journals, but in journals that are relatively obscure, or published outside of the US, for example, see articles by Greenberg and Shiau(3), and Thow et al(4).  Note that the former wrote,

academic public health has failed to appreciate the serious risks of the TPP[A] and has not responded to its threats. 

Keeping concerns that the new trade agreements could threaten patients' and the public's health out of public discussion may be just the latest example of what we have called the anechoic effect, because it looks like it may be no accident that these proposed trade agreements favor multinational corporations over patients' and the public's health.  There is evidence that at least the US governmental process for negotiating these agreements was heavily influenced by the interests of these corporations, but not by the interests of patients or citizens. 

Revolving Doors, Regulatory Capture Generate the Momentum

There are thus strong reasons for health care and public health professionals to oppose the rush to approve the new trade agreements (the TTIP and TPP).  Despite these concerns, and the increasingly vocal opposition from many US legislators, the current administration has forged ahead with its proposal to "fast-track" their approval, only to be suddenly blocked, and by its supposed compatriots in the Democratic party.  There are lots of explanations for this, but two that got only a little notice but seem particularly germane to Health Care Renewal are the influences of the revolving door and cultural regulatory capture.

The case for these was best made by a November, 2013 article in the Washington Post by Timothy B Lee,

the U.S. negotiating position also had an unmistakeable bias toward expanding the rights of copyright and patent holders.

Those positions are great for Hollywood and the pharmaceutical industry, but it's not obvious that they are in the interests of the broader U.S. economy. To the contrary, critics contend that the rights of copyright and patent holders have been expanded too much. Those concerns do not seem to have swayed the trade negotiators in the Obama administration.

Two major factors contribute to the USTR's strong pro-rightsholder slant. An obvious one is the revolving door between USTR and private industry. Since the turn of the century, at least a dozen USTR officials have taken jobs with pharmaceutical companies, filmmakers, record labels, and technology companies that favor stronger patent and copyright protection.

A more subtle factor is the structure and culture of USTR itself. In its role as a promoter of global trade, USTR has always worked closely with U.S. exporters. That exporter-focused culture isn't a problem when USTR is merely seeking to remove barriers to selling U.S. goods overseas, but it becomes problematic on issues like copyright and patent law where exporters' interests may run directly counter to those of American consumers.

Lee provided extensive examples of how US trade officials transited the revolving door to and/or from the pharmaceutical industry.

On May 3, 2004, the United States and Australia signed a bilateral trade agreement. The agreement included a section on intellectual property that had numerous provisions favorable to pharmaceutical manufacturers. For example, it barred generic drug makers seeking approval for their drugs from citing safety or efficacy information originally submitted by brand-name drug makers for a period of five years after the information is submitted, making it more difficult for generic drug makers to enter the market.

The lead American negotiator was Ralph Ives, who was promoted to Assistant USTR for Pharmaceutical Policy soon after the negotiations concluded. He was aided by Claude Burcky, Deputy Assistant USTR for Intellectual Property. Less than three months after the Australia agreement was signed, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that both men would take jobs at pharmaceutical or medical device companies. Their new employers stood to benefit from some of the pro-patent-holder provisions of the treaty. Ives took a job at AdvaMed, a trade group representing medical device manufacturers. Burcky moved to the pharmaceutical and medical device company Abbott Labs.

Since then, Abbott has hired two other USTR veterans, Andrea Durkin and Karen Hauda, according to the women's LinkedIn pages. Another USTR official, Kira Alvarez, has gone through the revolving door twice over the last 15 years. Her LinkedIn profile indicates that she served at USTR from 2000 to 2003, spent four years at the pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly, and then returned to USTR in 2008 as Deputy Assistant USTR for Intellectual Property Enforcement. She was there for five years before she took a job at AbbVie, a pharmaceutical firm that spun off from Abbott earlier this year.

According to his official biography at the site of the Biotechnology Industry Associaiton, Joseph Damond 'was chief negotiator of the historic U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade agreement' during his 12 years at USTR. He then spent five years at the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America before moving to BIO. Justin McCarthy went through the revolving door in the other direction. According to a USTR press release, McCarthy was responsible for intellectual property issues at the pharmaceutical company Pfizer from 2003 to 2005 before he was hired at USTR. He now works at a lobbying firm.

Lee also suggested that the US Trade Representative has been culturally captured by industry through its use of advisory panels made up of industry members, but not, for example, clinicians, public health advocates, or interested members of the public.

The agency has established 16 industry trade advisory committees to provide advice about the complex issues USTR deals with in the course of its negotiations. As the name suggests, the ITACs are designed to gather feedback from industry groups. There are no public interest groups, academics, or other non-industry experts on ITAC 15, which focuses on "intellectual property" issues.

And that matters because groups with ITAC seats have access to confidential information about the U.S. negotiating position that isn't available to the public. Sherwin Siy, an attorney at the advocacy organization Public Knowledge, has had multiple meetings with USTR representatives during the course of the TPP negotiations. But he says it was difficult to give USTR meaningful feedback because he didn't know what positions U.S. negotiators were advocating.

'They're willing to sit in a room with us and listen to our objections and our issues and be very polite,' Siy says. But 'whether or not that actually means anything is at best a black box.'

When USTR wants technical advice on transposing U.S. law into international agreements, it naturally turns to the industry representatives on the ITACs. And it stands to reason that the advice the agency receives in response would be a bit one-sided. Where U.S. law is ambiguous, industry groups naturally gravitate toward interpretations of U.S. law that favor their employers' interests. And because public interest groups and independent experts aren't allowed to see proposed language (aside from occasional leaks), the agency may not even realize that it is exporting a warped interpretation of U.S. law.

The pro-industry cultural bias has caused consternation among even well-known libertarians, as Lee noted,

'USTR sees itself as an advocate for U.S. exporter interests,' says Bill Watson, a trade expert at the Cato Institute. 'It's trying to negotiate market access for particular U.S. industries that ask for it. That bias leads USTR to think that because U.S. companies want more IP protection abroad, it's in their interest to negotiate that.'

So it seems quite clear that the US agency that negotiates the new international trade agreements may be staffed by people who came from affected industries, including pharmaceutical, device and biotechnology companies, and privileges advice from such companies.  Thus the agency appears to suffer from conflicts of interest due to the revolving door, and from regulatory capture induced by its bias in favor of advice from industry over that from clinicians, public health advocates, or interested members of the public.  This suggests why it appears that this government agency has actively been promoting trade agreements that favor industry interests over patients' and the public's health.

It may be that top US executive branch officials, all the way up to the President of the US, have been very ill-served by relying on an agency subject to such conflicts of interest and regulatory capture.

Summary

We have frequently written about the revolving door phenomenon, and its effect on government agencies and officials who regulate and control many aspects of health care. Recently, we wrote about how the revolving door risks corruption, and can lead to regulatory, and even state capture.

In 2011, we even wrote about how the revolving door may affect US trade negotiations, and thus important aspects of aspects of global health care.

Government officials affiliated with all major political parties have been known to transit the revolving door.  The recent cases we have documented have tended to be more about the party that currently controls the executive branch, of course.  But now, we seem to have documented how the revolving door has lead to a supposedly liberal president proposing trade agreements that seemed heavily biased towards corporate rather than popular interests, and thus suffered an embarrassing defeat at the hands of his party compatriots in the legislature.  The president seems to have been particularly ill-served by employees of the executive branch whose previous or potential revolving door transits have made them sing the tunes of industry rather than of the people they are supposed to be serving.  This suggests that in the long run, nobody but the participants in the revolving door ultimately benefits from their rotary transitions.

Instead, as we have said many times before, the constant interchange of health care insiders among government, large health care corporations, and the lobbying and legal firms which represent them certainly suggests that health care, like many other sectors, seems to be run by an amorphous group of insiders who owe allegiance neither to government nor industry.

However, those who work in government are supposed to be working for the people, and those who work on health care within government are supposed to be working for patients' and the public health.  If they are constantly looking over their shoulders at potential private employers who might offer big checks, who indeed are they working for?

Attempts to turn government toward private gain and away from being of the people, by the people, and for the people have no doubt been going on since the beginning of government (and since the Constitution was signed, in the case of the US).  However, true health care reform  would require curtailing the severe sorts of conflicts of interest created by the revolving door.

Real heath care reform would require  multiyear cooling off periods before someone who worked in the commercial world can get a job in a government whose work has direct effect on his or her previous employer or industry sector, and before someone who worked in government whose work had direct effect on a particular economic sector can accept a job for a company in that sector.

ADDENDUM (19 May, 2015) - This post was republished in OpEdNews.

ADDENDUM (29 May, 2015) - This post was republished in OpenHealth News.

References

1.  Freeman J, Keating G, Monasterio E at al.  Call for transparency in new generation trade deals. Lancet 2015; 385: 605-605, link here.
2.   Hilary J.  The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and UK healthcare.  Brit Med J 2014; 349: g6552, link here.
3.  Greenberg H, Shiau S. The vulnerability of being ill-informed: the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and global public health.  J Pub Health 2014; 36: 355-357, link here. 
4.  Thow AMT, Gleeson DH, Friel S. What doctors should know about the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement.  Med J Aust 2015; 202: 165-167, link here.

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