Clinical Practice Guidelines: Still Conflicted After All These Years

conflicts of interest guidelines Institute of Medicine institutional conflicts of interest

Clinical Practice Guidelines: Still Conflicted After All These Years

Unknown 6/03/2016 Komentar

Background: Untrustworthy Clinical Practice Guidelines

Since the 1990s, clinicians have been exhorted to follow clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) to improve their decision-making and patients' outcomes.  When Dr Wally Smith and I started teaching a short course (often at the Society for Medical Decision Making meetings) about changing physician behavior, we naively set out to improve decisions by increasing adherence to such guidelines.  We first thought that physicians' apparent shortcomings in guideline adherence were due to their lack of knowledge of the guidelines and the underlying evidence, and to their human cognitive limitations.

That approach, however, failed to yield ways to improve adherence.  After a while, it occurred to us that there might be other reasons physicians did not follow guidelines, including their lack of trust of the guidelines or the evidence supposedly incorporated within them.  We learned that integrity of  the clinical evidence base has been severely degraded due to the manipulation of clinical studies by those with vested interests, and the outright suppression of trials for which manipulation does not produce the desired results.

Furthermore, as we became less naive, we learned that the integrity of the guideline development process was also suspect, again due to the influence of those with vested interest.  No wonder physicians were suspicious of guidelines, and resisted adhering to them.

In 2011, the prestigious Institute of Medicine released a report on the development of  better standards to produce more trustworthy guidelines (Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust.  Link here.)  We posted about that report here, but noted that it was receiving little other attention, an example of the anechoic effect.  The IOM report cited conflicts of interest (COIs) affecting the guideline development process as a major reason such guidelines might be untrustworthy, and suggested a variety of ways to reduce COIs affecting guidelines.

These included in particular:
- Guideline committee members should disclose their conflicts of interest in detail, and these should appear in the guidelines (Standard 2.1, 2.2)
- The number of conflicted committee members should be minimized, and in no case should be a majority of the committee (2.3, 2.4)
- Funders should have no role in guideline development (2.4)

This week, an original article(1) and editorial(2) in PLoS Medicine discussed how guidelines published since the report was produced addressed conflicts of interest.

Article Summary

Below I summarized the article, but presented results somewhat differently than did the authors.

Design

Campsall et al did a cross-sectional study of clinical practice guidelines that appeared in the US Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) National Guideline Clearinghouse in 2012 from national or international organizations, excluding guidelines produced by organizations restricted to allied health professionals, guidelines produced by corporations, or guidelines that had no specific recommendations.  They obtained information from the guidelines, the organizations' websites, and surveys sent to the organizations.

Study Population

The study population was 290 guidelines produced by 95 organizations. The response rate for the surveys was 68%.  The organizations were primarily professional societies (67%) or disease advocacy groups (21%).

My comment is that therefore this study assessed guidelines mainly produced by non-profit organizations which ostensibly uphold health care professionals' values and/or primarily support patients' interests.

Industry Funding

63% of organizations reported receiving funds from biomedical companies.  (It was not clear whether the remainder denied receiving such funding, or provided no information about funding.)

My comment is that the majority of such ostensibly "do-gooder" organizations are nonetheless at least somewhat supported by commercial firms that market health care products, presumably mainly drugs or devices.

Conflict of Interest Policies

Please note that the authors provided results to emphasize the positive, for example, they provided the proportion of organizations which provided specific types of information about COIs or had particular policies to reduce COIs.  In most cases, I simply did subtractions to emphasize the negative.  Furthermore, the authors further emphasized the positive by choice of denominator, as noted below.

20% of organizations did not provide any information about conflict of interest policies, and 7% asserted the existence of such policies, but did not disclose them.  A majority, 55%, did not have disclosed policies that specifically dealt with with conflicts of interest affecting guidelines.

My comment is thus that a majority of these do-gooder organizations did not apparently even begin to address, at least in terms of clear, transparent written policy, the recommendations of the IOM report on trustworthy guidelines.

Measures to Improve Guidelines Trustworthiness by Decreasing Influence of Conflicts of Interest

The authors provided the number of organizations with disclosed policies that addressed particular issues of concern to the IOM in their report on trustworthy guidelines, but made the proportions of such organizations seem larger by using as a denominator the number of organizations that disclosed their entire policies, rather than the total number of organizations which produced the guidelines.

Therefore, they found that of the 60 (out of 95 total) organizations that fully disclosed their conflict of interest policies:
98% required committee members to disclose conflicts of interest;
90% required review of conflicts of interest before guideline publication; 
68% required that a majority of guideline committee members be free of conflicts of interest;
92% reported publishing committee members' conflicts of interest within guidelines;
78% did not allow direct industry funding of guideline development
82% did not allow industry participation in selection of committee members
67% did not allow industry to review guidelines prior to publication.

That all sound good, but consider what happens when one uses the total sample of organizations in the denominators.

Therefore, the article also found that of all 95 organizations that produced the guidelines of interest:

38% did not require CPG committee members to disclose conflicts of interest
43% did not require review of committee members' conflicts of interest prior to guidelines development
57% did not require that a majority of guideline committee members be free of conflicts
44% did not report publishing committee members' conflicts of interest within guidelines
48% did not report preventing direct industry funding of guidelines
51% did not report preventing industry participation in selection of committee members
61% did not report preventing industry review of guidelines prior to publication.

My comment is that thus the results suggested that substantial numbers of organizations that produced CPGs did not demonstrate that they were committed to measures that would improve guidelines trustworthiness by reducing the influence of conflicts of interest.

Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest Within Guidelines

Again, it was necessary to recalculate some proportions using the full population of guidelines reviewed as the denominator.

Of the 290 guidelines reviewed:
65% "included disclosure statements regarding direct funding and support"
37% specifically disclosed the absence or presence of direct funding from biomedical companies
However,
49% did not disclose committee members' financial relationships
99% did not disclose relevant financial relationships of the organization (that is, institutional conflicts of interest) that produced the guidelines as a whole

My comment is that substantial numbers of published guidelines were not clearly produced so as to increase their trustworthiness by reducing the influence of conflicts of interest on them. 

Did the Guidelines Follow the Organizations' Stated Policies?


The authors commendably provided information about whether the guidelines produced by organizations that disclosed conflict of interest policies followed those polices.  They found:

16% of organizations "that reported that committee member conflicts of interested were published in guidelines" produced guidelines that did not include committee members' COI disclosure

61% of organizations that "reported the majority of committee members must be free of conflicts of interest" produced guidelines by committees with majorities of conflicted members

6% of organizations that "reported that industry partners were not permitted to directly fund clinical practice guideline development" produced guidelines which disclosed such funding.

My comment is that thus even of the organizations that stated they had policies in place to improve the trustworthiness of the guidelines they produced by reducing the influence of conflicts of interest, they allowed guidelines to be produced that did not follow those policies.

Authors' Conclusion

Financial relationships between organizations that produce clinical practice guidelines and the biomedical industry appear to be common. These relationships are important because they may influence, through guideline usage, the practice of large numbers of healthcare providers. We believe that to effectively manage conflicts of interest, organizations that produce clinical practice guidelines need to develop robust conflict of interest policies that include procedures for managing violations of the policy, make the policies publicly available, and disclose all financial relationships with biomedical companies.

Editorialists' Conclusion

The editorial by Bastian(2) was sharper in tone.  It included an observation that reinforced my confession of naivete above:

With hindsight, I think those of us encouraging better methodology for guideline development in the 1990s took the issue of disclosure of financial interests too much for granted. It seemed so self-evident, it got barely a mention even in national policy on guideline development

She also noted that the Campsall study did not address all the ways conflicts of interest can influence guideline development:

Stelfox and colleagues focus particularly on the organizational conflicts of interest of guideline producers and their policies. They examine the financial interests of the organizations, but not of the individuals employed within those organizations. This same blind spot is evident when it comes to policies about committee members; the financial interests of the organizations that individuals represent tend to be disregarded. Yet these can be substantial, including for patients’ organizations.

She noted that the failure of guidelines to report their developers' conflicts of interest is a continuing problem.  The rate of failure to report found by Campsall et al was

about the same rate that Taylor and Giles found in 2004 and Norris and colleagues found in 2010.

Finally, she emphasized that we are still a long way from having guidelines that health care professionals and patients can trust:

Guideline processes without adequate financial conflict management have to become unacceptable to a far wider circle. They need to become unacceptable to influential committee members, to the medical journals that lend so many guidelines additional standing and reach, and to the membership of the professional societies that produce them. Until that happens, for guidelines as for clinical research, it’s a case of caveat lector: let the reader beware.

My Summary

So should physicians trust clinical practice guidelines?  At least this article suggests they ought to be very very skeptical of them.  The IOM report meant to improve the trustworthiness of practice guidelines seems to be honored mainly in the breach.  The likelihood that any given guideline was produced so as to reduce the influence of conflicts of interest on it is low.  Even organizations that ostensibly put professional values and patients first in their efforts to develop guidelines seem to often be financially beholden to companies that want to sell drugs and devices.  Physicians and patients ought to be concerned that most new clinical practice guidelines may be as much about marketing commercial products as improving medical practice or patients' outcomes.

The current US presidential race has made it evident that we have a lot of disgruntled citizens, many of whom believe our system is rigged to favor the "establishment."  I suggest that the more we know about clinical practice guidelines, the more it appears that the health care system is rigged to favor certain parts of the "establishment," the big corporations that market drugs and devices, and their paid part-time hands within medical societies and patient advocacy groups who have turned these ostensibly idealistic, do gooder organizations into part-time marketing machines.

The huge and complex web of individual and institutional conflicts of interest that binds much of the health care system, the government, and industry may be good for the insiders, but is stifling improvement in our dysfunctional health care system.  True health care reform would first expose these conflicts, then reduce or better yet, eliminate them, and make health care more about helping patients and less about making money by marketing commercial products.

Musical Interlude

To dispel the darkness a bit, Paul Simon, "Still Crazy After All These Years," 1992 acoustic version:





References

1.  Campsall P et al.  Financial relationships between organizations that produce clinical practice guidelines and the biomedical industry: a cross-sectional study.  PLoS Medicine 2016; DOI;10.1371/journal.pmed.1002029    Link here.

2.  Bastien H. Nondisclosure of financial interest in clinical practice guideline development: an intractable problem? PLoS Medicine 2016;  DOI;10.1371/journal.pmed.1002030  Link here.

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Academic Medical Leaders as Directors of For-Profit Health Care Corporations: the Prevalence of This "New Species" of Conflict of Interest Documented in the BMJ

academic medical centers boards of directors conflicts of interest institutional conflicts of interest medical schools You heard it here first

Academic Medical Leaders as Directors of For-Profit Health Care Corporations: the Prevalence of This "New Species" of Conflict of Interest Documented in the BMJ

Unknown 10/01/2015 Komentar

The important conflicts of interest generated when academic health care leaders also serve on the boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations is suddenly less anechoic, thanks to some intrepid researchers and the British Journal of Medicine.

Background: Academic Health Care Leaders Also Serving as Directors of For-Profit Health Care Corporations

First Discovered Cases

In 2006, we first noticed that leaders of academic medicine also were serving as board members of large for-profit health care corporations.  The first example we discussed was that of Marye Anne Fox, Chancellor (equivalent to president) of the University of California - San Diego, and hence the person to whom the University of California, San Diego School of Medicine and its academic medical center report. The conflict was between this position, and her service as a member of the board of directors of Boston Scientific, a medical device manufacture, and the board of directors of Pharmaceutical Product Development Inc., a contract research organization.

Later that year, we discussed a "new species of conflict of interest."  At that time we wrote:

Medical schools and their academic medical centers and teaching hospitals must deal with all sorts of health care companies, drug and device manufacturers, information technology venders, managed care organizations and health insurers, etc, in the course of fulfilling their patient care, teaching, and research missions. Thus, it seems that service on the board of directors of a such public for-profit health care company would generate a severe conflict for an academic health care leader, because such service entails a fiduciary duty to uphold the interests of the company and its stockholders. Such a duty ought on its face to have a much more important effect on thinking and decision making than receiving a gift, or even being paid for research or consulting services. Furthermore, the financial rewards for service on a company board, which usually include directors' fees and stock options, are comparable to the most highly paid consulting positions. What supports the interests of the company, however, may not always be good for the medical school, academic medical center or teaching hospital.

Since 2006, we continued to find colorful examples of such conflicts of interest, e.g.,

- In 2006, the UnitedHealth board included multiple academic leaders, at least one of whom seemed partly responsible as a member of the board compensation committee for allowing the then UnitedHealth CEO to collect many backdated stock options (look here)
- In 2009, some attributed the problems at George Washington University's medical school that caused it to be put on probation to the conflict of interest of its provost and vice president for health affairs,  who also sat on the board of Universal Health Services, which owned the university hospital (look here)...

Through more recent years,

- In 2014, members of the AMA committee that has an outsize role in how the government fixes the pay of US doctors wer also found to be members of boards of directors of such companies as Kindred Healthcare, Hanger Inc, and Sante. (Look here.)
- In 2015, the academic physician and research unit leader nominated to be the new head of the US Food and Drug was a director of Portola Pharmaceuticals (look here)...

Look here for even more

Our Early Cross-Sectional Study

In 2007, we did a somewhat rough and ready research project based on 2005 data to determine the prevalence of such conflicts.  The results were presented in abstract form,(1) but not published as an article:

In 2005, there were 164 US health care companies in the 2005 S&P 1500, and 125 US medical schools. We identified 198 people who served on the companies' boards of directors who had faculty or leadership positions at these medical schools. Of the 125 medical schools, 65 schools had at least one faculty member and/or leader who also served on a health care corporation's board of directors. 15 schools had more than five, and 4 had more than 10 such individuals. Of the 125 schools, 7 reported to university presidents who were also directors of health care corporations, and 11 schools reported to vice-presidents for health affairs who were also such corporate directors. Four schools were lead by deans who were also health care corporate directors, and 10 schools had academic medical center CEOs who were such directors. 22 schools had at least one top leader who was also a director of a health care corporation. 36 schools reported to university boards of trustees which each included at least one director of a health care corporation, and 12 schools' own boards of trustees included at least one such director.

We concluded:

more than one-half of US medical schools had a leader or faculty member who also was a director of a major US for-profit publicly traded Bpure^ health care corporation, more than one-sixth of schools had a top leader who was also such a director, and more than one-fifth reported to boards of trustees which included such directors.

More Modern and Complete Data

Unfortunately, we never wrote a full paper about this work, although the likelihood we could have gotten it published around 2007 was very small.  It is fortunate that Anderson and colleagues did a more complete and current version of this project, which was published online this week by the British Medical Journal.(2)

Methods

Their methodology was similar to our earlier work, but more sophisticated.  They obtained data on the 2013 board members of 446 public for-profit US companies listed on New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ and classified as in the healthcare sector, including pharmaceutical, biotechnology, medical equipment and supply companies and health care providers from the companies' 2014 proxy statements.

Results

Their results were striking, suggesting even a greater prevalence of conflicted academic leaders than our preliminary results suggested

Directors were affiliated with 85 geographically diverse non-profit academic institutions, including 19 of the top 20 National Institute of Health funded medical schools and all of the 17 US News honor roll hospitals. Overall, these 279 academically affiliated directors included 73 leaders, 121 professors, and 85 trustees. Leaders included 17 chief executive officers and 11 vice presidents or executive officers of health systems and hospitals; 15 university presidents, provosts, and chancellors; and eight medical school deans or presidents.

The new study also described the direct financial relationships among the academic leaders, professors and trustees and the corporations on whose boards they served.

The total annual compensation to academically affiliated directors for their services to companies was $54 995 786 (£35 836 000; €49 185 900) (median individual compensation $193 000) and directors beneficially owned 59 831 477 shares of company stock (median 50 699 shares).

Discussion

As we have suggested, Anderson et al stated that being on the board of directors of a for-profit health care corporation creates conflicts of interest beyond those created by simply having a financial relationship with a health care company, e.g., by participating in a commercially sponsored research project or acting as a consultant to a company.

Similar to individuals engaging in consulting relationships, directors on industry boards enter a formal contract with the company and receive financial payment for services; however, they are subject to two important differences. Firstly, unlike consultants who are compensated to provide expertise on a specific issue, directors are subject to a fiduciary responsibility to company shareholders to advance the general interests of the company and increase profits. Secondly, directors are reimbursed both through larger cash fees than typical consulting contracts and through stock options, the value of which is directly tied to the financial success of the company.

They also added the reminder that,

Though the missions of academia and for profit companies can overlap, they may also diverge, specifically when the for profit mission of industry competes with the non-profit taxpayer funded clinical and research missions of academic medical and research institutions.

So,

previous guidelines have emphasized the relationships of clinicians and researchers with industry, but institutional conflicts of interest, which arise when administrators, including executive officers, trustees, and clinical leaders have a financial relationship with industry, are increasingly recognized and pose a unique set of risks to academic missions. 

Our Summary

We have written again and again on the problem of conflicts of interest affecting health care professionals, academics, and policy makers.  The worst such conflicts may occur when individuals are simultaneously leaders of large mission-oriented health care non-profit organizations, such as teaching hospitals, medical schools, or research institutes, and board members of for-profit health care corporations.  Despite our attempts to raise such issues as important, and probably important causes of health care dysfunction, they have remained anechoic.

Now a broadly based study of this no longer so "new species" of conflict of interest has appeared in one of the biggest and most prestigious medical journals.  Let us hope it will bring this issue to the forefront, and also partially counter those who have been preaching that concerns about conflicts of interest in health care are overblown.

As we have said again and again, the web of conflicts of interest that is pervasive in medicine and health care is now threatening to strangle medicine and health care.  Furthermore, this web is now strong enough to have effectively transformed US health care into an oligarchy or plutocracy.  Health care is effectively run by a relatively small group of people, mainly professional managers plus a few (lapsed?) health care professionals, who simultaneously run or influence multiple corporations and organizations.

For patients and the public to trust health care professionals and health care organizations, they need to know that these individuals and organizations are putting patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain. Health care professionals who care for patients, those who teach about medicine and health care, clinical researchers, and those who make medical and health care policy should do so free from conflicts of interest that might inhibit their abilities to put patients and the public's health first.

Health care professionals ought to make it their highest priority to ensure that the organizations for which they work, or with which they interact also put patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain, especially the private gain of the organizations' leaders and their cronies.

ADDENDUM (16 November, 2015) - Note that an abbreviated version of this post has appeared as an electronic "rapid response" to the article by Anderson et al (link here), although the published form has on it our original submission date.   

References

1. Poses RM, Smith WR, Crausman R, Maulitz R. Selling them the rope: prevalence of for-profit health care corporate dirctors among academic medical leaders. J Gen Intern Med 2007; 22 (Suppl 1): 98.
2.  Anderson TS, Good CB, Gellad WF.  Prevalence and compensation of academic leaders, professors and trustees on publicly trade US healthcare company boards of directors: cross sectional study.  Brit Med J 2015; 351:h4826.  Link here. 

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How Institutional Conflicts of Interest Exacerbate the Anechoic Effect - the Example of ASCO Fearing "Biting the Hand that Feeds You"

American Society of Clinical Oncology anechoic effect conflicts of interest health care prices institutional conflicts of interest medical societies You heard it here first

How Institutional Conflicts of Interest Exacerbate the Anechoic Effect - the Example of ASCO Fearing "Biting the Hand that Feeds You"

Unknown 6/27/2015 Komentar

As we recently discussed (here, here, here and here), in May, 2015, the New England Journal of Medicine, arguably the world's foremost medical journal, published an editorial and a three-part commentary arguing that current concerns about the effects of financial conflicts of interest (COI) on health care are overblown(1-4).  On June 1, the Wall Street Journal published a report on the 2015 meeting of the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) that provided a vivid example of why these concerns should not be dismissed.

Questioning Drug Prices at the ASCO Meeting

The main issue in the article was:

In a sign of growing frustration with rising drug prices, a prominent cancer specialist on Sunday sharply criticized the costs of new cancer treatments in a high-profile speech at one of the largest annual medical meetings in the U.S.

'These drugs cost too much,' Leonard Saltz, chief of gastrointestinal oncology at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, said in a speech heard by thousands of doctors here for the annual meeting of the American Society of Clinical Oncology.

The notion that health care prices are high and are rising continuously in the US should hardly be novel for regular Health Care Renewal readers.  We have been writing about it for a while, starting in 2005.

We first posted about high drug prices in July, 2005, with the example of BilDil.  This was a brand-name combination drug that included two compounds that were already cheaply available in generic form, advertised as a uniquely convenient therapy for congestive heart failure.  We were aghast that the price of the combination drug might be $5.40 - $10.80 a day (in 2005 dollars), over three times the cost of the two drugs in generic form.

But only a few days later we noted that three cancer costs had yearly costs in the five figures, and one, Erbitux, cost as much as $100,000.  Most amazingly we noted that Thalidomid was priced at $25,000  a year.  Yet it was just the infamous thalidomide, the drug initially marketed as a tranquilizer that caused severe birth defects after it was initially sold in Europe.  The drug was still available in generic form in South America for about seven cents a pill.

Since then, the ridiculously high prices of many tests and treatments, but most notably new drugs and devices, has been so widely covered our discussion has been limited to special cases.   For example, consider just a few headlines from April to May, 2015.

How Much Would You Pay for an Old Drug? If You Have MS, a Fortune (Bloomberg)

Pharmaceutical Companies Buy Rivals' Drugs, Then Jack Up the Prices (WSJ)

How Marketing Exclusivity Led to Higher Drug Costs and Questionable Benefits (WSJ)

Runaway Drug Prices (NY Times)


Drug Prices as a Taboo Topic

However, despite this wide attention to the problem, the speech at ASCO was notable.  Back to the WSJ...

Dr. Saltz’s speech was unusual because it was made at the meeting’s plenary session, where the field’s most significant scientific research is presented and which all meeting participants are expected to attend. An estimated 25,000 doctors and scientists attended this year’s meeting.

One would think that the high price of drugs, especially cancer drugs, would be a fit subject for discussion at a plenary session of ASCO, however,

It is unprecedented for plenary speeches, which typically address scientific and medical issues, to substantially take on the topic of drug costs, said Alan Venook, a professor of medicine at the University of California San Francisco who planned the meeting’s scientific session and invited Dr. Saltz to speak.

The prominent venue for the speech was also unusual because, like many medical meetings, ASCO is sponsored by pharmaceutical companies and often focuses on highlighting advancements in drug development, said Dr. Venook. He said discussing drug prices there is 'uncomfortable' because it could be seen as 'biting the hand that feeds you.'

Doctors are also reluctant to antagonize the drug industry because they need pharmaceutical firms to invest in developing new medicines for patients, he said.

'It’s a tough balancing act for ASCO where the meeting is largely funded by pharma,' Dr. Venook said in an interview. 'You can’t have a [plenary] talk trashing pharma, but you can have a talk by a respected person questioning it.'

So because pharma gives ASCO a lot of money, at best, only the most distinguished ASCO members can gently question pharma, but cannot criticize, much less "trash" the source of their mammon.


This is thus a succinct example of why financial conflicts of interest in medicine and health care can be bad.  The incredibly high prices of cancer drugs should be a fit topic for discussion at a meeting run by a society of medical oncologists.  But those in charge of the meeting and the society are afraid to initiate such a discussion, and even more afraid of appearing to criticize the companies that charge these prices, because the society has become dependent on money from these very same companies.  So this is further an example of how conflicts of interest can create the anechoic effect - the notion that certain topics in medicine and health care are taboo, because discussing them might trouble the powers that be, and particularly the moneyed interests that now dominate medicine and health care. 

In a succinct response to the NEJM series (1-4) soft pedaling concerns about conflicts of interest, the British Medical Journal ran a commentary by a former NEJM national correspondent, and two former NEJM editors.(5)  It stated,

The NEJM has now sought to reinterpret and downplay the importance of conflicts of interest in medicine by publishing articles that show little understanding of the meaning of the term. The concern is not whether physicians and researchers who receive industry money have been bought by the drug companies, as Drazen writes, or whether members of guideline panels or advisory committees to the US Food and Drug Administration with ties to industry make recommendations that are motivated by a desire for financial gain, as Rosenbaum writes. The essential issue is that it is impossible for editors and readers to know one way or the other.

In this case, we seem not to be talking about the possibility that health care professionals "have been bought by the drug companies,"  but how drug companies essentially "buying" a professional organization has apparently heretofore prevented medical professionals from discussing a vital issue that could have major effects on patients.

Following the Money

In case there is any question about the money involved and its sources, one only needs to go to some publicly available in formation supplied by ASCO (mostly because of reporting requirements imposed on all US non-profit organizations of a certain size).  

The latest (2014) annual report from ASCO reveals that the organization only gets 16.1% of its revenue from member dues.  Thus a ostensible membership organization gets only about a sixth of its funding from members' dues.

Yet the organization has become quite wealthy.  Its most recent (2013) US Internal Revenue Service 990 Form reveals that it owns over $55 million in real estate, and has over $104 million in investments (presumably as an endowment.)  The organizations' leaders are also doing very well. Its CEO, Allen Lichter MD, got $804,775 in total compensation in 2012.  Eleven other managers, of which three are health care professionals (one MD, one RN, one PharmD), got at least $220,000 in total compensation.  Five of them got more than $300,000. 

The source of all that money seems mainly to be pharmaceutical and other health care corporations that sell goods and services for cancer care.  US non-profit organizations are not forced by law to reveal the details of their financial support.  However, the ASCO annual report does list 23 pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, and one for-profit cancer hospital chain as contributing at least $1 million each in total to the non-profit over time.  The report lists 37 pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device companies as current corporate donors, and also 10 other for-profit health care related corporations as current corporate donors.

In addition to these apparently marked institutional conflicts of interest, ASCO leaders may have their own individual conflicts of interest.  I do not have the resources to search all relationships affecting meeting organizers and ASCO officers and trustees, and the organization does not post conflicts of interest affecting its leadership and governance in a prominent place. However, Dr Alan Venook, who confessed to his discomfort about inviting a talk that might be perceived as biting the hand that feeds the finances of ASCO, is or has been on advisory boards for Thershold Pharmaceuticals,  Mirna Therapeutics, and GlobeImmune.  For a 2014 presentation, he gave the following disclosures: "Research support from Genentech/Roche, BMS, Lilly, Novartis; H. Lenz: Consulting, advisory boards and research support from Genentech/Roche, BMS and Merck."  Furthermore, the current chair of the ASCO Board of Directors, Julie M Vose, MD, is also on the Medical Advisory Board of EmergingMed Inc, and the Clinical Advisory Board of Bullet Biotechnology.

Summary

The New England Journal of Medicine recently launched a counter-attack against the "pharmascolds" who are allegedly slowing the pace of medical progress by their excessive and puritanical concerns about financial conflicts of interest.  Yet the arguments that COIs could be bad for health care are logical, and based on at least some reasonably good evidence.  (See the article by Steinbrook et al in the BMJ mentioned above[4], the accompanying BMJ editorial[5] just to start and then the 2009 Institute of Medicine report.)

Moreover, we have encountered a lot of vivid cases suggesting that conflicts of interest can have adverse influences on health care.  In this most recent one, we see at least one prominent if conflicted organizational insider admitting that institutional, and perhaps individual conflicts of interest have made discussion of at least one big health care and health care policy topic taboo.  This seems to corroborate our previous discussion that the anechoic effect - that certain topics in health care are taboo - may be generated by conflicts of interest of the people who ought to discuss them, or of those to whom those people may have to answer.

True health care reform requires full disclosure of conflicts of interest for honesty's sake, and marked reduction of conflicts affecting those who make health care decisions on behalf of individual patients, and health care policy decisions that affect patients' and the public's health.  If we allow conflicts of interest to continue, we will have difficulty even discussing the most severe problems affecting health care, because those generating the topics are benefiting from the circumstances that enable such problems.

ADDENDUM (1 July, 2015) - This post was republished on 28 June, 2015, on the Naked Capitalism blog. 

ADDENDUM (20 July, 2015 ) - This post was republished on July 12, 2015 in OpenHealth News.

References

  1.Drazen JM.  Revisiting the commercial-academic interface.  N Eng J Med 2015; ; 372:1853-1854. Link here.
2. Rosenbaum L.  Reconnecting the dots - reinterpreting industry-physician relations.  N Eng J Med 2015; 372:1860-1864.  Link here.
3. Rosenbaum L. Understanding bias - the case for careful study.  N Engl J Med 2015;  372:1959-1963.  Link here.
4.  Rosenbaum L.  Beyond moral outrage - weighing the trade-offs of COI regulation. N Engl J Med 2015; 372: 2064-2068.  Link here.
5. Steinbrook R, Kassirer JP, Angell M.  Justifying conflicts of interest in medical journals: a very bad idea.  Brit Med J 2015; 350: h2942.  Link here. 
6. Loder E. Revisiting the commercial-academic interface in medical journals.  Brit Med J 2015; 350: h2957.  Link here.

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academic corruption conflict of interest evidence-based medicine institutional conflicts of interest NEJM pharmaceuticals physicians

Unknown 5/19/2015 Komentar

Why is the New England Journal of Medicine Scolding "Pharmascolds"?

I, a normally quiet blogger on this site, was disquieted by what may be a backlash aimed at quashing the anti-conflict-of-interest movement.

Lisa Rosenbaum just published her second of three treatises in the highly prestigious New England Journal of Medine, scolding "pharmascolds" (see Conflicts of Interest: Understanding Bias — The Case for Careful Study). "Pharmascolds" is the term Rosenbaum and others use for those of us at Health Care Renewal, the Institute of Medicine, and countless medical journals and institutions.  Why?  Because we dare assert there is great danger when providers practice though saddled by (potential) conflicts of interests in medicine.  Such conflicts are created when physicians (up to 94% of us, according to Rosenbaum's research), other health care providers in practice, and health care organizations accept, not only gifts and trinkets, but also large, sometimes clandestine consulting fees and other arrangements from pharma and device companies, all the while providing direct patient care using the companies' products.

Rosenbaum and others say we pharmascolds are essentially self-righteous and obstructionist, holding back the progress of medical science.  In this article, she seems to claim that not proving direct patient harm from a specific questionable financial arrangement with a company whose product we may therefore more likely prescribe, speak well of, or publish (pseudo)evidence supporting the use of, is enough of a reason to justify the arrangement. 

Wouldn't that be the same as saying, "Until you actually crash into another car while texting, it's ok to text while driving, even if it's distracting."?

Rosenbaum uses mainly anecdote to prove her point, and appeals to a little-quoted, but still important, heuristic/bias called "moral liscensing."  Rosenbaum describes the phenomenon correctly: "once disclosure [of a conflict of interest] gets the weight [of guilt] off your chest, you feel liberated and may feel licensed to behave immorally."  True.  But then Rosenbaum seems to support non-disclosure of acts that create conflicts of interest, because disclosure doesn't decrease the acts themselves.

Rosenbaum goes further. At the same time as she supports non-disclosure of conflicts, she attempts to paint those who accept conflict-generating arrangements and keep them clandestine as victims--afraid to "come out of the closet" because doing so is socially taboo, though the activity is not wrong. 

I beg to differ.  For certain acts, potential conflicts, and actual conflicts, it seems to me that mere disclosure of the act or conflict shouldn't relieve one of the guilt associated with the act or conflict.  It also seems disclosure of a conflict should not make a speaker seem more credible to his/her audience because of its disclosure, though some research Rosenbaum quotes seems to show that disclosure improves credibility. 

Perhaps the stronger argument for disclosure is to disqualify people from activities that should be prohibited for people in conflict, as well as to warn people away from engaging in questionable activities that would result in conflicts. 

In an unbelievable twist of logic, Rosenbaum seems to be arguing in this article for more, not less of these questionable activities, in the interest of advancing science, until we prove patients are directly hurt by them, i.e., we have a "wreck."  Heck, let's get rid of traffic lights too, while we're at it.  People have eyes. We should trust them. They should be able to avoid accidents voluntarily, on their own.

In short, how could Dr. Rosenbaum not see that the best solution for the "problem" of conflicts of interests is avoidance when possible?  One can't help but wonder if she and the Journal aren't blinded by the shimmer and pull of powerful, influential organizations, ones so shiny, so strong, and so ubiquitous that resistance is just too hard for her, the Journal, and for 94% of us.

Conflicts of interest should be avoided.  Society has accepted that improved health will result not just from secondary prevention (e.g., not texting while driving after one has had an accident from the activity), but also from primary prevention (not texting while driving, even before an accident occurs). 

Wally R. Smith, MD

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