Showing posts with label public relations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label public relations. Show all posts

Monday, 4 January 2016

Stealth Public Relations and Health Advocacy, Special Pleadings and the Opposition to Guidelines Discouraging Overuse of Narcotics

As I have written before as a physician who saw too many dire results of intravenous drug abuse, I was amazed how narcotics were pushed as the treatment of choice for chronic pain in the 1990s, with the result that the US was once again engulfed in an epidemic of narcotic abuse and its effects.  In mid-December, 2015, as reported in the Washington Post,

The nation continues to suffer through a widespread epidemic to prescription opioids and their illegal cousin, heroin. The CDC estimated that 20 percent of patients who complain about acute or chronic pain that is not from cancer are prescribed opioids. Health-care providers wrote 259 million prescriptions for the medications in 2012, 'enough for every adult in the United States to have a bottle of pills,' the CDC wrote.

Last week, the National Center for Health Statistics reported that the number of overdose deaths from legal opioid drugs surged by 16.3 percent in 2014, to 18,893, while overdose fatalities from heroin climbed by 28 percent, to 10,574. Authorities have said that previous efforts to restrict prescription drug abuse have forced some people with addictions to the medications onto heroin, which is cheaper and widely available.

This rising tide of death and morbidity seems to have been fueled by reckless, sometimes deceptive, sometimes illegal marketing by the pharmaceutical companies that produced narcotics other than heroin.

Background - Legal Drug Pushing

As I wrote in 2013,

the realization began to dawn that patients, doctors and society were being victimized by a new type of pusher man, this time dressed in a suit and working for an 'ethical' drug company.  In the earlier days of Health Care Renewal, we first posted (in 2006) about allegations of deceptive and unethical promotion of fentanyl by Cephalon that lead to its overuse by patients beyond those with cancer who were its ostensible target population.  Then in 2007 came the spectacular case of guilty pleas by a subsidiary of Purdue Pharma and several of its executives for 'misbranding' Oxycontin,  that is, promoting it far beyond any medically legitimate use in severe chronic pain.  Following that various investigations, well chronicled in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, showed how pharmaceutical companies employed deceptive marketing techniques, subverting medical education and research, and creating conflicted key opinion leaders and institutionally conflicted disease advocacy groups, to push more 'legal' narcotics  For example, see the Journal Sentinel reports the subversion of :  medical schools and their faculty; .medical societies, disease advocacy groups, and foundations; and guideline writing panels.  In 2012, we posted about how a drug company paid key opinion leader admitted to second thoughts about his role promoting narcotics.

As I described in that 2012 post, the new narcotic pushers relied on only the most sketchy evidence about the safety of prescription narcotics.  In the 1990s, they taught that the rate of addiction caused by prescribing legal narcotics was only 1%, but this was based on a tiny flawed case series of a mere 38 patients.  In 1996, a consensus statement from the American Academy of Pain Medicine and the American Pain Society, entitled "The Use of Opioids for the Treatment of Chronic Pain," included the following statements,

Pain is often managed inadequately, despite the ready availability of safe and effective treatments.

Studies indicate that the de novo development of addiction when opioids are used for the relief of pain is low.

Yet one of the primary proponents of profligate use of narcotics to treat chronic pain later admitted he

erred by overstating the drugs' benefits and glossing over risks. 'Did I teach about pain management, specifically about opioid therapy, in a way that reflects misinformation? Well, against the standards of 2012, I guess I did,' Dr. Portenoy said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. 'We didn't know then what we know now.'

Also,

'I gave innumerable lectures in the late 1980s and '90s about addiction that weren't true,' Dr. Portenoy said in a 2010 videotaped interview with a fellow doctor. The Journal reviewed the conversation, much of which is previously unpublished.

In it, Dr. Portenoy said it was 'quite scary' to think how the growth in opioid prescribing driven by people like him had contributed to soaring rates of addiction and overdose deaths. 'Clearly, if I had an inkling of what I know now then, I wouldn't have spoken in the way that I spoke. It was clearly the wrong thing to do,' Dr. Portenoy said in the recording.


The CDC Attempts to Moderate the Use of Opioids for Chronic Pain

So to me it seems quite reasonable the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), being cognizant of the rising toll of narcotic addiction, would attempt to do something about it.  As reported by the Washington Post,

The government on Monday urged primary-care physicians who prescribe opioids for pain relief to rein in their use of the drugs, proposing new guidelines that call for a more conservative approach than the one that has led to a crippling epidemic of addiction to the powerful narcotics.

Just a few days after a new report showed a surge of drug-related overdoses in 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention suggested in draft recommendations that physicians tackle chronic pain with other methods, such as physical therapy and non-opioid analgesics, before turning to the powerful medications. If opioids, such as OxyContin and Percocet, are necessary, the agency recommended short-acting versions over extended release formulations, the lowest possible dose and short-term prescriptions.

It also suggested that doctors ask patients to take urine tests before prescribing opioids and additional urine tests at least once a year if they continue on the drugs, to ensure that they aren't secretly taking other opioids or illegal drugs.

'What we want to just make sure is that doctors understand that starting a patient on an opiate is a momentous decision,' said CDC director Tom Frieden. 'The risks are addiction and death, and the benefits are unproven.'

Based on the events since they 1990s, the lack of clear data from well performed randomized controlled trials of the effectiveness of opioids in chronic pain, and their obvious, known risks, that seems like common sense to me.

The Strong but Obscure Opposition to the CDC Guidelines

However,others disagreed.  The guidelines attracted immediate opposition, for reasons that were not immediately obvious.  Four days after the Post article, the Associated Press reported that the guidelines were in big trouble,

A bold federal effort to curb prescribing of painkillers may be faltering amid stiff resistance from drugmakers, industry-funded groups and, now, even other public health officials.

Also,

Critics complained the CDC guidelines went too far and had mostly been written behind closed doors. One group threatened to sue. Then earlier this month, officials from the FDA and other health agencies at a meeting of pain experts bashed the guidelines as 'shortsighted,' relying on 'low-quality evidence.' They said they planned to file a formal complaint.

The CDC a week later abandoned its January target date, instead opening the guidelines to public comment for 30 days and additional changes.

Anti-addiction activists worry the delay could scuttle the guidelines entirely.

This, however, did not make much sense.  I repeat, the evidence that narcotics are effective for chronic pain other than that due to terminal cancer is very weak.  The evidence that opioids have multiple side effects, some fatal, and can cause addiction, which has more side effects, and bad societal consequences, is strong.  So the evidence that narcotics have benefits that are worth their harms, both to individuals and society, in this setting is essentially non-existent.  So why did these guidelines go too far?  Why invoke low quality evidence, when the evidence that is low quality is about the benefits of the drugs?  Who should be sued?  Furthermore, why did the CDC cave in so readily to these critics?

The AP noted,

But industry-funded groups like the U.S. Pain Foundation and the American Academy of Pain Management warn that the CDC guidelines could block patient access to medications if adopted by state health systems, insurers and hospitals.

Of course they could reduce access.  The whole point of the guidelines is to reduce access.  But who would want more access to medicines that do more harm than good?

Then there was the issue of just who it was who opposed the guidelines. Much of the opposition seemed to come from rather obscure organizations with authoritative names.  Some of the opposition was chronicled by equally obscure, apparently journalistic organizations. (From now on, I will highlight these mysterious organizations by using bold, italic text in this color.)  For example, according to the Washington Post,

Many of the patient and physician groups opposing the CDC guidelines are part of a larger coalition called the Pain Care Forum, which meets monthly in Washington to strategize on pain issues. Officials from the White House, the FDA, NIH and other agencies have met with the group over the years, according to documents obtained by The Associated Press under the Freedom of Information Act.

The Pain Care Forum presents itself as a leaderless collective that does not take formal positions. But most members receive funding from drugmakers, including OxyContin-maker Purdue, whose chief lobbyist helped found the group and remains at its center.

The mission of the Pain Care Forum, its organizational nature (informal group, membership society, non-profit advocacy group, etc), its leadership, and its sources of funding were not entirely obvious from this article.  But certainly the drift of the article was that the organization maybe represents pharmaceutical manufacturers, particularly the previously discredited Purdue Pharma (see above) more than others.  So why not take what it says with many grains of salt.

But who threatened to sue?  Which FDA officials chimed in, and why, given that the FDA does not have a mission that includes writing guidelines?   That was not clear from the AP story.

My attempts to gain further clarity produced more mystification.  A Medscape article also claimed that the opposition to the CDC guidelines included Dr James Madara, the Executive Vice-President and CEO of the American Medical Association, and "some members of the Interagency Pain Research Coordinating Committee [who] criticized the process, according to the Pain News Network."  It was not clear whether Dr Madara's viewpoint had broad support in the AMA, which members of the Interagency Pain Research Coordinating Committee opposed the CDC guidelines, and whether this opposition was personal, or reflected the considered viewpoint of the committee.  Furthermore, that committee's purview does not obviously include clinical guideline development or public health, so why it was commenting on this issue was also unclear.  

The Pain News Network story which apparently was the source used by the Medscape in turn referred to a Politico story, but one which is only available to subscribers.  The Pain News Network also credited a survey by "the Pain News Network and the Power of Pain Foundation."

The Medscape article said nothing more about the Pain News Network.which is not exactly a household word in health care journalism.  The Pain News Network story did not give more detail about the Power of Pain Foundation, whose mission, nature, leadership, funding etc was not obvious.   

The Pain News Network story also quoted the Washington Legal Foundation's chief counsel.

The overly secretive manner in which CDC has been developing the Guideline serves the interests of neither the healthcare community nor consumers.

Similarly, the Washington Post article also credited the Washington Legal Foundation's opposition to the CDC guidelines,

The Washington Legal Foundation, a public interest law firm dedicated to protecting the free enterprise system, accused the CDC of trying to formulate them secretly by failing to make public the work of its original advisory committee, the Core Expert Group. The CDC disputes that accusation, but issued the recommendations in draft form Monday and will have them reviewed by another advisory panel after receiving more comment over the next 30 days, Frieden said.

Yet, neither the Pain News Network nor the Post explained why a group supporting "free enterprise" was so concerned about this issue, or what expertise it might have in this area.  It is ironic that a group that proclaims opposition to secrecy seems less than transparent about its involvement in this issue.

Finally, the nature of the Pain News Network, which claims to be a "non-profit, independent news source," is also obscure.  It appears to be one of those non-profits that has no physical address per its web page of contact information, does not disclose its sources of funding, and if it files US Internal Revenue Service 990 forms, I cannot find them.

The most detailed article I could find about the substance of the complaints about the CDC guidelines was in another obscure source, the Legal News Line.  The article mostly described the concerns of

Peter Pitts, a former associate commissioner of external affairs at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and now president and co-founder of the Center for Medicine in the Public Interest, can be counted among those critical of how the panel was put together.

Pitts' main issue was that a member of the group that developed the CDC guidelines was biased. He said,

'So you have to have as open of a mind as possible.'

And that’s exactly where the CDC went wrong, Pitts said, pointing to Jane Ballantyne. Ballantyne served as a member of the CDC’s “Core Expert Group,” which played a key role in developing the agency’s opioid guidelines.

Ballantyne, a retired professor of anesthesiology and pain medicine at the University of Washington, is a member of the International Association for the Study of Pain, or IASP, and last year was named president of the Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing, or PROP.

PROP’s mission, according to its website, is to 'reduce opioid-related morbidity and mortality by promoting cautious and responsible prescribing practices.'

'Not only does she have strong opinions, but extra strong opinions -- almost on the lunatic fringe -- on pain medicine issues,' Pitts said.

'For the CDC to say, we’re going to put someone who comes to the discussion with such preconceived notions on such a committee, you have to ask yourself, why? And then why was it hidden from the public?'

The Legal New Line's example of supposed journalism did not apparently ask Pitts what was "lunatic" about wanting to promote cautious and responsible prescribing of opioids.  That seems to me like common clinical sense, the opposite of insanity.  

Also, Pitts complained that beyond this alleged bias, Dr Ballantyne had a conflict of interest,

Pitts noted Ballantyne’s connection to law firm Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC -- a plaintiffs law firm that is known for its class action lawsuits and has been hired by a number of state attorneys general in recent years, including some of those to whom it donated.

Ballantyne reportedly disclosed her services as a paid consultant for Cohen Milstein to the CDC. The firm currently is helping to represent the City of Chicago in a lawsuit filed against a group of pharmaceutical companies over the marketing of opioid painkillers.

Note that in the first paragraph above, the writer apparently meant that the law firm donated to the campaigns of the attorney generals.

More importantly, why the apparent conflict of interest affecting a single member of a large group - the core expert group of which Dr Ballantyne sat included 17 people - was so important was not apparent from Mr Pitts' argument.  Mr Pitts did not explain how any sort of advisory group that included experts in the field could avoid people who already had strong opinions about that field.  The Legal News Line article did not discuss Mr Pitts' own background, or provide any information about the Center for Medicine in the Public Interest, which he leads.  

I could not find reporting in major news outlets or medical/ health care scholarly publications about the opposition to the CDC guidelines beyond the stories in the Washington Post, AP, and Medscape, and a brief report in Modern Healthcare.  I did find numerous articles on yet another little known website called the National Pain Report, (e.g. see this one).

So to summarize so far, the opposition to the new CDC opioid guidelines was apparently strong enough to delay, if not derail them.  Yet who was in the opposition, their funding, and their interests remains obscure.  The arguments of the opposition remain unclear.  Even some of the purported journalists reporting on the opposition remain mysterious.  There seems to be a tremendous amount of fog surrounding the opposition to more conservative prescribing of narcotics for non-cancerous chronic pain.

The Common Thread - Stealth Health Policy Advocacy


It was striking that much of the opposition seemed to come from rather mysterious organizations, the Pain Care Forum, Power of Pain Foundation, Washington Legal Foundation, and Center for Medicine in the Public Interest.  However, the reporting on these organizations was minimal.  Furthermore, some of the news sources reporting on the opposition to the CDC guidelines also were rather mysterious, such as the Pain News Network, National Pain Report, and Legal News Line.

One recent media article, and some of our previous blogging, though suggest that the opposition organizations all have ties to the pharmaceutical industry, and in several cases, directly to one of the major producers of legal opioids.  On December 23, 2015, Lee Fang wrote in the Intercept by way of an introduction,

The pharmaceutical companies that manufacture and market OxyContin, Vicodin, and other highly addictive opioid painkillers — drugs that have fueled the epidemic of overdoses and heroin addiction — are funding nonprofit groups fighting furiously against efforts to reform how these drugs are prescribed.

In particular,

An investigation by The Intercept has found that the pharmaceutical companies that dominate the $9 billion a year opioid painkiller market have funded organizations attacking reform of the prescribing guidelines:

The Washington Legal Foundation, a nonprofit that litigates to defend 'free-market principles,' threatened the CDC with legal action if the agency moved forward with the proposed opioid guidelines. The WLG claimed the CDC’s advisory panel for the guidelines lacked 'fair ideological balance,' because it included a doctor who is part of an advocacy effort against opioid addiction. The WLF does not disclose donor information, but has filed friend-of-the-court briefs on behalf of Purdue Pharma, the makers of OxyContin. In a recent article with Pain News Network, a spokesperson for Purdue Pharma conceded: 'We’re long-standing supporters of WLF, in addition to several other business and legal organizations. We’ve provided them with unrestricted grants.'

The Pain Care Forum organized opposition to the CDC prescribing guidelines, mobilizing regular meetings among stakeholders opposed to the idea, according to an investigation by AP reporter Matthew Perrone. A recently re-filed complaint by the City of Chicago found that Burt Rosen, the chief in-house lobbyist for Purdue Pharma, controls the Pain Care Forum. A former drug company employee allegedly told investigators that Rosen tells the Pain Care Forum 'what to do and how we do it.' The Pain Care Forum is funded through contributions by Purdue Pharma, as well as major opioid manufacturers Cephalon, Endo, and Janssen, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson.

 The Power of Pain Foundation, a group funded by Purdue Pharma, asked supporters to contact the CDC in opposition to the guidelines, claiming that 'taking away pain medication and making providers afraid to prescribe due to your guidelines is only going to make more abusers, increase suicides, and tear apart the lives of millions.'


Fang also noted that the Legal News Line, the source of the story documenting Peter Pitts' problems with the CDC guidelines, also is tied to the pharmaceutical industry:

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a corporate lobbying group that represents opioid manufacturers, including Johnson & Johnson, issued a press release masquerading as a news story [published by the Legal News Line] criticizing the CDC guidelines. (The U.S. Chamber operates a public relations effort dressed up as a bona fide media outlet called Legal Newsline, which it uses to disseminate stories that support the political priorities of its member companies.)

In addition, on Health Care Renewal we have previously discussed the Center for Medicine in the Public Interest.  Back in 2008, we noted that when writing for the New York Times, Mr Pitts had to disclose that the Center for Medicine in the Public Interest receives pharmaceutical industry funding, including from Pfizer and the PhRMA.  At that time, Mr Pitts' day job was  Senior Vice President for Global Health Affairs at the big public relations firm Manning, Selvage and Lee. Manning, Selvege and Lee had many big pharmaceutical accounts  Since then, he moved on to become director for global healthcare at Porter Novelli, also a public relations/ communications company with many health care corporate clients, including pharmaceutical companies, and now appears to be a consultant in the life sciences area for YourEncore.  I cannot find any updated information on current Center for Medicine in the Public Interest funding, but there is no reason to think that it is not still funded by the pharmaceutical industry.

Mr Pitts' published objections to the CDC guidelines had to do with the supposed bias and conflicts of interests of a single member of the guideline expert panel, and the alleged lack of transparency of the guideline project.  Yet Mr Pitts was not very transparent about his own background, and his and his organizations' financial interests.  For Mr Pitts to condemn the guideline panel member's conflict while hiding his own conflict amounts to a garish example of the logical fallacy of special pleading.  Similarly, the Washington Legal Foundation's objections to the alleged biases of the guideline panel, given that  foundation is apparently funded by Purdue Pharma, is another garish example of the same logical fallacy.

On the other hand, the Pain News Network and the National Pain Report remain obscure.   The former claims to be a non-profit organization, but I cannot find its federal 990 filing, identify its board of trustees, or even determine its physical address. It does claim an affiliation with the Power of Pain Foundation.  The National Pain Report at least has a physical address, which it shares with the equally obscure American News Report. Other details, like its ownership, remain obscure.  The failure of supposedly journalistic organizations to publicly reveal basic information about their nature and operations does raise suspicions that they are not really so journalistic.

Summary

In summary, the organizations most widely mentioned as opposing the new CDC guidelines that recommend more conservative use of opioids for chronic pain seem to be heavily involved with the pharmaceutical companies that make such opioids.  Thus, the opposition to the guidelines seems to be arising from a stealth public relations campaign leading to stealth health policy advocacy.  Furthermore, at least so far, the objections to the guidelines do not seem clearly based on logic and good evidence from clinical research, again suggesting they are more about financial interests than improving patient outcomes and reducing risks.

Overuse and misuse of opioids, which may lead to all the individual and social consequences of opioid addiction, are clearly major, worsening medical and public health issues.  We need earnest effort to address these problems, which should be informed by a logical, evidence-based discussion of the clinical and social realities.  Such a discussion is only hindered by the growing fog of objections launched by mysterious organizations funded by the companies who have made the most money selling narcotics.  So we also need some societal response to the growing domination of the public debate by marketing and public relations, often based on emotional manipulation, logical fallacies, and outright deception.

We cannot address our worsening health care dysfunction when public discussion and policy making blunders about in the fog of stealth health policy advocacy, stealth lobbying, and stealth marketing.  If the leaders of big health care corporations really believe they are making good products and providing good services that add value and improve patients' and the public's health, they ought to be able to rely on honest and open communications.  If they cannot disavow stealth public relations and stealth marketing, we ought to disavow the companies that practice them.

Not So Cheerful Musical Interlude

Unfortunately, given the topic of this post, here is Lou Reed singing Heroin



ADDENDUM (4 January, 2016) - This post was republished on the Naked Capitalism blog, sadly without Lou Reed. See the interesting comments appended to that version.

Also, this post was republished in its entirety on OpEdNews.
Baca selengkapnya

Friday, 6 March 2015

A "PR Pawn" Confounds the Public Relations Burnishing of Texas Health Resources and its CEO

A "PR Pawn" Confounds the Public Relations Burnishing of Texas Health Resources and its CEO

The Ebola virus epidemic in Africa is hopefully winding down.  The uproar, if not panic, over Ebola virus in the US has been eclipsed by the latest  internet craze.  However, we are still learning from the echoes of the brief, and thankfully very localized US experience with Ebola.

In particular, the country's response to the virus should continue to inspire unease about how our supposedly market based, managerially focused health care non-system can handle real public health threats.

Background - Ebola at Texas Health Presbyterian

Starting on October 2, 2015, we discussed numerous concerns about whether problems with leadership or management at Texas Health Presbyterian hospital, part of the Texas Health Resources system, contributed to the poor outcomes of its Ebola patients.  First, InformaticsMD raised questions about whether a badly designed or implemented electronic health record at the hospital enabled the initial misdiagnosis of Eric Duncan, the first patient to present with the Ebola virus on US soil.  These questions were reinforced when hospital managers gave conflicting responses on this issue.  He expanded on these questions here.

A week later, I wrote about the "mystery of the discharged Ebola patient," asking:  why don't we know yet exactly what happened when our Ebola patient zero first appeared?  I wondered then whether a decision by management to shift the health system's emphasis from acute care to "population health management," whatever that is, might have lead to problems addressing what was a severe, acute medical problem (albeit with public health implications.)    About a week later, I wrote about the questions raised by inconsistencies in hospital managers' statements, about Mr Duncan's clinical status and the failure to initially accurately diagnose his infection, about the hospital's readiness to handle Ebola patients, and about whether hospital professional staff may have been silenced by administrators, and if so, why?


By late November, 2014, a Texas Health Presbyterian nurse had gone public with accusations that the initial care of Mr Duncan had been chaotic; Mr Duncan had died; and two nurses who cared for him after he was admitted after his second emergency visit to Texas Health Presbyterian had contracted Ebola infections; but no new Ebola cases had been diagnosed in the US, and Ebola was starting to fade from the media.   At that time, I wrote that the three questions above remained unanswered.  However, Texas Health Resources, the parent system for Texas Health Presbyterian, had hired Burton-Marsteller, a big public relations firm, and  managers of both companies generated considerable verbiage, but no specific answers and no real enlightenment.  Hospital managers had already pointed their fingers elsewhere, at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for inadequate guidelines, unnamed third parties for exploiting the crisis, and the media for sensationalizing it. Hospital managers had sponsored a pep rally, but the health professionals who appeared there either seemed to stick to talking points, or remained "tight lipped."   The hospital settled a lawsuit filed by Mr Duncan's relatives, and Micahel Barden, the THR president, submitted to an interview in which he boasted of a "high level of communication" and asserted the system had "maintained the trust level," but did not supply any specifics.

Since November, 2014, no further specifics have appeared about what happened at Texas Health Presbyterian.

The Public Relations Burnishing of Texas Health Resource Management

Instead, since October, 2014, a series of events and media reports seemed more about burnishing the management of Texas Health Resources, and particularly its CEO, Barclay Berdan, than about learning from the problems that occurred when the US first encountered the Ebola virus.

On November 29, 2014, Modern Healthcare published an interview with Mr Berdan including leading questions like:

Has this Ebola crisis caused you to take a broader look at hospital-acquired infections?

How were you able to maintain high staff morale throughout this crisis?

The answer to that last question was particularly upbeat:

It was really important to make sure that we had a high level of communication and that we maintained trust inside the organization while we were in many cases being attacked from the outside, as the world moved from science to political science to social science to superstition and fear. That helped us keep the morale of the organization up and to keep people focused on the fact that we had a lot of patients to take care of.

Even though our patient census dropped by 20%, we told everybody we weren't going to reduce staffing. We were going to keep people working at their regular rates and times. We kept everybody really focused on this challenge, that we had to stay strong and get through this period of time.

Note that this implied communications had always been good, trust had always been maintained, and morale had never declined. There were no followup questions, particularly whether staff morale could have seemed good because dissent had been silenced? 

On December 5, 2014, the D Healthcare Daily reported on an event in which Mr Berdan participated, and treated him as an honored expert.  Berdan was quoted, for example,

The best thing you can do—if you’re a local hospital, if you’re a rural hospital or an urban hospital—is to try and figure out how to manage the safety of your employees, the safety of your institution, the safety of patients who may present with, in this case, a disease that already causes people great fear.

The article trumpeted how selflessly Berdan has led THR to teach other hospitals about Ebola, with the underlying assumption that it had valuable lessons to teach:
 
THR has shared what it’s learned with other hospitals, both in North Texas and across the country. It held a webinar with 1,200 medical professionals to share what it learned and changed....

On December 5, 2014, D Healthcare Daily also noted that at the event, an award was given to caregivers who dealt with ebola at Texas Health Presbyterian, but who accepted the award on their behalf? 

Barclay Berdan, CEO of Texas Health Resources, was center-stage on Tuesday at the Sheraton downtown, flanked by more than a dozen staffers representing the 100-plus caregivers who helped treat the three Ebola patients in October.

The Dallas Regional Chamber presented the caregivers of Texas Health Presbyterian Dallas with the Courage of Public Service Award, an annual recognition that honors groups or officials who 'demonstrated significant leadership on important issues.'

After Berdan gave his little speech, next up on stage were:

Texas Health Resources Board Chair Anne Bass and Presbyterian Hospital Board Chair Stan Rabin walked up first,... 

Although the actual caregivers were supposedly being honored, airtime and coverage went to board chairs.

Then last month (February, 2015), it began again. Another interview with Mr Berdan appeared in D Healthcare Daily. It allowed Mr Berdan to pontificate on issues like the hospital system's growth plans, and to go back to the idea of population health as more important than acute care,

I think we’re looking always to find good opportunities to improve the health of the people in the communities we serve, and that’s our mission. In fact, we have really changed the scope and direction of our organization over the last four or five years from being a great acute care hospital company—you referenced all of our hospital properties in North Texas—to really being a health company.

Ebola, and the questions I raised above, were not featured. 

Finally, in the March issue (available in late February, 2015), D Magazine published, "How Texas Health Managed its Ebola Crisis," focused, of course, on CEO Barcaly Berdan. It featured a large color photograph of Mr Berdan.  It seemed to suggest that the most important issue was maintaining the reputation of the hospital system, rather than for example, being transparent about and learning from mistakes. It featured a big informal portrait of Mr Berdan, and started with how Mr Berdan managed the first news conference about Ebola, rather than, for example, the details of Mr Duncan's encounters with THR.

To Berdan, it was important to show that Presby—one of Dallas County’s largest and busiest hospitals—was safe and open for business.

The article described Berdan as an "unassuming man who speaks with confidence and fatherly authority," an "able communicator," a man whose "word is his bond," and eventually, "a battle tested CEO." It stated that "the treatment of Duncan - and the safety of the men and women who volunteered to care for him - rested squarely on his shoulders." Yet, of course, Mr Berdan's highest degree was an MBA, from University of Chicago, no less. He may have had a public relations battle, but he did not have to walk into a room containing a highly infectious Ebola patient. He actually should not have had any authority over the actual treatment of Mr Duncan. That should have been in the hands of the patient's doctors and nurses.

The article obliquely addressed the unanswered questions, but did provide substantive answers. Why was Mr Duncan not diagnosed accurately?

Privacy laws prevented the hospital from discussing the care provided Duncan until he permitted them to....

Was the hospital prepared to take care of Ebola patients?

We were moving in parallel with the CDC's ongoing recommendations....

Were health professionals silenced? The hospital paraded four nurses in front of 60 Minutes' cameras:

On the evening of Oct. 26, wearing blue scrubs and seated in front of a jet-black background, nurses Sidia Rose, John Mulligan, Richard Townsend, and Krista Schaefer offered a poignant and moving narrative of Duncan’s treatment. It was the most substantive account offered to that point.

The final section of the article was entitled, "On the Mend." Again, the emphasis was on PR.

THR had positive momentum. Once a pin-cushion, its public reputation was improving.

The hospital settled a lawsuit with Mr Duncan's relatives for an undisclosed sum. After the settlement was announced, Mr Duncan's nephew proclaimed:

This facility is an outstanding facility, and we as humans are not perfect.

Maybe getting a big sum of money can make one more philosophical about human imperfections.

The article ended up describing how

North Texas seems to have appreciated the efforts of THR under Berdan....

It all sounded so rosy, at least for a few days.

A "PR Pawn" Strikes Back, or, Nina Pham Administers a Corrective

Only a few days after the D Magazine piece appeared, the Dallas Morning News published an article about Nina Pham, the first THR nurse to have been infected with Ebola virus after caring for Mr Duncan.  Pham had never previously been portrayed as a dissident, and had been seen in the media as a young professional gamely facing down the virus and supporting her fellow nurses.  Now, however, rather than participating further in the feel good celebration of THR and Mr Berdan, Ms Pham announced she would be suing the hospital and THR.


She says the hospital and its parent company, Texas Health Resources, failed her and her colleagues who cared for Thomas Eric Duncan, the first person in the United States diagnosed with Ebola.

'I wanted to believe that they would have my back and take care of me, but they just haven’t risen to the occasion,' Pham told The Dallas Morning News

Pham reaffirmed the contention that Texas Health Presbyterian was not prepared to care for Ebola patients.

In her 90-minute interview, Pham described working in chaotic surroundings at the hospital with ill-prepared nurses who received little guidance on how to treat Ebola and protect themselves.

In particular,

She said the extent of her Ebola training was a printout of guidelines that her supervisor found on the Web.

And


The day Duncan moved to ICU, Pham said, she and the charge nurse went in with double gloves taped to double gowns and wore double booties and a face shield. The hospital did not have hazmat-type suits, and Pham said her neck was always exposed.

'We’ve had nurses that I’ve worked with that worked in other states, and they worked in hazmat suits for flu and H1N1,' Pham said. 'Why aren’t we wearing hazmat suits for Ebola?'

After days of asking, Pham said, the nurses were given hazmat suits. She said all the decisions to upgrade the protective gear and precautions were made by the nurses 'on the fly.'

 Meanwhile, the nurses devised their own hazardous waste area. In a room adjacent to Duncan’s, the nurses set up a place to take off their protective gear and shower after caring for him. In another nearby room, they placed bags of dirty linens, towels and other soiled items.

Finally,

while she became the American face of the fight against the disease, the hospital’s lack of training and proper equipment and violations of her privacy made her 'a symbol of corporate neglect — a casualty of a hospital system’s failure to prepare for a known and impending medical crisis.'

She also contradicted much of the feel good public relations speak found in the articles above.  The D Magazine article had referred to Pham and the other nurses who care for Mr Duncan as "the men and women who volunteered to care for him."  In contrast, the Dallas Morning News article said "she did not volunteer to care for Duncan, but felt she couldn't say no."

During the crisis, Pham was seen in a video where she appeared gamely optimistic.  However,

She says that Texas Health Resources violated her privacy while she was a patient at Presbyterian by ignoring her request that 'no information' be released about her. She said a doctor recorded her on video in her hospital room and released it to the public without her permission.

While the hospital argued that Pham gave permission to make the video,


The day Pham was transferred to NIH, a notation was made in her medical file that 'she does not have the mental capability to make end-of-life decisions,' [Pham's attorney Charla] Aldous said. But PR people from Texas Health were trying to talk to her for a media release 'about how much she loves Presbyterian,' Aldous said.

Texas Health, with a PR firm’s help, developed a slogan — 'Presby Proud' — aimed at restoring the community’s faith in the beleaguered hospital.

Before Pham’s flight to Maryland on Oct. 16, she said, a doctor wearing a video camera under his protective hood came into her room and said he was filming her for educational purposes. Pham said she did not give permission for the video, which was released to the media.

'Thanks for getting well. Thanks for being part of the volunteer team to take care of our first patient,' a man’s voice said in the video. 'It means a lot. This has been a huge effort by all of you guys.'

'I could tell they wanted me to stay just because they kind of knew, they could see I was getting better. They wanted that ‘yes we cured her’ kind of attitude. They wanted a win, especially after a loss.' - Nina Pham


Charla Aldous, Pham’s attorney, put it all more simply:

Texas Health Resources 'used Nina as a PR pawn.'

Summary

So it looks like back to the drawing board for the public relations flacks who have been defending the "reputation" of Texas Health Resources, and, in my humble opinion, mainly the reputation of its CEO, Barclay Berdan.  After questions about its preparedness for and the care of Ebola patients, and about whether managers overrode and silenced health care professionals, the hospital system had put on a big public relations campaign, in concert with a big outside PR firm.  Yet all the questions have now resurfaced as one of the hospital nurses put before the public as brave yet ever loyal to "Presby" now says she was turned into a "PR pawn." 

Of course, the immediate response by the hospital and the CEO were to trot out the old talking points.  In the Dallas Morning News article, spokesman Wendell Watson said,

Nina Pham bravely served Texas Health Dallas during a most difficult time.  We continue to support and wish the best for her, and we remain positive that constructive dialogue can resolve this matter.

Later, as again reported by the Dallas Morning News, CEO Barclay Berdan tried to refute Ms Pham's contention that her privacy was violated by saying:

We adhered to HIPAA rules in determining what information to share publicly.  

But HIPAA rules are notoriously hard to interpret and implement.

Also,

We had Nina's consent to share the information about her that was released.

But she had contended she was too ill, and confused on pain relief medicines to give informed consent, and aspects of her record apparently corroborate that. 

So the questions about what was going on at THR persist.  The latest twist in the story does emphasize how important public relations has become to contemporary hospital managers.  One cannot avoid the notion that most of what went on in the C-suites of Texas Health Presbyterian and Texas Health Resources in response to the presence of three Ebola patients was about public relations, protecting the reputation of the hospital, and particularly celebrating its very well paid MBA CEO.  Of course if leaders focus on public relations, maybe they will not do such a good job supporting the health care professionals who actually care for patients, and ultimately supporting the patients' and the public's health.

So as I said a while ago about this case, the rise of generic managers who value, among other things, favorable public relations perhaps to the detriment of patient care, threatens the US' ability to care for acutely ill patients, especially in the context of new or epidemic diseases.  True health care reform would restore leadership by people who understand the health care context, uphold health professionals' values, are willing to be held accountable, and put patients' and the public's health ahead of self-interest.

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Thursday, 5 February 2015

Outsize Compensation for "Teflon-Coated" Executives  - After Many Lawsuits and Negative News Stories, Norton Healthcare Executives Still Get Millions

Outsize Compensation for "Teflon-Coated" Executives - After Many Lawsuits and Negative News Stories, Norton Healthcare Executives Still Get Millions

In an earlier era of chemistry, politicians who continued to acquire votes while shedding doubts, criticisms, and allegations were called "Teflon-coated."  Teflon may be outdated now, but there certainly seems to be some health care executives who have unique non-stick coatings.

The Executives' Compensation

Our latest example comes from the Louisville (KY) Courier-Journal, which just published an article about the compensation received by top executives of one of the region's major hospital systems.  The essentials were:

From 2011 to 2013, the three most recent years available, tax records show the chief executive of Norton Healthcare, Stephen A. Williams, received total compensation that averaged $3.2 million a year.

The yearly numbers were:

2013: $2,447,122
2012: $4,705,333
2011: $2,376,186

Other top executives also were paid handsomely,

The tax reports show Norton paid chief operating officer Russell Cox an average of $1.5 million annually over the three years and chief financial officer Michael Gough $1.2 million. Cox also was promised an average of $547,580 annually over those years in additional future compensation and Gough $375,567 a year.

The Usual Talking Points as Justification

The justification given for such munificent pay for top hired managers of non-profit organizations that are supposed to put patient care (and sometimes teaching and research) ahead of personal enrichment never seems to go beyond the talking points we have previously discussed.

 It seems nearly every attempt made to defend the outsize compensation given hospital and health system executives involves the same arguments, thus suggesting they are talking points, possibly crafted as a public relations ploy.   We first listed the talking points here, and then provided additional examples of their use here, here here, here, here, and here, and here

They are:
- We have to pay competitive rates
- We have to pay enough to retain at least competent executives, given how hard it is to be an executive
- Our executives are not merely competitive, but brilliant (and have to be to do such a difficult job).
True to form, per the Courier-Journal article,

Industry leaders — and Norton board members — say the salaries and bonuses are essential to attract and retain executives with the skills to run complex organizations as they navigate enormous reimbursement and regulatory changes. Norton operates five hospitals and has revenues of about $1.8 billion.

In an interview, Hank Robinson, Norton's finance committee chairman and former board chairman, said Williams' compensation is 'very fair, very competitive and appropriate.'

So there, in three sentences, were direct versions of the "competitive rates," and "retention" talking points, and an indirect version ("skills to run complex organizations") of the "brilliance" talking point.

Also, the Courier-Journal article included,

Norton's chief communication officer, Thomas Johnson, points out that since Williams was named CEO, the company's revenues have climbed sixfold, and its work force has tripled to more than 12,000 employees, making it the third-largest employer in the Louisville area.

That was another indirect version of the "brilliance" talking point, since Mr Johnson seemed to be arguing that the CEO was the person most personally responsible for the "company's" [not "hospital system's?" - Ed)] increased revenue, regardless of the work of the more than 12,000 other employees.  Of course, Mr Johnson doubtless reports nearly directly to the CEO.

Pointedly left out of the discussion was that Norton Healthcare's financial performance in the recent years in which the CEO had received so much money was hardly brilliant.   As apparently first reported in Modern Healthcare in August, 2014, but going back to 2012,

A multimillion-dollar installation of an electronic health-record system dragged down Norton Healthcare's financials in 2012 and 2013, but the Louisville, Ky.-based health system rebounded in the first half of this year.

Norton—like many others racing to adopt the latest health information technology—began implementing an Epic Systems Corp. EHR in 2012. Norton's five hospitals and several physician practices fully converted to the Epic system by 2013. In total, the EHR cost nearly $80 million to install, according to Norton's audited 2013 financial documents (PDF).

According to Modern Healthcare, Norton had a $13.4 million operating loss in the first half of 2013.  However, Norton CEO Williams received nearly $2.5 million in 2013. So these negative financial results in 2012 and 2013 did not apparently drag down the CEO's compensation in those years.

Compared to What?

The Courier-Journal went a bit farther in their reporting of executive compensation at Norton Healthcare than other media outlets have when reporting on the pay of other health care leaders.  In particular, reporter Andrew Wolfson delved into how Mr Williams' compensation was justified by comparing it to the compensation of other health care CEOs.

The Norton finance committee chair, Mr Robinson

said it is derived through a rigid process based on an outside consultant's survey of pay at 66 comparable hospitals nationwide. The board then sets it at the 65th percentile of that compensation, which Robinson described as standard industry practice.

Furthermore,

Norton's consultant, Integrated Healthcare Strategies, says it looks at comparable peer groups — hospital companies, some larger and some smaller — to find a benchmark for Norton's board.

They include Baptist Health of Florida, whose CEO was paid $3.2 million in 2013, and Inova Health Care Services, of Falls Church, Va., whose top executive received total compensation of $4.2 million in 2012.

'Norton tries to set salary a little bit above the middle of the market,' Integrated's Dave York said in an interview. 'They are neither a conservative nor an aggressive payer.'


That still begged the question of why the compensation was "above the middle of the market," specifically, the 65th percentile?  Presumably, the board thought that CEO Williams has been at the 65the percentile of CEO performance.  But why did they pick that figure? What evidence is there that Mr Williams was better than average?

The Courier-Journal article also questioned the choice of the group of CEOs whose pay was used for comparison,


But Paul R. Dorf, managing director at Compensation Resources Inc., a Saddle River, N.J., consulting firm, who reviewed Norton's executive pay at the newspaper's request, said 'it doesn't seem right.
They are exceptionally well compensated,' he said.

The average compensation for the top 147 nonprofit hospital CEOs in 2012 was $2.2 million in 2012, according to Modern Healthcare, an industry publication.

Williams' average compensation from 2011-13 was more than paid in 2012 to the CEOs of 20 of the 25 top grossing nonprofit hospitals in the U.S., all of which were bigger than Norton, according to Becker's Hospital Review, another industry news outlet.

Given that compensation consultants like Mr Dorf usually seem to back the status quo for executive compensation, Mr Dorf's doubts should be underlined.  The Courier-Journal's coverage did suggest that the CEO and other top executives of Norton Healthcare are paid not only much more than the typical hospital employee, and the health care professionals who make the hospital run, but more than CEOs and top executives of other hospitals.  The reasons for this unclear.

Left unanswered were further questions.   Why are so called market comparisons limited to other CEOs or top managers, and never take into account other hospital employees, especially the health care professionals who actually provide the health care?  Why is the complexity of the managers' jobs never compared to complexity of other health care jobs, like the care of complex patients with multiple diseases, or neurosurgery, for example?  How is the "brilliance" of the managers measured, and compared to the brilliance of other employees, especially health care professionals?

Shedding Doubts, Criticisms, and Allegations

A little internet searching and dot connecting, however, did suggest that there may be one argument for the "brilliance" of the Norton Healthcare leadership, but it is an argument that the hospital system's board might not have been eager to make.

It seems, at least in my humble opinion, that the leadership has been brilliant, but brilliant in fending off multiple questions that have been raised in recent years about its management of the health care system, particularly questions about the ethics and integrity of their health care system's acts and practices. 

So far I have found the following issues, in more or less chronologic order,

Top Spine Surgeons' Questionable Royalties

In 2010, the Wall Street Journal reported that spine surgeons at Norton had been collecting millions in questionable royalty payments.

Norton Hospital in Louisville, Ky., may not be a household name nationally. But five senior spine surgeons have helped put it on the map in at least one category: From 2004 to 2008, Norton performed the third-most spinal fusions on Medicare patients in the country.

The five surgeons are also among the largest recipients nationwide of payments from medical-device giant Medtronic Inc. In the first nine months of this year alone, the surgeons—Steven Glassman, Mitchell Campbell, John Johnson, John Dimar and Rolando Puno—received more than $7 million from the Fridley, Minn., company.

Furthermore, Norton surgeons' use of spinal fusion for disc problems, a procedure whose benefits do not clearly outweigh its harms, was particularly notable.

At Norton, spinal fusions on patients who only suffered from aging disks accounted for 24% of the 2,475 fusions the hospital performed for Medicare between 2004 and 2008, compared with 17% nationally. This placed it 11th in percentage terms out of 60 hospitals that performed 1,000 or more spine fusions in those years, and fourth in raw count. Norton ranked third nationally in the overall numbers of spine-fusion surgeries.
Furthermore, the WSJ reported that it had obtained documents from a lawsuit filed by whistle-blowers against Medtronic which alleged


the five surgeons at Kentucky's Norton Hospital became Medtronic's biggest spine client [sic] after they signed consulting and royalty deals in early 2001.


We posted briefly about Norton's spinal fusion enthusiasts here, and Dr Howard Brody discussed it extensively on his blog, concluding,

some of my surgeon colleagues who actually care about professionalism and ethics believe that these 'royalty and consulting' payments are a huge cesspool. It's that much harder to get to the bottom of it because the device companies have been smart about how to cover their tracks.

Yet while there have been continuing questions raised about the actions of Medtronic vis a vis its medical "consultants" since then, it seems that no one has so far thought to question the role of Norton Healthcare, especially given that the hospital system doubtless collected millions for the performance of these procedures in its operating rooms.    

University of Louisville Litigation Claims Contract Violations, Debts Owed by Norton Healthcare

Apparently since at least 2013, Norton Healthcare has been involved in litigation with the University of Louisville over Kosair Children's Hospital, which is run by Norton on land owned by the University.  As summarized in Louisville Business First in October, 2013,

Norton Healthcare Inc. has filed a complaint in Franklin Circuit Court that seeks to establish that the University of Louisville has no legal right to evict the organization from Kosair Children’s Hospital.

Louisville-based Norton owns and operates Kosair Children’s Hospital on land it leases from the state.

U of L executive vice president of health affairs David Dunn issued this response late Friday to Norton's claim:

'It’s unfortunate that Norton filed a lawsuit instead of meeting to negotiate a long-term agreement for the care of children at Kosair Children’s Hospital. The University of Louisville’s repeated attempts to meet and negotiate have been rejected again and again by Norton’s CEO, who told us today that he will neither meet nor negotiate while their lawsuit is pending.'

'This is a disturbing trend in dealing with Norton as we try to resolve these complicated matters in a way that best meets the needs of Kosair Children’s Hospital, the patients we serve and U of L’s Department of Pediatrics. It is our hope that, later today, Norton will take a deep breath, accept our invitation to meet, and we all can focus on securing a long-term agreement to best serve the children of our community.'

Furthermore, the University of Louisville also demanded

that the hospital company rectify alleged violations  of a land lease and other agreements

In addition,

other claims in U of L's letter was that Norton owes U of L millions of dollars related to the Kosair agreements.

The dispute apparently also involves the University of Kentucky and the KentuckyOne hospital system. Some of the other relevant issues were summarized on the Kentucky Health Policy Institute website here.  It seems that patient care and medical education have become caught in the cross-fire between these powerful organizations. It is not obvious that Norton Healthcare is more or less responsible for this state of affairs than the other large organizations involved. However, neither is it obvious that Norton has taken the high ground regarding this matter.

Kosair Charities Sues Norton Healthcare for Misusing Charitable Funds

In mid-2014, another litigation front opened against Norton Healthcare.  As reported then by the Louisville Courier-Journal,

Kosair Charities, which has given more than $6 million annually to Kosair Children's Hospital, is accusing parent company Norton Healthcare of misusing some of that money to enhance its bottom line and 'line the pockets' of its executives.

In a lawsuit filed Thursday in Jefferson County Circuit Court, the charity says Norton has refused to provide an accounting of how Kosair's donations are spent.

'We have an obligation to the kids and our donors to make sure the money is being used to help children,' said Randy Coe, president of Kosair Charities, which is the hospital's largest donor. 'We don't want our money to go into the Norton pot.'
Note that the source of generous executive compensation at Norton Healthcare is a direct point of contention in this legal matter.


This lawsuit stems from the previously cooperative relationship between Kosair and Norton,

 At one time, Kosair Charities and Norton each operated their own pediatric hospitals — Kosair Crippled Children's Hospital and Norton Children's Hospital.

But in 1982, Kosair agreed to close its hospital on Eastern Parkway and to help pay for a new one downtown that was named Kosair Children's Hospital.

Kosair Charities said that, in an agreement struck that year, Norton agreed to keep separate accounts for the children's hospital in exchange for millions of dollars of contributions. Kosair says that arrangement was continued when the agreement was renewed in 2006.

In fact, the charges brought in this lawsuit about Norton executive compensation led the Courier-Journal to publish the 2015 article about the hospital system's executive compensation. Also, in 2014, Norton further belayed this previous spirit of cooperation by counter-suing Kosair, again as dutifully reported by the Courier-Journal. These lawsuits have not been resolved.


Patient Lawsuit Claiming "Unfair, False, Misleading or Deceptive Acts or Practices" by Norton

Also first reported in August, 2014, by the Courier-Journal, was a lawsuit by a patient who claimed that  in the emergency department of a Norton hospital,

he was seen only by a nurse practitioner who failed to diagnose that he was suffering from an acute and potentially fatal version of diverticulitis, an inflammation of the intestinal lining — and sent him home with a prescription for oral antibiotics. Two days later, he began vomiting and was rushed back to the hospital, where he underwent emergency surgery for a perforated bowel and was fitted with a colostomy bag.

However, that hospital had been advertising

 You don't just deserve emergency care. You deserve remarkable care.

This lawsuit, which alleges that Norton Healthcare violated a law prohibiting "unfair, false, misleading or deceptive acts or practices" by advertising "remarkable care," but delivering much less,  has not been resolved, either.

Summary

The 2015 report about executive compensation at Norton Healthcare raise the same points that many, many stories about executive compensation in health care have raised before.  Top managers/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ executives in health care seem to be paid ever increasing amounts, even as other employees, including health care professionals, work harder, burn out more frequently, and may be laid off.  These executives' payments rise faster than inflation, and are seemingly unrelated to the financial performance of the the relevant health care organizations, much less the health care quality provided, or the positive effects on patients' or the public's health

Yet the defenders of excess compensation seem to get away with repeatedly reciting the same tired talking points, without clear logic, and certain without evidence.

In the current case, however, one talking point, the argument that the pay was justified by the executives' hard work and "brilliance" may be justified, albeit in a somewhat twisted way.  Executives at Norton Healthcare have been fending off questions about the ethics and integrity of their system raised by a barrage of news stories and claims, including many for which litigation is in progress, claiming the hospital system engaged in a variety of allegedly deceptive or dishonest practices.  One might think that the doubts raised by these claims might have threatened the compensation of the executives on whose watch they occurred.  Instead, perhaps they got even more pay for being "brilliant," not so much brilliant at providing excellent health care, but brilliant at keeping all these doubts at bay for so long, without so far actually disproving any of them. 

As we have said before, in US health care, the top managers/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ executives - whatever they should be called - continue to prosper ever more mightily as the people who actually take care of patients seem to work harder and harder for less and less. This is the health care version of the rising income inequality that the US public is starting to notice.

Thus, like hired managers in the larger economy, non-profit hospital managers have become "value extractors."  The opportunity to extract value has become a major driver of managerial decision making.  And this decision making is probably the major reason our health care system is so expensive and inaccessible, and why it provides such mediocre care for so much money. 


One wonders how long the people who actually do the work in health care will suffer the value extraction to continue?

So to repeat, true health care reform would put in place leadership that understands the health care context, upholds health care professionals' values, and puts patients' and the public's health ahead of extraneous, particularly short-term financial concerns. We need health care governance that holds health care leaders accountable, and ensures their transparency, integrity and honesty.

But this sort of reform would challenge the interests of managers who are getting very rich off the current system.  So I am afraid the US may end up going far down this final common pathway before enough people manifest enough strength to make real changes. 
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