Friday, 16 October 2015

Phooled Again - More Settlements Suggesting Bad Behavior by Big Pharma/ Biotech

Once again, here is a roundup of cases showing big multi-national pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies are up to their usual tricks.

Presented in alphabetical order...

Bristol-Myers Squibb Settles Charges of Bribery of Chinese Hospitals.

The best version of this I could find was in USA Today, in early October, 2015,

Pharmaceutical manufacturer Bristol-Myers Squibb has agreed to pay more than $14 million in fines to settle charges that its joint venture in China paid cash and other benefits to state-owned hospitals in exchange for prescription sales, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced Monday.

After its investigation, the SEC found that the New York-based company violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in its dealings with Chinese hospitals and doctors and 'reaped more than $11 million in profits from its misconduct.'

Bristol-Myers Squibb neither admitted nor denied the findings, the SEC said.

The details, such as they were:

Chinese sales representatives at BMS China, the Chinese joint venture that is majority-owned by Bristol-Myers, paid bribes — including cash, jewelry, meals, travel, entertainment, sponsorships and other gifts — to health care providers between 2009 and 2014 to generate more sales. And Bristol-Myers Squibb 'failed to respond effectively to red flags' indicating such practices, the SEC said.

Apparently, some lower level Chinese employees were fired, although it is not clear whether they were involved in bribery, or in whistle-blowing about it, but top company management did not look too hard to see who might have authorized or directed the bad behavior,

Several BMS China employees who were fired by the company made claims that faked invoices, receipts and purchase orders were widely used to bribe health care providers. But Bristol-Myers Squibb did not investigate their claims, the SEC said.

Bristol-Myers Squibb was aware of improper payments as early as 2009, when an internal audit highlighted the problem. But the company was 'slow to remediate gaps in internal controls' over dealing with Chinese health care providers and monitor payments to them, the SEC said.

Needless to say, no one who might have authorized or directed the bad behavior, and who conceivably might have personally gotten bigger bonuses based on the revenue it brought it, suffered any negative consequences. Despite the settlement, of charges of bribery, no less, company public relations produced the usual,

We have resolved this matter with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, and are committed to the highest standards of business integrity, vigilance and ethics across our organization.

Well then, that clears it up.

I cannot find any information about what BMS allegedly bribed the hospitals to do, and hence can draw no conclusions whether patients may have been harmed by receiving inappropriate medications.

UK Judge Found Pfizer Threatened Health Professionals

The most thorough coverage of this was, amazingly, in a medical journal, namely the British Medical Journal (Kmietowicz A. Pfizer loses UK patent for blockbuster pain drug after threats to doctors.  Brit Med J 2015; 351: h4918.  Link here.)  The background was,

The patent for the use of Lyrica for epilepsy and generalised anxiety disorder expired in July 2014, and manufacturers of generic versions already have licences for these two indications. But the manufacturer, Warner-Lambert (a subsidiary of Pfizer), holds a 'second medical use' patent for the use of pregabalin to treat peripheral and central neuropathic pain, which expires in July 2017. A second medical use patent is one that relates to a new medical use for a known compound.

Lyrica is one of Pfizer’s most successful products, with global sales in 2013 of some $4.6bn (£3bn; €4.1bn).

So apparently Pfizer set out to scare physicians away from prescribing generic pregabalin [generic Lyrica].

In his 174 page ruling Mr Justice Arnold said, 'Since late September 2014, Pfizer has taken extensive steps to try to ensure that generic pregabalin is neither prescribed nor dispensed for the treatment of pain.' This included sending a letter to the BMA and pharmacists stating that doctors and pharmacists risked infringing the patent if they supplied generic pregabalin for the pain indication and that this would be an unlawful act.

A letter sent to clinical commissioning groups in December 2014 was described by Arnold as 'calculated to have a chilling effect on the sales of Lecaent [the version of pregabalin made by Actavis].'

These letters would be seen by the recipients as a threat, said Mr Justice Arnold.

The Justice ultimately "overturned Pfizer's UK patent for pregabalin for pain control," in part because the "company made 'groundless claims' that its patent for Lyrica would be infringed if doctors did not specify Lyrica as opposed to a generic alternative when prescribing...."

This case was apparently only about the patent (and is subject to appeal), so it appears no one who apparently tried to authorize, direct or implement apparent intimidation of health care professionals with "groundless threats" will suffer any negative consequences.

This case does not seem to involve any obvious harms to patients.  However, "groundless threats" to health care professionals could have obviously demoralized them and clearly challenged their autonomy and professional values.

Sanofi Again Settles Charges of Misbranding Seprafilm

We discussed the first civil settlement the company made of this case in 2014 here.  A relatively clear summary of the new settlement was given by Reuters in September, 2015.

Genzyme Corp agreed to pay $32.59 million, admit wrongdoing and enter a deferred prosecution agreement to resolve U.S. criminal charges over its marketing of the surgical implant Seprafilm, the Department of Justice said on Thursday.

The biotechnology unit of French drug company Sanofi SA (SASY.PA) was accused of two misdemeanor counts of violating the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act from 2005 to 2010 by allowing Seprafilm to be adulterated and misbranded while being sold. Sanofi bought Genzyme in 2011.

Seprafilm is a clear film used to reduce abnormal internal scarring that can cause organs and tissues to stick together following pelvic and abdominal surgeries known as laparotomies.

But the Justice Department said some sales representatives taught surgeons how to turn Seprafilm into a 'slurry' for use in increasingly popular laparoscopic surgery, even though U.S. regulators had never approved the film for that use.

According to papers filed with the federal court in Tampa, Florida, Genzyme admitted and accepted responsibility for the facts underlying the two criminal counts.

The two-year deferred prosecution agreement calls for improved oversight, and steps to halt Seprafilm sales for off-label uses. If Genzyme complies, the government will dismiss the charges.

Note that at least in this case, there was some admission by the company of the truth of the facts charged, and no protestation that "we adhere to the highest standards of integrity," or some such.

It seems possible that the use of the Seprafilm slurry in patients without clear evidence of its safety or effectiveness may have lead to patient harms, but I cannot find clear discussion of this.

Summary

So while big health care corporations, especially large drug and biotechnology companies, are always protesting how their main goal is to benefit patients, and how they support health care professionals, here are more cases in which it appears they at best set out to manipulate patients and health care professionals to maximize revenue.

Note that this is hardly the first time any of these companies have apparently misbehaved.  See our previous posts on BMS, on Genzyme (now a Sanofi subsidiary), and on Pfizer.  Note that our last discussion of the ever troubled Pfizer was only one month ago.

We have discussed endlessly how the march of legal settlements and other legal rulings affecting big health care corporations has raised questions about whether they are in it for patients and health care professionals, or just for the money.  That almost none of these legal actions has resulted in any real consequences for the individuals within the corporations who profited most from the misbehavior has allowed health care corporate managers' continued impunity, and has suggested how cozy health care corporate managers and goverment regulators and law enforcement officials have become, partially through the mechanism of the revolving door.

While these latest three cases have appeared, the mainstream media have begun to feature more discussion about how widespread managerial and corporate misbehavior is fueling the decline of the global economy, and perhaps of global society.  For example, as discussed in srticles in The Guardian, and more recently in the New York Times, Nobel Prize winners Robert Shiller and George Akerlof's new book, Phishing for Pfools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception, suggests that widespread bad behavior in supposedly "free," and mainly unregulated markets can cause all sorts of evil.  In the Guardian, Shiller used the examples of how

 Most of us have suffered 'phishing': unwanted emails and phone calls designed to defraud us.  A 'phool' is anyone who does not fully comprehend the ubiquity of fishing.  A phool sees isolated examples of phishing, but does not appreciate the extent of professionalism devoted to it, nor how deeply this professionalism affects lives.  Sadly, a lot of us have been phools - including Akerlof and me, which is why we wrote this book

As Shiller wrote in the NYT, while he is a "free market advocate,"

we both believe that standard economic theory is typically overenthusiastic about unregulated free markets. It usually ignores the fact that, given normal human weaknesses, an unregulated competitive economy will inevitably spawn an immense amount of manipulation and deception.

Shiller and Akerlof believe that various kinds of manipulation and deception are enabled by technological advances, and that they are contagious,

When you realize that your competitor has used sophisticated and effective marketing tricks, then you will fall behind if you don’t follow suit.

This is really not a new idea,

In 1918, Irving Fisher, the Yale economist, argued that what people maximize in their actions is something that could better be described as 'wantability' rather than utility, for they are subject to temptation and mistakes in the vast array of purchases they make, leading profit-maximizing marketers to take advantage of them on a systematic basis.

In the first half of the 20th century, such critiques were of general interest. But they are little discussed today.

In the Guardian, Shiller warned that failure to address this problem in the financial sector could lead to "a new Dark Age." I fear that we are already close to a dark age for health care.

Similarly, in the Wall Street Journal, of all places, Charles Moore, the authorized biographer of Margaret Thatcher, and former editor of the conservative UK Daily Telegraph, wrote:

The relationship between money and morality, on which the middle-class order depends, has been seriously compromised over the past decade.  Which means that the mass bourgeoisie (a phrase that Marx and Engles would have thought a contradiction in terms) start to feel like the new proletariat.

Furthermore,

To the extent that people cheat in markets, they are not real markets, any more than antifreeze labeled 'wine' is real wine.  Too many advocates of markets have allowed themselves to be suborned into becoming apologists for business.  And too many businesses now operate as if their responsibilities are only to themselves and not to consumers.

See the above examples, and all we have written about bribery, kick-backs, fraud, other crime, and corruption to show how prevalent cheating is in health care.

Shiller concluded,

Marx did have an insight about the disproportionate power of the ownership of capital. The owner of capital decides where money goes, whereas the people who sell only their labor lack that power. This makes it hard for society to be shaped in their interests. In recent years, that disproportion has reached destructive levels, so if we don’t want to be a Marxist society, we need to put it right.

I would add that if we do not put these things right in health care, ending up with a Marxist system will be the least of our worries.

So as a start, to quote Shiller, we need more

heroic effortsw of campaigners for better values, both among private organizations and advocates of government regulation

Who will step up?

Our musical diversion, "Won't Get Fooled Again," the Who, 1978 live version:


Baca selengkapnya

Wednesday, 7 October 2015

Fatal Fraud? - More Settlements by Commercial Hospices of Allegations They Enrolled Non-Terminal Patients

Fatal Fraud? - More Settlements by Commercial Hospices of Allegations They Enrolled Non-Terminal Patients

Introduction - Commercialized Hospices

We have occasionally written about the rise of the commercialized hospice industry, and concerns that commercialized hospices may not be providing the compassionate care they promise.  As we have discussed before, the hospice movement began with small, non-profit, community based organizations meant to provide compassionate palliative care to the terminally ill.  However, in the US, the hospice movement has been co-opted by commercial hospices, often run by large corporations, which may put profit ahead of compassion.

In the Washington Post series "Aging in America," Peter Whoriskey explored problems affecting the contemporary "industrialized" model of hospice.  He noted in August, 2014,

The hospice industry in the United States is booming and for good reason, many experts say. Hospice care can offer terminally ill patients a far better way to live out their dying days, and many vouch for its value.

In the US, hospice care is funded by Medicare, and the funding at times may seem generous. As more hospices are taken over by for-profit corporations, that money may be irresistible. Whoriskey noted,

But the boom has been accompanied by what appears to be a surge in hospices enrolling patients who aren’t close to death, and at least in some cases, this practice can expose the patients to the more powerful pain-killers that are routinely used by hospice providers.

Whoriskey presented a case in which a non-terminally ill patient was admitted to hospice, and died possibly due to aggressive use of narcotics.

Clinard 'Bud' Coffey, 77, a retired corrections officer, did the crossword in The Charlotte Observer after breakfast every morning, pursued his hobby of drawing cartoons, talked seven or eight times a day to his son Jeff and, just two weeks before his death, told a pal that he still felt 'like a teenager.'

He did, however, have some chronic back pain, and in late March he was enrolled in hospice care 'essentially for pain management,' his doctor said. Over a two week period, he received rising doses of morphine and other powerful drugs, grew sleepy and disoriented, and stopped breathing, dying peacefully at home, according to his family and medical records they provided.

While hospices tend to use very aggressive pain management strategies, they also by design do not attempt to cure patients who develop new acute problems. So if a non-terminally ill patient enters hospice, such a new acute problem could be fatal. For example, we discussed a case in which a person admitted to a commercial hospice for "debility" but apparently not defined terminal illness, died from untreated sepsis. It is possible that timely use of antibiotics could have contained her initial infection, or possibly even cured her sepsis.

Yet evidence continues to accumulate that modern industrialized hospices, especially those owned and run by large for-profit corporations, may enroll patients who are not terminally ill to increase revenue. The regulatory response to such behavior continues to be spotty, and seems focused on enrollment of non-terminal patients as a form of fraud, not as a danger to patients.

So far in 2015 two commercial hospice chains settled charges that they enrolled patients who were not terminally ill.

Good Shepherd Hospice

Early in 2015, there was very abbreviated news coverage of the settlement made by Good Shepherd Hospice. A Department of Justice press release noted,

Today, Good Shepherd Hospice Inc., Good Shepherd Hospice of Mid America Inc., Good Shepherd Hospice, Wichita, L.L.C., Good Shepherd Hospice, Springfield, L.L.C., and Good Shepherd Hospice – Dallas L.L.C. (collectively Good Shepherd) agreed to pay $4 million to resolve allegations that Good Shepherd submitted false claims for hospice patients who were not terminally ill. Good Shepherd is a for-profit hospice headquartered in Oklahoma City which provides hospice services in Oklahoma, Missouri, Kansas and Texas.

The press release specifically stated,

The government alleged that Good Shepherd knowingly submitted or caused the submission of false claims for hospice care for patients who were not terminally ill. Specifically, the United States contended that Good Shepherd engaged in certain business practices that contributed to claims being submitted for patients who did not have a terminal prognosis of six months or less, by pressuring staff to meet admissions and census targets and paying bonuses to staff, including hospice marketers, admissions nurses and executive directors, based on the number of patients enrolled. The United States further alleged that Good Shepherd hired medical directors based on their ability to refer patients, focusing particularly on medical directors with ties to nursing homes, which were seen as an easy source of patient referrals. The United States also alleged that Good Shepherd failed to properly train staff on the hospice eligibility criteria.

However, it suggested that the behavior was fraudulent, not dangerous,

'Health care fraud puts profits above patients, and steals from taxpayers,' said U.S. Attorney Tammy Dickinson of the Western District of Missouri. 'In this case, company whistleblowers alleged that patients received unnecessary hospice care while Good Shepherd engaged in illicit business practices to enrich itself at the public’s expense.'

Note that as is usual in cases of health care fraud, Good Shepherd Hospice did not admit wrongdoing, and no individual who authorized, directed or implemented the alleged bad behavior suffered any negative consequences. The minimal media coverage of this case did not discuss the possibility of any risks to patients. (For example, look here.)

Good Shepherd Hospice is part of a for-profit corporation. I could find nothing about its ownership, who its leaders are, or its financial status.  So who particularly benefited from the alleged behavior was not clear.

Guardian Hospice and AccentCare, Owned by Oak Hill Capital Partners

In early October, 2015, a brief news item in the Atlanta Journal Constitution described the settlement by Guardian Hospice.

A Georgia hospice company has agreed to pay $3 million to resolve allegations it billed taxpayers for patients who were not terminally ill,...

In particular,

Guardian Hospice set aggressive targets to recruit and enroll patients it knew were not in the last months of their lives so it could collect Medicare payments, the federal government alleged.

The article noted the settlement arose from a whistle-blower law suit, and that the whistle-blowers

alleged they routinely saw non-terminal patients being treated but were told it was necessary to keep the hospice’s 'census' up,...

The AJC article did quote their attorney as saying,

the practice was 'doubly cruel' because when unqualified patients are put on hospice, they are forced to forego regular medical care that could help cure their illness.

But it provided no further detail. The official news release only quoted an agent of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Inspector-General's office:

Hospice care is only medically appropriate – and reimbursed by Medicare – for terminally ill patients who are in the last months of their lives

Again, there were no admissions of culpabality, and no actions taken against any individuals.

The $3 million penalty seems paltry, given that we do know something about the owners of Guardian Hospice and the depth of their pockets.  One brief news article about a June, 2015, settlement made by Guardian Hospice for underpaying its nurses, did mention that Guardian Hospice is owned by AccentCare.  A little more digging found this press release from 2010 made by Oak Hill Capital Partners, a large private equity firm.

Oak Hill Capital Partners announced today that following the closing of their acquisition of AccentCare, Inc. ('AccentCare'), a premier provider of home healthcare services, including nursing and attendant care services, they intend to combine it with Guardian Home Care Holdings, Inc. ('Guardian'), a leading homecare and hospice service provider in the Tennessee, Georgia and Texas markets. The terms of the transaction were not disclosed.

The combination of AccentCare and Guardian creates one of the largest operators in the industry, with an expanded geographical footprint and highly diversified service offerings. The new company will operate over 130 branches across 10 states, serving more than 30,000 patients.

Since private equity firms have minimal reporting requirements, we do not know who owns Oak Hill Capital Partners, and hence who owns AccentCare and Guardian Hospice. We do know from the Oak Hill Capital Partners web-site that their portfolio is prodigious.

Summary and Discussion

There are more cases being reported in which hospices, particularly those owned and run by for-profit corporations, have enrolled patients who were not terminally ill.  These enrollments may be motivated by the desire for more money, but they put patients at risk.  Hospice patients may receive large doses of psychoactive drugs and narcotics, which may lead to adverse effects up to and including death.  Hospice patients may not, however, receive treatments for new acute problems, even if those problems are potentially curable.  Therefore, hospice patients may die from untreated infections that otherwise might respond to antibiotics.  Aggressive pain medication and withholding treatment of infections make sense as part of palliative care for terminally ill patients, e.g., those with terminal cancer.  But they make no sense for patients with longer life expectancy.

Nonetheless, such abuses by hospices get little press coverage, seemingly are ignored by health care regulators and law enforcement, and are almost completely anechoic in the health care, medical and health policy literature.

If a measure of society is how it cares for the most vulnerable patients, the US laissez faire approach to for-profit hospices suggests a society in decline.

To repeat what I wrote the last time for-profit hospices were (barely) in the news for enrolling the wrong patients,...

 In my humble opinion, we should return control of direct patient care, especially of the most vulnerable patients, to health care professionals and if necessary small non-profit community organizations.  We ought to give strong consideration to banning corporate hospices, and banning all forms of the corporate practice of medicine and corporate health care "delivery."

Given how many insiders make so much money from the current version of laissez faire capitalism in health care, however, I would expect strong resistance should such apparently "radical," but actually conservative proposals actually get any mainstream attention.    

Baca selengkapnya

Thursday, 1 October 2015

Academic Medical Leaders as Directors of For-Profit Health Care Corporations: the Prevalence of This "New Species" of Conflict of Interest Documented in the BMJ

Academic Medical Leaders as Directors of For-Profit Health Care Corporations: the Prevalence of This "New Species" of Conflict of Interest Documented in the BMJ

The important conflicts of interest generated when academic health care leaders also serve on the boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations is suddenly less anechoic, thanks to some intrepid researchers and the British Journal of Medicine.

Background: Academic Health Care Leaders Also Serving as Directors of For-Profit Health Care Corporations

First Discovered Cases

In 2006, we first noticed that leaders of academic medicine also were serving as board members of large for-profit health care corporations.  The first example we discussed was that of Marye Anne Fox, Chancellor (equivalent to president) of the University of California - San Diego, and hence the person to whom the University of California, San Diego School of Medicine and its academic medical center report. The conflict was between this position, and her service as a member of the board of directors of Boston Scientific, a medical device manufacture, and the board of directors of Pharmaceutical Product Development Inc., a contract research organization.

Later that year, we discussed a "new species of conflict of interest."  At that time we wrote:

Medical schools and their academic medical centers and teaching hospitals must deal with all sorts of health care companies, drug and device manufacturers, information technology venders, managed care organizations and health insurers, etc, in the course of fulfilling their patient care, teaching, and research missions. Thus, it seems that service on the board of directors of a such public for-profit health care company would generate a severe conflict for an academic health care leader, because such service entails a fiduciary duty to uphold the interests of the company and its stockholders. Such a duty ought on its face to have a much more important effect on thinking and decision making than receiving a gift, or even being paid for research or consulting services. Furthermore, the financial rewards for service on a company board, which usually include directors' fees and stock options, are comparable to the most highly paid consulting positions. What supports the interests of the company, however, may not always be good for the medical school, academic medical center or teaching hospital.

Since 2006, we continued to find colorful examples of such conflicts of interest, e.g.,

- In 2006, the UnitedHealth board included multiple academic leaders, at least one of whom seemed partly responsible as a member of the board compensation committee for allowing the then UnitedHealth CEO to collect many backdated stock options (look here)
- In 2009, some attributed the problems at George Washington University's medical school that caused it to be put on probation to the conflict of interest of its provost and vice president for health affairs,  who also sat on the board of Universal Health Services, which owned the university hospital (look here)...

Through more recent years,

- In 2014, members of the AMA committee that has an outsize role in how the government fixes the pay of US doctors wer also found to be members of boards of directors of such companies as Kindred Healthcare, Hanger Inc, and Sante. (Look here.)
- In 2015, the academic physician and research unit leader nominated to be the new head of the US Food and Drug was a director of Portola Pharmaceuticals (look here)...

Look here for even more

Our Early Cross-Sectional Study

In 2007, we did a somewhat rough and ready research project based on 2005 data to determine the prevalence of such conflicts.  The results were presented in abstract form,(1) but not published as an article:

In 2005, there were 164 US health care companies in the 2005 S&P 1500, and 125 US medical schools. We identified 198 people who served on the companies' boards of directors who had faculty or leadership positions at these medical schools. Of the 125 medical schools, 65 schools had at least one faculty member and/or leader who also served on a health care corporation's board of directors. 15 schools had more than five, and 4 had more than 10 such individuals. Of the 125 schools, 7 reported to university presidents who were also directors of health care corporations, and 11 schools reported to vice-presidents for health affairs who were also such corporate directors. Four schools were lead by deans who were also health care corporate directors, and 10 schools had academic medical center CEOs who were such directors. 22 schools had at least one top leader who was also a director of a health care corporation. 36 schools reported to university boards of trustees which each included at least one director of a health care corporation, and 12 schools' own boards of trustees included at least one such director.

We concluded:

more than one-half of US medical schools had a leader or faculty member who also was a director of a major US for-profit publicly traded Bpure^ health care corporation, more than one-sixth of schools had a top leader who was also such a director, and more than one-fifth reported to boards of trustees which included such directors.

More Modern and Complete Data

Unfortunately, we never wrote a full paper about this work, although the likelihood we could have gotten it published around 2007 was very small.  It is fortunate that Anderson and colleagues did a more complete and current version of this project, which was published online this week by the British Medical Journal.(2)

Methods

Their methodology was similar to our earlier work, but more sophisticated.  They obtained data on the 2013 board members of 446 public for-profit US companies listed on New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ and classified as in the healthcare sector, including pharmaceutical, biotechnology, medical equipment and supply companies and health care providers from the companies' 2014 proxy statements.

Results

Their results were striking, suggesting even a greater prevalence of conflicted academic leaders than our preliminary results suggested

Directors were affiliated with 85 geographically diverse non-profit academic institutions, including 19 of the top 20 National Institute of Health funded medical schools and all of the 17 US News honor roll hospitals. Overall, these 279 academically affiliated directors included 73 leaders, 121 professors, and 85 trustees. Leaders included 17 chief executive officers and 11 vice presidents or executive officers of health systems and hospitals; 15 university presidents, provosts, and chancellors; and eight medical school deans or presidents.

The new study also described the direct financial relationships among the academic leaders, professors and trustees and the corporations on whose boards they served.

The total annual compensation to academically affiliated directors for their services to companies was $54 995 786 (£35 836 000; €49 185 900) (median individual compensation $193 000) and directors beneficially owned 59 831 477 shares of company stock (median 50 699 shares).

Discussion

As we have suggested, Anderson et al stated that being on the board of directors of a for-profit health care corporation creates conflicts of interest beyond those created by simply having a financial relationship with a health care company, e.g., by participating in a commercially sponsored research project or acting as a consultant to a company.

Similar to individuals engaging in consulting relationships, directors on industry boards enter a formal contract with the company and receive financial payment for services; however, they are subject to two important differences. Firstly, unlike consultants who are compensated to provide expertise on a specific issue, directors are subject to a fiduciary responsibility to company shareholders to advance the general interests of the company and increase profits. Secondly, directors are reimbursed both through larger cash fees than typical consulting contracts and through stock options, the value of which is directly tied to the financial success of the company.

They also added the reminder that,

Though the missions of academia and for profit companies can overlap, they may also diverge, specifically when the for profit mission of industry competes with the non-profit taxpayer funded clinical and research missions of academic medical and research institutions.

So,

previous guidelines have emphasized the relationships of clinicians and researchers with industry, but institutional conflicts of interest, which arise when administrators, including executive officers, trustees, and clinical leaders have a financial relationship with industry, are increasingly recognized and pose a unique set of risks to academic missions. 

Our Summary

We have written again and again on the problem of conflicts of interest affecting health care professionals, academics, and policy makers.  The worst such conflicts may occur when individuals are simultaneously leaders of large mission-oriented health care non-profit organizations, such as teaching hospitals, medical schools, or research institutes, and board members of for-profit health care corporations.  Despite our attempts to raise such issues as important, and probably important causes of health care dysfunction, they have remained anechoic.

Now a broadly based study of this no longer so "new species" of conflict of interest has appeared in one of the biggest and most prestigious medical journals.  Let us hope it will bring this issue to the forefront, and also partially counter those who have been preaching that concerns about conflicts of interest in health care are overblown.

As we have said again and again, the web of conflicts of interest that is pervasive in medicine and health care is now threatening to strangle medicine and health care.  Furthermore, this web is now strong enough to have effectively transformed US health care into an oligarchy or plutocracy.  Health care is effectively run by a relatively small group of people, mainly professional managers plus a few (lapsed?) health care professionals, who simultaneously run or influence multiple corporations and organizations.

For patients and the public to trust health care professionals and health care organizations, they need to know that these individuals and organizations are putting patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain. Health care professionals who care for patients, those who teach about medicine and health care, clinical researchers, and those who make medical and health care policy should do so free from conflicts of interest that might inhibit their abilities to put patients and the public's health first.

Health care professionals ought to make it their highest priority to ensure that the organizations for which they work, or with which they interact also put patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain, especially the private gain of the organizations' leaders and their cronies.

ADDENDUM (16 November, 2015) - Note that an abbreviated version of this post has appeared as an electronic "rapid response" to the article by Anderson et al (link here), although the published form has on it our original submission date.   

References

1. Poses RM, Smith WR, Crausman R, Maulitz R. Selling them the rope: prevalence of for-profit health care corporate dirctors among academic medical leaders. J Gen Intern Med 2007; 22 (Suppl 1): 98.
2.  Anderson TS, Good CB, Gellad WF.  Prevalence and compensation of academic leaders, professors and trustees on publicly trade US healthcare company boards of directors: cross sectional study.  Brit Med J 2015; 351:h4826.  Link here
Baca selengkapnya

Friday, 25 September 2015

Cambridge University Hospitals Trust IT Failures:  An Open Letter to Queen Elizabeth II on Repeated EHR Failures, Even After £12.7bn Wasted in Failed NHS National IT Programme

Cambridge University Hospitals Trust IT Failures: An Open Letter to Queen Elizabeth II on Repeated EHR Failures, Even After £12.7bn Wasted in Failed NHS National IT Programme

Dear Queen Elizabeth,

I am an American citizen who has written for years about healthcare information technology mismanagement (IT malpractice), dangers to patients of this technology when faulty in healthcare, and the huge mania or bubble that has surrounded this technology in a layer of fairy tales that has cost your Kingdom's treasury, as well as that of the U.S., dearly.

Your subjects seem unable to learn from their mistakes, or learn even from free material at sites such as this, or at my academic site at Drexel University at http://cci.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/.

Instead of being appropriately skeptical, they spend your citizen's money extravagantly and with abandon on grossly faulty computing.  This results in serious health care meltdowns such as I observed at my September 22, 2011 post on your now-defunct National Programme for IT in the National Health Service (NPfIT).  That post was entitled "NPfIT Programme goes 'PfffT'" and is at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/09/npfit-programme-going-pffft.html.

In that post I observed:

... [NPfIT] also failed because of collective ignorance of these domains [e.g., healthcare informatics, social informatics, etc. - ed.] among its leaders, and among those who chose the leaders. For instance, as I wrote here:


The Department of Health has announced the two long-awaited senior management appointments for the National Programme for IT ... The Department announced in February that it was recruiting the two positions as part of a revised governance structure for handling informatics in the Department of Health.

Christine Connelly will be the first Chief Information Officer for Health and will focus on developing and delivering the Department's overall information strategy and integrating leadership across the NHS and associated bodies including NHS Connecting for Health and the NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care.
Christine Connelly was previously Chief Information Officer at Cadbury Schweppes with direct control of all IT operations and projects. She also spent over 20 years at BP where her roles included Chief of Staff for Gas, Power and Renewables, and Head of IT for both the upstream and downstream business.

Martin Bellamy will be the Director of Programme and System Delivery. He will lead NHS Connecting for Health and focus on enhancing partnerships with and within the NHS. Martin Bellamy has worked for the Department for Work and Pensions since 2003. His main role has been as CIO of the Pension Service.

Excuse me. Cadbury Schweppes (candy and drink?) The Pension Service? As national leaders for healthcare IT?

Also see my August 2010 post "Cerner's Blitzkrieg on London: Where's the RAF?" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/08/cerners-blitzkrieg-on-london-wheres-raf.html.

It's clear medical leaders in the UK learned little from the £12.7bn NPfIT debacle.  Now we have this:

Addenbrooke's Hospital consultants concerned over online records
BBC News
31 July 2015
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-cambridgeshire-30393575

A £200m online patient-record system has been "fraught with problems" and medics' concerns "seemingly overlooked", senior hospital consultants have claimed.

A letter seen by the BBC reveals management at Addenbrooke's and Rosie hospitals in Cambridge were told of "serious" issues last month.  It came after the hospitals transferred 2.1 million records in October.

The trust said "unanticipated" issues led to "more than teething problems". 

The hospital is the first in the UK to use Epic's eHospital system, which is used in hospitals in the US.

To the CEO, these problems are just "hiccups":

... Chief executive Dr Keith McNeil admitted there had been "more than teething problems" and "some of it was anticipated and some of it was unanticipated". The "unanticipated" problems included problems with blood tests and "one of the busiest periods in the hospital's history", he said. He added: "We're profoundly sorry about that... people will understand that you can't do an information technology implementation of this size without some hiccups.

"Hiccups" are a euphemism for incompetence in system design, implementation and testing before it is used on live patients, Your Majesty.  I also note that a close relative of mine, and numerous other patients I know of are severely injured or dead due to these "hiccups."  

And now this:

Addenbrooke's and Rosie hospitals' patients 'put at risk'
BBC News
22 September 2015
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-cambridgeshire-34317265

One of the UK's biggest NHS trusts has been placed in special measures after inspectors found it was "inadequate".

Cambridge University Hospitals Trust, which runs Addenbrooke's and the Rosie Birth Centre, was inspected by the Care Quality Commission in April and May.

Inspectors expressed concerns about staffing levels, delays in outpatient treatment and governance failings.

... Prof Sir Mike Richards, the Care Quality Commission's (CQC) chief inspector of hospitals, said while hospital staff were "extremely caring and extremely skilled", senior management had "lost their grip on some of the basics".

"[Patients] are being put at risk," he said. "It is not that we necessarily saw actual unsafe practice but we did see they would be put at risk if you don't, for example, have sufficient numbers of midwives for women in labour."

The trust, which is said to be predicting a £64m deficit this year, has apologised to patients.

I note that these hospitals had been the beta site for the first implementation of U.S. EHR maker EPIC company's product of the same name.  That £64m deficit looks a bit suspicious for IT overspend; for example see this U.S. hospital's experience of going in the red over fixing 10,000 "issues" (problems) with EPIC, in my post of June 2, 2014:  "In Fixing Those 9,553 EHR "Issues", Southern Arizona’s Largest Health Network is $28.5 Million In The Red" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/06/in-fixing-those-9553-ehr-issues.html.

... Perhaps the most worrying aspect of the Addenbrooke's story is not that such a world-renowned hospital has ended up in a predicament like this, but rather that it happened so quickly.

A year ago the trust which runs the hospital - Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust - wasn't even on the Care Quality Commission's radar in terms of being a failing centre.

I suggest a deep connection between this rapid fall, and the rapid rise of an EHR - an antiquated term for what is now an enterprise command-and-control system for hospitals.

... In fact, two years ago - as the regulator was embarking on its new inspection regime - it was among the band of hospitals considered to be the safest, according to the risk-rating system at the time.

But now a hospital which can boast to being a centre of excellence for major trauma, transplants, cancer, neurosurgery, genetics and paediatrics, has been judged to be a basket case and will join the 12 other failing hospitals already placed in special measures.

In my view, a major disruptive technology such as a new EHR is the Number One suspect in such a fall.

... Certainly it seems to have made mistakes - as the troubles with its £200m computerised patient records programme illustrates - but it's hard to escape the feeling that this is just the tip of the iceberg.

The "troubles with its £200m computerised patient records programme" is likely the iceberg, not just its tip.

The Care Quality Commission ("The independent regulator of health and social care in England", http://www.cqc.org.uk/) investigated these hospitals and issued a report, located at http://www.cqc.org.uk/location/RGT01/reports.

Among their key findings were:

Introducing the new EPIC IT system for clinical records had affected the trust’s ability to report, highlight and take action on data collected on the system. 

Excuse me?   Spend £200m on a computer system, and the result is impaired ability to report, highlight and take action on data collected?  Something is very wrong here.

 ... Although it was beginning to be embedded into practice, it was still having an impact on patient care and relationships with external professionals.

Clearly, the CQC does not mean a positive impact.

... Medicines were not always prescribed correctly due to limitations of EPIC, although we were assured this was being remedied.

Spend £200m on a computer system and the result is medicine prescription impairment (with the risks to patients that entails)?  Excuse me?

If those "limitations" affect these British hospitals, what "limitations" on getting prescriptions correct exist in all the U.S.-based hospitals that use this EHR, I ask?

... There was a significant shortfall of staff in a number of areas, including critical care services and those caring for unwell patients. This often resulted in staff being moved from one area of a service to another to make up staff numbers. Although gaps left by staff moving were back-filled with bank or agency staff, this meant that services often had staff with an inappropriate skills mix and patients were being cared for by staff without training relating to their health needs.

I suspect many staff were so unhappy with the EHR that they left, and recommended others not come.

Despite this patients received excellent care.

Odd how patient care and safety is never affected by bad health IT, as in the myriad stories at this site under the indexing key "patient care has not been compromised" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Patient%20care%20has%20not%20been%20compromised).

... Clinical staff were not always able to access the information they required – for example, diagnostic tests such as electrocardiographs (ECGs) to assess and provide care for patients. This was because ECGs had to be sent to a central scanning service to be scanned into the electronic recording system [a.k.a. EHR] once the patient had been discharged. This meant their ECGs would not be available for comparison purposes if a patient was re-admitted soon after discharge.

Very, very bad IT planning, potentially putting unstable patients at risk.  Cybernetic miracles always have "fine print" that needs be read by skeptical managers BEFORE implementation.

Where agency staff were used, they were not always able to access information about patients they were supporting. 

 Ditto.

... Some staff told us there were no care plans on the new IT system.  Some staff told us the doctors’ orders had replaced care plans on the new EPIC IT system. These orders were task-orientated and did not always reflect the holistic needs of the patients.

This defective arrangement sounds like it was designed by non-clinicians.   The hubris and arrogance of non-clinicians sticking their heads into clinical issues - especially those of an IT-management background - must be witnessed to be fully comprehended.  It is my belief that such individuals should be subject to the liability as are the clinicians whose work increasingly depends on these IT systems.   If you dare to stick your neck into clinical affairs regarding systems upon which clinicians depend, you should be subject to the same liabilities as a clinician.  Unfortunately, this rarely if ever occurs.

 ... Whilst there were up-to-date evidence-based guidelines in place, we were concerned that these were not always being followed in maternity. This included FHR monitoring, VTE and early warning score guidelines. Staff were competent and understood the guidelines they were required to follow, however, lack of staffing and familiarity with the computer system (EPIC) made this difficult.

The point being missed here is that paper records required no massive multi-hundred page training manual in order to to perform basic functions such as the above.  The complexity of EHRs is costly, unnecessary, impairs clinicians and the solution is a massive scale back and simplification of these systems' complexity and scope.  Unfortunately, that, too is unlike to happen until the negative impacts become increasingly visible and intolerable - a meltdown I predict will occur, eventually.

... Since the introduction of EPIC, outcomes of people’s care and treatment was not robustly collected or monitored. For example, there was no maternity dashboard available since December 2014.

Again, spend £200m and have this result?  Something is seriously wrong here.  I suspect it is that personnel no longer had the time to perform monitoring, as they were likely distracted and struggling to keep afloat with more fundamental medical issues (like keeping major mishaps from occurring) using a complex and buggy EHR system.

That theory is likely confirmed by the following:

... At unit level we observed examples of excellent leadership principles; however, leadership of the directorate overall required improvement. This was because senior managers had not responded appropriately or in a timely way to known and serious safety risks, there was a general lack of service planning, and because key performance data was not being collected robustly and therefore not being analysed. We recognised that EPIC was the root cause of the problems with data collection, and that prior to its introduction in October 2014 many of the data collection issues were not apparent, however, improving this issue was not seen as a priority.

Management, I suspect, became complacent due to their infatuation with cybernetics and a belief that with a big-name EHR in place, operational ills were accounted for and they could relax.  (I've written of this phenomenon as the "syndrome of inappropriate overconfidence in computing.")  Management complacency, bad health IT and struggling clinicians is a very, very bad combination.

... Staff understood their responsibilities for safeguarding children, and acted to protect them from the risk of avoidable harm or abuse. There were enough medical staff but there were nursing shortages in some areas, such as in the day unit and in the neonatal unit. The new ‘EPIC’ (a records management system) computer system added to pressures on staff but effective temporary solutions helped to protect patients.

In other words, workarounds were used to get around the work-impeding EHR.  Workarounds introduce yet more risk.

... the electronic records system (EPIC) created significant numbers of delayed discharges that impacted on patients receiving end-of-life care.  ... Many staff said they had struggled with EPIC and it was time consuming. The specialist palliative care team found patients dropped off the system, so kept two lists to avoid losing patients.

One does not struggle with paper records.  (My current colleagues tell me the EHR struggle is non-ending.)  I further note that a computer system's rights, it appears, took precedence over patients' dying with dignity.

... While introducing EPIC, processes to deal with remaining paper records were unclear. For example, staff documented follow-up appointment requests on notepads. Paper records which were not stored in EPIC were inconsistently stored within the outpatients department. Inaccurate discharge summaries led to a risk that patients would not receive appropriate follow up care.

A fetish to totally eliminate paper, even where paper is the best medium for a purpose (e.g., as here:  http://cci.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=Cardiology%20story), creates major chaos and increases risk.

In conclusion, Your Highness, it might benefit your citizens (and those of the U.S.) if a national re-education programme were instituted to de-condition your leaders from unfettered belief in cybernetic miracles in medicine, a mental state they attain in large part due to mass EHR vendor and pundit propaganda.

A more sober mindset is recommended by your subject Shaun Goldfinch in "Pessimism, Computer Failure, and Information Systems Development in the Public Sector" (Public Administration Review 67;5:917-929, Sept/Oct. 2007, then at the University of Otago, New Zealand): 

The majority of information systems developments are unsuccessful. The larger the development, the more likely it will be unsuccessful. Despite the persistence of this problem for decades and the expenditure of vast sums of money, computer failure has received surprisingly little attention in the public administration literature. This article outlines the problems of enthusiasm and the problems of control, as well as the overwhelming complexity, that make the failure of large developments almost inevitable. Rather than the positive view found in much of the public administration literature, the author suggests a pessimism when it comes to information systems development. Aims for information technology should be modest ones, and in many cases, the risks, uncertainties, and probability of failure mean that new investments in technology are not justified. The author argues for a public official as a recalcitrant, suspicious, and skeptical adopter of IT.

Such a mindset would be helpful in preventing massive wastes of healthcare Pounds, Euros and Dollars better spent on patient care than on cybernetic pipe dreams.

Sincerely,

S. Silverstein, MD
Drexel University
Philadelphia, PA

------------------

Addendum:

I would like to hear from those in the know if my suspicions are correct.  Please leave comments.

-- SS
    Baca selengkapnya

    Thursday, 24 September 2015

    Turn That Door Around - A Physician Substantially Tied to the Pharmaceutical Industry Nominated to Run the FDA

    Turn That Door Around - A Physician Substantially Tied to the Pharmaceutical Industry Nominated to Run the FDA

    It seems to be the season of the revolving door in health care.  The latest version got some media attention, because it involves one of the most important health care leadership positions in the US government, the Director of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  However, the case actually seems much more serious than what the media has recently reported.

    The Basics

    For an introduction, we turn to the Wall Street Journal from September 15, 2015:

    President Barack Obama plans to nominate the prominent cardiologist and medical researcher Robert Califf as the next commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, the White House said Tuesday.

    Dr. Califf had been named the FDA’s deputy commissioner for medical products and tobacco—effectively the No. 2 post—in February. He joined the FDA from Duke University, where he had served as a professor of medicine, a leading pharmaceutical researcher and the vice chancellor for clinical and translational research.

    The new nomination got some rave reviews. For example, from the WSJ article,

    Francis Collins, director of the National Institutes of Health and a scientist who has worked with Dr. Califf for years, called this 'a fantastic nomination.'

    Then this in the NY Times (Sept 15, 2015):

    'He’s never forgotten that at his core he’s a doctor, and he cares deeply about providing evidence to help people take better care of patients,' said Dr. Robert Harrington, professor and chairman of the department of medicine at the Stanford University School of Medicine, who worked with Dr. Califf at Duke.

    Also, a MedPage Today article was entitled, "Califf Nomination for FDA Chief Gets Most High Marks," and included such testimonials as,

    'He has a very good understanding of industry and academia, and think that will serve him well,' Caleb Alexander, MD, co-director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Drug Safety and Effectiveness in Baltimore, told MedPage Today....

    Also, this from Dr Harlan Krumholz,

    He's a broad thinker and a very creative and visionary individual. He will be an outstanding choice.

    And this from Dr Sanjay Kaul,

    I can't think of a more qualified person than Dr. Califf to lead the FDA at the present time. He is an accomplished leader in cardiovascular disease research whose work has resulted in therapies that save lives and improve the quality of life for millions of patients.
    Is it time to break out the confetti yet?

    Conflicts of Interest a Fly in the Ointment?

    The only fly in the ointment was the matter of Dr Califf's ties to industry. The WSJ article included,

    Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Center for Health Research, a Washington-based group focusing on medical-product safety, questioned his ties to the drug industry.

    'Dr. Califf’s expertise and his close ties to the pharmaceutical industry are both well-known,' she said. 'His ties to industry have been a source of great concern to public-health experts when he was previously considered for FDA commissioner, and those ties raise important questions about this nomination.'

    The MedPage Today article noted that Public Citizen's Health Research Group stated,

    'During his tenure at Duke University, Califf racked up a long history of extensive financial ties to multiple drug and device companies, including Amgen, Astra-Zeneca, Eli Lilly, Johnson & Johnson, Merck Sharpe & Dohme and Sanofi-Aventis, to name a few,' Michael Carome, MD, the group's director, said in a statement. 'Strikingly, no FDA commissioner has had such close financial relationships with industries regulated by the agency prior to being appointed.'

    The MedPage Today article, however, then went on to undermine those concerns, implying that only fringe people like those at Public Citizen were really worried. 

    Most experts contacted by MedPage Today seemed to think Califf would not have a problem getting Senate confirmation. 'I expect him to be confirmed," said [Dr. Steven] Nissen. 'He is very well liked by people ... in both parties, and I would expect the nomination to go well.'

    'All signals suggest that Dr. Califf is well-respected on both sides of the political aisle,' Jay Wolfson, DrPH, JD, senior associate dean at the University of South Florida's Morsani College of Medicine, in Tampa, said in an email.

    'There are some who believe his relationship with [the drug industry] may be a problem, but most see it as a value-added factor in building a functional, more streamlined relationship with the industry in order to improve the speed with which truly effective and quality drugs and devices are made available, mitigate the excessive costs associated with pharmaceuticals, and influence policies and practices intended to improve health status.'

    Note that the experts were not all named, or their expertise described, the first two paragraphs were really about Dr Califf's political support, and the third paragraph clearly reflected the views of someone who thought that the FDA needs to have a lighter regulatory touch. 

    There was additional reporting about Dr Califf's conflicts of interest, but again with the effect of minimizing their importance.  The Wall Street Journal published a second article on September 18, 2015 which first reported,

    From 2009 through early 2015, Dr. Califf received consulting fees of roughly $205,000 from companies including Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co., GlaxoSmithKline PLC and one medical-device maker, records show. The payments are documented by the federal Open Payments database, and PharmaShine, a database of pharmaceutical disclosures operated by Obsidian Healthcare Disclosure Services LLC. Drug makers spent an additional $21,000 on travel, meals and other expenses for Dr. Califf, data show.

    But the article provided this counterpoint,

    Kevin Griffis, a spokesman for the Department of Health and Human Services, said Dr. Califf had ceased all work with drug makers once he was hired by the FDA and that he has gone through a rigorous screening process for potential conflicts of interest. Mr. Griffis said Dr. Califf had donated all the consulting fees he has received since the mid-2000s to nonprofit groups.

    'Dr. Robert Califf’s professional career has been dedicated to advancing biomedical research, including the rigorous evaluation of the safety, efficacy and appropriate use of both new medical products and those already on the market,' said Mr. Griffis, assistant secretary for public affairs at HHS.

    Note that Dr Califf already is at the FDA, in a position that I do not believe required Senate confirmation.  It is striking, however, how the agency's own public relations people have jumped to his defense now as a nominee who has to be confirmed by the Senate.  However, I suppose that had Dr Califf donated all this fees to a local soup kitchen, they could not be called much of a conflict of interest.  But Mr Griffis said "nonprofit groups," without specification, not "soup kitchens." And continue reading to find out more. 

    A simultaneous NY Times article enlarged a bit on Dr Califf's industry relationships,

    He has written scientific papers with pharmaceutical company researchers, and his financial disclosure form last year listed seven drug companies and a device maker that paid him for consulting and six others that partly supported his university salary, including Merck, Novartis and Eli Lilly. A conflict-of-interest section at the end of an article he wrote in the European Heart Journal last year declared financial support from more than 20 companies.

    However the NYT article also quoted Mr Griffis about the donations to "nonprofits," and added,

    A résumé studded with industry funding is not unusual in academic medicine, Dr. Califf’s supporters note. Doctors are paid consulting fees all the time, and universities routinely conduct clinical trials on behalf of companies. Those contracts help support university researchers’ salaries, a standard practice. Many emphasize that it does not imply an inherent conflict.

    His supporters contend that Dr. Califf’s vast experience in the clinical science world could be a major asset in his new post.

    Furthermore,

    Supporters and former colleagues say Dr. Califf’s background makes him perfectly suited to the job of commissioner. He has spent years improving the way clinical trials are conducted, coming up with groundbreaking trial designs for medicines against blood clots.

    'His integrity in scientific matters is impeccable, and his innovation in clinical trial design is legendary,' said Dr. Steven Nissen, a cardiologist at the Cleveland Clinic, who has been an outspoken critic of both the F.D.A. and drug companies.

    Even better,

    Dr. Califf is often in the gym on the StairMaster before 6 a.m., said a former colleague at Duke, Dr. Adrian Hernandez. He often invites younger doctors to join him in golf and has a passion for Duke basketball that he expresses by wearing the team colors on game days.

    How could anyone criticize a man who is at the gym at 6 AM?

    More seriously, note that while the recent reporting may bring up questions about Dr Califf's conflicts of interest in terms of financial relationships with drug, device and biotechnology companies when he was on the Duke faculty, all the reporting also included passages minimizing the importance of these conflicts.  To minimize the issue of conflicts of interest, articles cited unnamed experts, suggesting the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority; noted that the financial ties that were criticized are standard practice in academic health care, suggesting the logical fallacy of an appeal to common practice.  The articles also cited Dr Califf's positive attributes which may have been relevant to his work at the FDA, like knowledge of research, but were not related to the question of conflicts of interest. This suggests another appeal to authority, or something of a reverse ad hominem (pro hominem?) fallacy.  It seems odd that what appear to be straightforward journalistic reports of a presidential nomination included such attempts to defend the candidate.  Note further that many of these logical fallacies appeared not in quotes from Dr Califf's supporters, but in text apparently written by journalists (e.g., "industry funding is not unusual," "in the gym on the Stairmaster," etc.)

    Nonetheless, this is the state of play as of this moment.  The thrust of the media coverage suggested that Dr Califf is a brilliant physician and researcher, and while he as some ties to industry, they do not amount to much of a problem, except in the eyes of the likes of Public Citizen.


    If one digs deeper, however, there is more. When Dr Califf was appointed to his current FDA position in February, 2015, and years earlier when his name was first mentioned as a possible candidate to run the FDA, evidence appeared that his ties to pharmaceutical, biotechnology and device companies were much more serious than what the recent accounts suggested.  

    Where Does the Money from Industry Sponsored Research Grants Go? 

    The recent coverage of Dr Califf's nomination in the NY Times dismissed his multiple corporate research grants as common practice.  Yet in the TIME coverage of  his original appointment to the FDA in February, 2015, this reminder of the significance of corporate sponsored research grants appeared.

    Califf says his salary is contractually underwritten in part by several large pharmaceutical companies, including Merck, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly and Novartis.

    Note that apologists for physician and academician interaction with industry often claim that industry funding of research grants that does not go directly to individuals does not cause important conflicts of interest. In one sentence, however, this article underlined how these grants support academic salaries, and hence lead to the dependency that is at the heart of conflicted relationships.

    As we posted in 2007, academic medical institutions now depend on "external," including corporate research funding to support their research faculty's salaries, and via "overhead," their overall budgets.  Dr Lee Goldman, then Dean and Executive Vice President at Columbia University, called faculty who bring in a lot of grant money "tax payers," who earn gratitude, and likely bonuses and perks.  Thus Dr Califf's multiple large corporate research grants cannot be completely dismissed as conflicts of interest. 


    A More Extensive List of Industry Relationships

    Furthermore, a relatively obscure February, 2015, report from MDDIOnline noted that Dr Califf had more industry relationships than were reported this month,

    Conflict of interest disclosures dating back to 2007 made public by the DCRI show that Califf has been paid for consulting or other services provided to a number of medical device pharmaceutical, and biotech companies, including Medtronic, Acumed, Bayer Healthcare, Merck, Novartis, Roche, GlaxoSmithKline, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Sanofi-Aventis, and Eli Lilly & Co. Califf also disclosed that he held equity in two pharmaceutical companies—Boulder-based N30 Pharmaceuticals and South San Francisco, CA-based Portola Pharmaceuticals—as recently as 2014. Califf retired from Portola’s board of directors January 26, according to a press release from the company.
    A somewhat more obscure commentary by Martha Rosenberg in OpEdNews provided even more extensive listings of Dr Califf's industry relationships. And it suggested having a look at the disclosures he has made in the past in medical journal articles. A statement in a 2013 JAMA commentary was particularly telling,


    Dr Califf receives research grants that partially support his salary from Amylin, Johnson & Johnson, Scios, Merck/Schering-Plough, Schering-Plough Research Institute, Novartis Pharma, Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation, Aterovax, Bayer, Roche, and Lilly; all grants are paid to Duke University. Dr Califf also consults for TheHeart.org, Johnson & Johnson, Scios, Kowa Research Institute, Nile, Parkview, Orexigen Therapeutics, Pozen, WebMD, Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation, AstraZeneca, Bayer/Ortho-McNeil, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Boehringer Ingelheim, Daiichi Sankyo, Gilead, GlaxoSmithKline, Li Ka Shing Knowledge Institute, Medtronic, Merck, Novartis, sanofi-aventis, XOMA, University of Florida, Pfizer, Roche, Servier International, DSI-Lilly, Janssen R&D, CV Sight, Regeneron, and Gambro; all income from these consultancies is donated to nonprofit organizations, with most going to the clinical research fellowship fund of the Duke Clinical Research Institute. Dr Califf holds equity in Nitrox LLC, N30 Pharma, and Portola.

    These lists of corporations from which Dr Califf got salary support and consulting fees are much longer than previous lists.  He acknowledged 13 commercial research sponsors, and consulted for 32 organizations, most of which were pharmaceutical companies.  Again, given that the salary support and overhead likely supplied by corporate research grants do suggest conflicts of interest, Dr Califf may have had many more of these sorts of conflicts than current reports implied  

    A Seat on a Pharmaceutical Company Board of Directors

    Note that the MDDIOnline article mentioned that Dr Califf was a member of the board of directors of Portola Pharmaceuticals. That was a significant source of income.  According to the Portola Pharmaceuticals 2015 proxy statement, Dr Califf received $259,623 in cash and stock options from the company in 2014.  I cannot find anything to suggest that this payment did not go directly to him.  This position, and the money it paid were not mentioned in the recent coverage. That payment alone seems to represent a major conflict of interest.

    However, being on the board of directors of a health care corporation presents a deeper conflict than that produced by a simple payment of money or stock options, no matter how large. In 2006, we discussed corporate directorships as a new and important species of conflict of interest for medical academics.  As we have previously posted, corporate directors have fiduciary responsibilities to the company and its shareholders to support its financial success.  They are supposed to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders" [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]   Thus corporate directors have a much more significant commitment to the corporation than do corporate consultants, or researchers supported by corporate grants. 

    Where Did Those Donated Consulting Payments Go?

    Also note that the disclosure statement in the JAMA article mentioned that most of the consulting payments Dr Califf received went to the clinical research fellowship of the Duke Clinical Research Institute (DCRI).  Dr Califf was the first director of DCRI, 

    So, while Dr Califf apparently did donate the consulting fees to a non-profit organization, that organization actually was part of Duke, and an organization that Dr Califf once led. It appears likely that Dr Califf benefited at least indirectly in terms of institutional gratitude and reputation from these consulting fees that he donated to his own institution.  So it appears that Dr Califf's donations of his consulting fees did not reduce the conflicts of interest generated by these fees to the extent suggested by the current FDA spokesperson and current media reports. 

    Payments for "Educational Activities" 

    Finally, perusal of disclosures of Dr Califf's commercial relationships made by the Duke Clinical Research Institute for the years 2010-2015 showed that he received payments for "educational activities" in 2011 from Amylin.  Information about earlier years is not available on this site, but in 2009, Dr Daniel Carlat wrote this about Dr Califf's then rumored candidacy for leadership of the FDA in the Carlat Psychiatry Blog,

    look at these industry disclosures. He took money—lots of money--from 18 different pharmaceutical or device firms. Most of this was not for research, but for consulting and speaking, including CME. If Dr. Califf believes that it is ethical for physicians to help drug companies market their products, that’s his own business. But to elevate him to a position in which he is the country’s chief watchdog over unsafe medications and foods seems a dangerous move. With money from 18 drug companies padding his bank account, he will presumably spend most of his FDA career recusing himself from crucial decisions. Not a good idea.


    There has been no mention of Dr Califf being a paid speaker for pharmaceutical companies in any of the recent reporting.  Dr Carlat implied that Dr Califf was paid to speak to further marketing objectives of pharmaceutical companies, that is, was giving "drug talks."  Since the publication of "Dr Drug Rep" in the New York Times in 2007, authored by Dr Carlat, the public has learned that such talks mainly include content provided by the pharmaceutical companies, and are meant by the companies as marketing exercises.  From that case we also learned that physicians who deviate from the marketing message do not last long on speakers' bureaus.  (See posts here and here.)

    Paid speakers may be regarded by pharmaceutical companies as paid "key opinion leaders," KOLs, who serve a marketing function in the guise of academics. As noted here and here, the companies buying their services may believe they have bought the services of sales people.    Evidence about key opinion leaders actually performing like marketers has come from documents revealed during litigation (e.g., see this recent example of a huge monetary settlement made of charges that GlaxoSmithKline, a major multinational drug company committed fraud among other things, and in the course of its unethical activities used key opinion leaders as marketers).   Also, see the Neurontin marketing plan (see post here), and the Lexapro marketing plan (see post here) for examples of how company keaders view key opinion leaders as marketers.

    So the revelation that Dr Califf received corporate payments for "education" suggests a bigger commitment to corporate marketing objectives than has previously been revealed.  

    Summary

    So, looking at not only current media reports, but media reports from earlier this year, and also proxy statements, the fine print of journal articles, and old blog posts, it appears that Dr Robert Califf really did have very substantial financial interactions with the drug, device and biotechnology industry.  These interactions likely underwrote his salary and his standing with the leaders of his former employer, Duke University.  Dr Califf seemed to be a paid speaker for drug companies on at least two occasions, suggesting that the companies may have put him in a covert marketing role, or viewed him as a paid key opinion leader.  Finally,  Dr Califf served on the board of directors of one drug company, a much deeper commitment than being a sponsored researcher or consultant.

    Thus Dr Califf really appears to be one of the most, if not the most drug, device and biotechnology industry connected individual ever nominated to lead the agency that is the most important regulator of the US drug, device and biotechnology industry.  Some of his connections, particularly his previous membership on a pharmaceutical company board, and his previous roles as a paid pharmaceutical speaker, suggested not only financial relationships, but commitments to companies' financial and marketing goals.  These appear to be major conflicts of interest vis a vis Dr Califf's current leadership position at the FDA, and his nomination to be the ultimate leader of this regulatory agency.  This is the revolving door writ large.

    As we have said very recently,  the revolving door can be veiwed as a species of conflict of interest.  Government officials who can look forward to extremely lucrative employment in health care industry may be much more inclined to seem friendly to the industry while in office.  Government officials who just came from industry are likely to maintain their industry mindset and be mindful of their industry friends.

    Worse, some experts have suggested that the revolving door is in fact corruption.  As we noted here, the experts from the distinguished European anti-corruption group U4 wrote,


    The literature makes clear that the revolving door process is a source of valuable political connections for private firms. But it generates corruption risks and has strong distortionary effects on the economy, especially when this power is concentrated within a few firms.
    Furthermore, the ongoing and increasing revolving door phenomenon clearly suggests excess coziness between industry and government, now to the extent that industry and government leaders of health care are becoming interchangeable.  This suggests that health care is increasingly run by this cozy ingroup, who very likely put their own interests ahead of those of patients and the public.

    The continuing egregiousness of the revolving door in health care shows how health care leadership can play mutually beneficial games, regardless of the their effects on patients' and the public's health.  Once again, true health care reform would cut the ties between government and corporate leaders and their cronies that have lead to government of, for and by corporate executives rather than the people at large.

    ADDENDUM (28 September, 2015) - This post has been republished on the Naked Capitalism blog,  and OpEdNews.

    ADDENDUM (28 September, 2015) - See also more detail on Dr Califf's activities on the Portola board on the PEU Report blog
    Baca selengkapnya